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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role of discretion in determining the evolving structures of 
Indonesia’s overseas labour migration programme. Focusing on the turbulent period 
following the establishment of the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of 
Overseas Indonesian Workers in 2007, the study examines the impact of intra-state conflict 
on the workings of the bureaucracy centrally, in five other locations in Indonesia and in 
three Asian host countries. Each of these case studies engages with the everyday strategies 
of bureaucrats as they seek to navigate the place-specific ways in which the legal 
framework of the programme collide with the objectives of the formal institutions 
competing for control over its implementation.  
 
In all of these cases, discretion emerges as a key resource for policymakers and 
administrators. At the highest level, it serves as a conduit for the ambitions of senior 
officials competing for influence in the brave new world of democratic Indonesia. For 
grassroots bureaucrats, it is a useful tool in the management of the complex – and 
sometimes conflicting – demands of managing the overseas labour migration programme 
during a period of prolonged inter-agency conflict. In effect, then, discretion serves as a 
kind of ‘institutional fix’ in situations where institutions begin to break down.  
 
In empirical terms, the thesis reveals the extent to which local context influences the level 
of discretion available to individual bureaucrats and the decisions they ultimately make. At 
a theoretical level, the study explains how that discretion draws on – and reinforces – 
misalignments between state institutions and the formal legal structures that govern them, 
while at the same time making it possible for those institutions to continue operating under 
difficult circumstances. In doing so, it confirms – in contradiction to the literature – that 
while discretion can indeed contribute to corruption and other forms of illegality, it can 
also play a positive role in the maintenance of state function.
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Introduction 
Indonesian bureaucrats have a reputation for subverting procedure, for example, by 
granting exemptions in return for bribes or turning a blind eye to inconvenient facts. 
Studies indicate that corruption, collusion and nepotism effectively impose informal taxes 
on public services and private activity.1 The principal challenge is that the illegal and 
(semi-)covert nature of corruption makes regular and direct assessment of it impossible.2 
At the same time, however, illegality, including corruption, is ubiquitous in Indonesia3 – its 
existence, in fact, utterly predictable. When examining particular cases within state 
agencies, the ‘how’ question is answered relatively easily by identifying precisely who 
authorized a particular instance of illegal activity. More complicated, however, is 
answering questions about ‘why’ because illegal activity has individual and systemic 
dimensions. While it is not possible to fully understand the motivations for illegal acts, it is 
certainly possible to identify nuances and patterns in the exercise of illegality through 
attention to those with authority to support – or turn a blind eye to – it within the 
bureaucracy. 
 
Major strategies to reduce corrupt practices aim to limit government officials’ discretion 
concerning the use of resources and ability to extract fees in exchange for their services.4 
According to the literature, elimination of the capacity for discretionary decision-making 
ought to make the various forms of corruption associated with it disappear, or at least be 
reduced.5 The working assumption here is that opportunities to profit personally from 
government business are limited when government officials are deprived of the ability to 
use discretion, for example, when awarding procurement contracts or selecting private 
                                                          
1 Olken, B, "Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality," Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009): 
1. 
2 "Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality," Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009): 1. 
3 Aspinall, E and G van Klinken, The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van 
Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). 
4 Hamilton-Hart, N, "Anti-corruption strategies in Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies 37, no. 1 (2001): 67. 
5 Rose-Ackerman, S, Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 39-42. 
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partners for the outsourcing of government services. Elimination of these forms of 
discretionary capacity may take some element of choice away from how government 
officials perform their administrative roles. However, what of cases ‘where it is practically 
impossible to follow mechanically any particular algebraic formula’ when determining 
what officials should do?6 In such situations, the rule-versus-discretion model for 
determining the level of corruption not only becomes problematic; it also draws attention to 
the fact that the model skews the broader understanding of discretion and its role in 
creating capacity to implement policy.7  
 
This study presents one such case in which discretion has generated opportunities for 
corruption, but has also served to maintain the viability of state agencies in the face of legal 
and institutional uncertainty. In the administration of Indonesia’s overseas labour migration 
programme, government officials have been shown to be corrupt and negligent in their 
interactions with migrant workers and the labour recruitment companies that recruit and 
deploy them. Government agencies have shown little interest in intervening against labour 
recruitment companies that routinely break laws designed to protect the well-being of 
migrant workers.8 Moreover, incarceration and the mental and physical abuse of intending 
migrants, especially women, is as much part of the system as the processes put in place by 
the government to regulate migrant flows. These processes focus on three major areas: the 
authorization of recruitment, the verification of labour migrants’ documents and the 
certification of vocational competencies. Corrupt and negligent practices are rife in all 
                                                          
6 Taylor, J, "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy 39 (1993): 195. 
7 Brietzke, P, "Administrative reform in Indonesia," in Corruption in Asia: rethinking the 
governance paradigm, ed. T Lindsey and H Dick (Sydney: Federation Press, 2002), 110. 
8 Lindquist, J, "The elementary school teacher, the thug and his grandmother: informal brokers and 
transnational migration from Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 85, no. 1 (2012); "Labour recruitment, 
circuits of capital and gendered mobility: reconceptualizing the Indonesian migration industry," 
Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010); Killias, O, "'Illegal' migration as resistance: legality, morality and 
coercion in Indonesian domestic worker migration to Malaysia," Asian Journal of Social Science 38, 
no. 6 (2010); "The politics of bondage in the recruitment, training and placement of Indonesian 
migrant domestic workers," Sociologus 2 (2009). 
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three.9 Government personnel often exempt labour recruitment companies from compliance 
with procedures, such as meeting minimum standards for health and competency or 
application deadlines for recruitment certificates. These failures to comply with the 
system’s own standards have contributed to the popular perception that those requirements 
can simply be waived for the right price.10  
 
Many academic studies describe these corrupt activities in analyses of the state’s 
involvement in migration processes.11 However, there is no comprehensive study of 
interactions between the various government agencies, units and individuals that make up 
the country’s migration bureaucracy.12 Where they engage with intra-state dynamics, 
existing studies generally do so as part of a broader analysis of the labour migration 
experience rather than focusing specifically on the internal politics of the bureaucracy.13 
These studies are usefully complemented by a detailed examination of the internal politics 
at play when illegal acts are performed in the context of the overseas labour migration 
programme. Such a study shifts the focus from the modus operandi of corruption – easily 
gleaned from other sources – to a deeper examination of the specific contextual and 
                                                          
9 International Organization for Migration (IOM). "Labour migration from Indonesia: an overview 
of Indonesian migration in selected destinations in Asia and the Middle East." Jakarta: International 
Organization for Migration, (2010). 
10 Human Rights Watch (HRW). "Maid to order: ending abuses against migrant domestic workers in 
Singapore." New York: Human Rights Watch, (7 December 2005). 
11 See, for example Silvey, R, "Unequal borders: Indonesian transnational migrants at immigration 
control," Geopolitics 12, no. 2 (2007); Ford, M and L Lyons, "Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' 
labour migration through an Indonesian border town," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E 
Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011); Killias, O, "'Illegal' migration as resistance: 
legality, morality and coercion in Indonesian domestic worker migration to Malaysia," Asian 
Journal of Social Science 38, no. 6 (2010). 
12 For a detailed discussion of how ‘migration bureaucracy’ is used to describe the overseas 
migration programme in The Philippines, see Rodriguez, R, Migrants for export: how the Philippine 
state brokers workers to the world (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
13 See Jones, S, Making money off migrants (Hong Kong: Asia 2000 and Centre for Asia Pacific 
Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, 2000); Tirtosudarmo, R, Mencari 
Indonesia: demografi-politik pasca-Soeharto (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2007); Ford, M, "After Nunukan: 
the regulation of Indonesian migration to Malaysia," in Divided we move: mobility, labour migration 
and border controls in Asia, ed. A Kaur and I Metcalfe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); 
Ford, M and L Lyons, "Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' labour migration through an Indonesian 
border town," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: 
KILTV, 2011). 
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institutional factors that enable and limit corrupt and negligent behaviour by officials 
tasked with managing the programme.  
 
This study provides a detailed examination of inter-agency conflict in the turbulent period 
between March 2007, when the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of 
Overseas Indonesian Workers (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia, BNP2TKI) was established, and October 2010, when the conflict was, at 
least temporarily, resolved. Before March 2007, migrants and labour recruitment 
companies engaged primarily with the Ministry of Manpower. With the establishment of 
the BNP2TKI, responsibility for much of the overseas labour migration programme was 
transferred to the new institution. Conflict ensued as the ministry fought to maintain 
influence over the programme. At the lowest point, the Minister for Manpower and the 
head of the BNP2TKI authorized personnel to duplicate services provided to labour 
recruitment companies. In Jakarta, the ministry set up a rival service to issue recruitment 
certificates, provide pre-departure training and finalize migrants’ permission to travel. 
Elsewhere, it authorized provincial governments to do the same. In response, the BNP2TKI 
instructed its offices in Jakarta and 18 other locations to ignore the ministry’s regulations 
and continue ‘business as usual’.  
 
The very fact that individual officials navigated the structures produced by these 
contradictory claims for authority to administer overseas migration underscores the central 
role of discretion in the production, maintenance and resolution of at least some intra-state 
conflict around interpretation of legal and policy frameworks. Taking this as a starting 
point, this study identifies institutional considerations in the generation of such conflict, 
including discipline and hierarchy that, as this study shows, can and do influence the 
decision-making of individual officials. In doing so, it does not seek to assess how inter-
agency conflict affects the state’s capacity to achieve particular objectives, the profitability 
of the migration business or the nature of migration experience. Rather, its purpose is to 
examine how different government bodies work to strengthen their respective positions in 
struggles for power and influence. It also analyses the various formal and informal 
arrangements that government officials put in place as part of attempts to negotiate gaps 
between institutional objectives and the scope of their formal legal authority.  
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The study begins with an institutional and legal history of the overseas labour migration 
programme, which provides the context of the conflict between the ministry and the 
BNP2TKI. It then examines the extent to which the conflict affected bureaucrats’ decisions 
about how to perform their roles in various ‘transit zones’ within Indonesia and in 
Indonesian consular offices in destination countries. In doing so, it illustrates how context 
directly influences both the level of discretion available to individual bureaucrats and the 
decisions they ultimately make. At a theoretical level, the study uses the experiences of 
these bureaucrats to explore the effects of misalignment between the state’s institutions and 
its formal legal structures on the exercise of discretion as a tactic for maintaining 
institutions’ functions in the face of uncertainty. As the study demonstrates, this 
misalignment not only adds an extra layer of complexity to decisions about the appropriate 
and legitimate accomplishment of bureaucratic tasks but also provides bureaucrats with a 
powerful resource to perform their roles despite the gap between the legal framework and 
institutional practice. 
Methodology 
This interdisciplinary study uses the case study method to explore the drivers and 
consequences of the institutional break down of the relationship between the Ministry of 
Manpower and the BNP2TKI. The case study method was selected because of its utility 
‘when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control 
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context’.14 The case study method recognizes the importance of the investigation of 
complex issues and explanation of how they relate to one another in a particular situation 
for the production of the exemplars required to test theory.15 In the context of this study, it 
makes it possible to analyse how the conflict played out in different locations in Indonesia 
and overseas. Providing detail for in-depth case studies in a single area of policymaking, 
                                                          
14 Yin, R, Case study research: design and methods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oakes and London: SAGE 
publications, 2003), 1. 
15 Flyvberg, B, "Five misunderstandings about case-study research," Qualitative Inquiry 12 (2006): 
219, 42. 
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the method in turn paves the way for a more general analysis of the role discretion plays 
within the state in contemporary Indonesia.  
 
Initial fieldwork began with a pilot case study in Surabaya, East Java, conducted in the 
three months between August and October 2009. Pilot sites are chosen for a range of 
reasons. Informants there ‘may be unusually congenial and accessible, or the site may be 
geographically convenient or may have an unusual amount of documentation of data’.16 
Alternatively, a site may represent ‘a most complicated case’17 that, once understood, can 
help predict scenarios in other locations. Multiple, lengthy conversations with the head of 
the programme’s technical implementation unit in Surabaya helped me develop an 
understanding of administrative challenges in that province and develop a research plan for 
the broader study. This interaction led me to formulate three propositions to guide data 
collection in other cities. First, I concluded that administrative challenges would depend 
heavily on context, and second, that conflict between central and provincial authorities 
would not be likely if a tier of government was missing from the administrative landscape 
(in the case of Surabaya, the central tier).18 Third, I noted that – if other cases were 
anything like Surabaya – provincial authorities may have more power over the 
administration of the overseas labour migration programme than central government 
agencies, despite provincial governments’ relatively weak position under 
decentralization.19 
                                                          
16 Yin, R, Case study research: design and methods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oakes and London: SAGE 
publications, 2003), 79. 
17 Case study research: design and methods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oakes and London: SAGE 
publications, 2003), 79. 
18 As detailed in Chapter Four, in Surabaya, the BNP2TKI’s unit was in fact subordinate to the 
provincial government’s manpower office as a consequence of the way in which decentralization 
was carried out. 
19 The decentralization programme transferred the bulk of administrative authority and the lion’s 
share of the state budget to city and district governments (the lowest sub-national tier). The 
intermediate and highest sub-national tier (provincial government) was designed to act as an 
administrative extension of the centre through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and perform a 
coordinative function in relation to the local authorities that directly administered the segment of 
population and territory under their jurisdiction. This has contributed to the popular perception that 
provincial government authorities are a redundant tier of government. For detailed studies of 
decentralization, see Aspinall, E and G Fealy, eds., Local power and politics in Indonesia: 
decentralisation and democratisation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 
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The multi-sited nature of my broader research design also enabled me to engage deeply 
with questions of scale.20 The concept of scale offers a useful way to better understand 
patterns in the nuances of the labour migration system as it operates in different locations. 
In the context of Indonesia, studies that show national laws are not implemented evenly 
across the country were instructive in deciding against the single-sited approach.21 Based 
on my study of the legal framework for the migration programme, I already had an 
understanding of how national and sub-national government agencies and units ought to 
divide administrative functions. Observing the daily practice of officials in a range of sites, 
where they perform their roles differently even though they are working in the same 
institution and legal context, enabled me to develop a comparative perspective on 
implementation. This, in turn, meant that I could identify the factors that influence the 
decisions bureaucrats routinely make about how to do their jobs. In short, a multi-scalar 
approach made it possible to engage more confidently with propositions concerning the 
impact of place-specific elements of context on the operation of the system. 
 
The ethnographic methodology I used in each of these sites enabled me to engage deeply 
with the community of officials stationed in disparate parts of the country. Multi-sited 
ethnographic research ‘is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or 
juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, 
physical presence’.22 My approach used a social network analysis model to recast those 
sites as nodes with formally replicated vertical and horizontal ties.23 It served as a mode of 
construction for collecting data from disparate but connected sites. Moreover, it gave me 
                                                          
20 Paasi, A, "Place and region: looking trough the prism of scale," Human Political Geography 28 
(2004): 536. 
21 Fougères, D, "Governing villages in Indonesia's coastal zone," in State of authority: the state in 
society in Indonesia, ed. G van Klinken and J Barker (New York: Southeast Asia Program 
Publications, 2009); Ford, M and L Lyons, "Smuggling cultures in the Indonesia-Singapore 
borderlands," in Transnational flows and permissive polities, ed. B Kalir and M Sur (Amsterdam: 
University of Amsterdam Press, 2012). 
22 Marcus, G, "Ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography," 
Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 105. 
23 Wasserman, S and K Faust, Social network analysis: methods and applications (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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access to a community of officials whose views and ways of doing things bore relation to 
one another, which allowed me to extrapolate patterns and identify idiosyncrasies in the 
system. While the heads of the BNP2TKI’s units in each site had a vertical relationship 
with the BNP2TKI in Jakarta, heads of regional manpower offices had no such tie with the 
ministry. Rather, they were subordinate to an entirely different tier of government, 
namely provincial authorities. In destination countries, meanwhile, labour attachés were 
structurally subordinate to the head of mission rather than to the ministry. In reality, 
however, social ties between different groups of officials in all field sites made the 
network far more complex, introducing an informal, horizontal dimension, which the 
multi-sited approach partly helped to expose.  
 
Identification of case study sites 
A number of possible case study sites, including Surabaya, were initially identified using 
government statistics. I also planned to gather data in Jakarta and Mataram, which along 
with Surabaya comprise the three largest administrative sites for the programme.24 I 
decided to base myself in Surabaya because it is approximately half way between Jakarta 
(also on Java) and Mataram (two islands east on Lombok), and because I had established 
networks with bureaucrats, former migrant workers and labour recruitment company 
owners in the city. I developed these networks while working for a migrant worker support 
organization in Hong Kong (2007-2008) and during a preliminary visit to Surabaya in 
December 2008. From Surabaya, I planned to conduct a series of fieldwork trips to 
Mataram for the purpose of gathering data about how and why the city had developed into 
the second largest transit zone for labour migrants in the country. I expected to make more 
frequent trips to Jakarta – the historical locus of administration for the programme, the 
transit point for the majority of overseas labour migrants, and the location of the ministry 
and the BNP2TKI – to directly observe those agencies’ duplication of services to migrants.  
 
                                                          
24 I used Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI statistics on the number of citizens to depart 
Indonesia for employment under overseas labour migration programme. 
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It became evident on my first trip to Jakarta that the situation was even more complex than 
I had anticipated. In addition to the main offices in Central and South Jakarta, the ministry 
and the BNP2TKI each operated a unit in Ciracas, East Jakarta, which duplicated some of 
the other’s services. To further complicate matters, there was a de facto division of 
administrative labour between these central agencies and a provincial government unit in 
Pasar Rebo, close to Depok. It was clear, then, that institutional arrangements in each field 
site were likely to differ far more than formal documents had led me to expect. As a 
consequence, I expanded the scope of my data collection to include two other 
administrative sites in Java (Semarang and Yogyakarta), three in mainland Sumatra (Banda 
Aceh, Medan and Pekanbaru), and two that share an international border with Malaysia 
and/or Singapore (Nunukan and Tanjung Pinang) to capture a structured picture of the 
variations in the system.25 The final decision to focus on these locations to the exclusion of 
eastern Indonesia was influenced by the fact that 75 per cent of the BNP2TKI’s units were 
located in western Indonesia, where 91 per cent of labour migrants were processed, 
whereas only 9 per cent were recorded in eastern Indonesia, where the BNP2TKI maintains 
units in Kupang, Makassar and Mataram.26  
 
The final geographical element of the study captures the transnational nature of the 
programme. Previous research in Hong Kong on relationships between the Indonesian 
consulate and migrant labour recruitment companies had convinced me of the importance 
of consular offices as a site of administration of the programme.27 In addition to returning 
to that field site, I travelled to Malaysia and Singapore, two other important Asian 
destinations for Indonesian migrant workers. In all three, I sought to build a comparative 
perspective about how systems for interacting with labour recruitment companies and 
                                                          
25 Refer to Appendix B to see these sites on a map of Indonesia and surrounding territories. 
26 Mataram records over 75 per cent of the departures processed in eastern Indonesia. For detailed 
studies of the recruitment industry in Lombok, see Barker, J et al., "Figures of Indonesian 
modernity," Indonesia 78 (2009); Lindquist, J, "Labour recruitment, circuits of capital and gendered 
mobility: reconceptualizing the Indonesian migration industry," Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010); 
"The elementary school teacher, the thug and his grandmother: informal brokers and transnational 
migration from Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 85, no. 1 (2012). 
27 This case study has since been published. See Palmer, W, "Public-private partnerships in the 
administration and control of Indonesian migrant labour in Hong Kong," Political Geography 34 
(2013). 
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handling labour migrants were set up and what role labour attachés played in handling 
particular cases. I endeavoured to understand the context in which consular officials 
operated by formally interviewing labour recruitment company owners, employers and 
migrant workers about their interactions with the Indonesian government in each of these 
destination countries. This approach mirrored my methodology in Indonesia, where I also 
sought perspectives from the recruitment industry and returned migrant workers. In these 
cases, such perspectives helped identify a fuller range of extraterritorial factors that either 
enabled consular officers to act or served to limit their ability to do so. 
Gaining access 
One of the most potentially difficult elements of this study was developing the kind of 
access that would enable me to closely observe the internal workings of the bureaucracy. 
Access to administrative circles can be facilitated in part by organizing the necessary 
research authorizations. Ultimately, however, researchers must complement this strategy by 
working through personal connections.28 As I developed my networks, such personal 
connections enabled me to collect information about processes and events not available in 
the public domain. Illegality is ubiquitous and its symptoms easily understood, but the kind 
of access this study required was such that it could probe into not just the ‘how’ questions, 
but also lines of inquiry that focussed on the ‘why’. The data that this combination of 
approaches yielded were always going to be a kind of ‘situated knowledge’, which is just 
as much a ‘product of the relationship’ between researcher and respondent than any 
concrete fact.29 But a key challenge was developing the kind of access and rapport that 
would facilitate the candid conversations with the system’s key stakeholders required to 
obtain that data. 
 
Initial access to senior personnel in the BNP2TKI was gained through the labour attaché at 
the Indonesian consulate in Hong Kong, whom I had met in the course of my earlier 
research. One of the first bureaucrats I met in Indonesia was Dr Endang Sulistyaningsih, 
                                                          
28 Adams, L, "The mascot researcher: identity, power, and knowledge in fieldwork," Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography 28 (1999): 359. 
29 "The mascot researcher: identity, power, and knowledge in fieldwork," Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography 28 (1999): 360. 
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then the Director of Promotion at the BNP2TKI in Jakarta. In late 2008, she mentioned the 
difficulties that her colleagues in the placement division had experienced over the past two 
years in their relationships with the Ministry of Manpower. Upon returning to Australia, I 
came to understand just how difficult those relationships had become. In the Indonesian 
press, I read that the minister had relegated the BNP2TKI to a place of insignificance by 
amending a regulation on implementation of the overseas labour migration programme to 
allow it to assume the BNP2TKI’s main administrative roles.30 In March 2009, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the regulation.31 However, it was clear from the media reporting 
that the ministry was resisting the Supreme Court’s judgement, and I wanted to know why. 
It was at this point that I finalized the empirical focus of the study. 
 
I subsequently gained access to other senior officials in Indonesia through staff in 
Indonesian embassies in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Links with the BNP2TKI were 
formalized a few months later when I commenced a Prime Minister’s Australia Asia 
Endeavour Award, which required affiliation to an organization in my area of research. In 
her role as my in-country supervisor, Dr Sulistyaningsih provided me with letters of 
introduction to present to BNP2TKI staff in the regions. It was unclear whether these 
letters would be accepted because Dr Sulistyaningsih was a middle-ranking official and in 
a division that had no direct links to regional units. These concerns proved to be 
unfounded, as the six units where I presented the letter made time to meet with me 
immediately or later on the same day.32 Dr Sulistyaningsih also facilitated contact with 
other officials I wanted to interview in the BNP2TKI’s head office. I was subsequently able 
to develop ongoing relationships with individuals who played key roles in the conflict with 
the ministry. Many of those to whom she introduced me had been former colleagues within 
the ministry, who also enjoyed the opportunity for career advancement that the BNP2TKI 
offered in 2007 and were very happy to discuss the quirks of their former roles.  
                                                          
30 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 22/MEN/XII/2008. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
31 Supreme Court. MA No. 5 P/HUM/2009, decided on 19 March 2009. 
32 In those meetings, they frequently asked how I knew Dr Sulistyaningsih and remarked that with a 
PhD she was one of the most highly qualified officials in the agency and predicted that she would 
achieve promotion to one of the most senior posts (which she did in 2011). A few respondents told 
me that they called her mobile to ask what they could discuss and if I could speak Indonesian. 
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Formal affiliation provided other advantages. I was alerted to an open hearing meeting in 
which lawmakers attempted to mediate the dispute between senior officials from the 
ministry and the BNP2TKI. In addition, I was invited to two multiple-day meetings where I 
saw first-hand how senior BNP2TKI officials represented the conflict to other government 
units in the regions (Pekanbaru, April 2010) and to external parties, such as civil society 
groups (Jakarta, December 2010). On the BNP2TKI’s recommendation, I was also invited 
to attend a policy forum at the Indonesian Institute of Social Science (Lembaga Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) later that month.33 The opportunity to attend these events 
enabled me to extend and deepen my networks, as it provided another setting in which to 
interact with former informants and to make first contact with those whom I had already 
planned to interview at a later date. It also enabled observation of BNP2TKI staff in a 
range of contexts. I took note of differences in how they communicated about the conflict 
to different groups, and the differences in how they explained various problems in private 
and then in the presence of their colleagues. 
 
My affiliation to the BNP2TKI was also useful when contacting other government 
departments in Jakarta and when dealing with provincial authorities. In terms of access to 
ministry officials, it did not pose a problem as I had established contact through the 
Indonesian labour attachés in Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. It was important, 
though, to underplay the connection when dealing with the ministry. The experience of 
Anna Guevarra, an American Filipina who conducted fieldwork in The Philippines, was 
instructive here. Her identity as a fellow Filipino facilitated access to her target community, 
but at the same time complicated her role as independent researcher, making it more 
difficult to earn her respondents’ trust.34 I expected to experience this kind of complication 
as a result of my affiliation with the BNP2TKI. In order to avoid it, I emphasized my 
                                                          
33 I would later learn that Indonesian government agencies condensed seminars and study tours into 
December each year because it was the last month of the annual budget cycle. Unspent funds had to 
be handed back to the Ministry of Finance, which could affect their chances of receiving the same or 
much larger allocation the following year. 
34 Guevarra, A, "The balikbayan researcher: negotiating vulnerability in fieldwork with Filipino 
labor brokers," Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 35, no. 5 (2006): 548. 
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identity as a university researcher with ministry personnel and made certain to demonstrate 
that I understood their point of view.  
Interviews 
As implied in the discussion above, interviewees were identified using a targeted snowball 
technique. In most cases, I contacted respondents directly. In some, however, stakeholders 
who thought that their views deserved consideration contacted me. For example, I was 
contacted by an official from the BNP2TKI’s implementation unit in Banda Aceh who had 
heard that I had interviewed officials in the provincial and city government. In another 
case, I was contacted on Facebook by a labour recruitment company owner who heard 
from his professional association that I was interested in gathering recruitment industry 
perspectives.35 These contacts constituted a minority of my respondents, as I started 
fieldwork with a list of core government agencies, units, positions and private individuals 
whose point of view and activity it was crucial to understand for the purpose of this thesis. 
It was possible to identify these respondents because information concerning them is 
publicly available.36 
 
Informal conversations during chance encounters added to the richness of data collected. 
For example, at the immigration desk in Surabaya International Airport, I was informed of 
differences between the administration of migrant workers heading to Malaysia and those 
going to other destinations. This alerted me to a deviation from procedure in East Java that 
had not been mentioned in formal interviews. In Kuala Lumpur and Yogyakarta, I met 
migrant workers in boarding rooms as we waited for international flights. This gave me an 
opportunity to chat with them about the programme’s administration as they had just 
experienced it. In Singapore, I checked in behind a young woman who had been 
unexpectedly fired and immediately taken to the airport by her labour recruitment 
                                                          
35 Criticizing me for not immediately adding him as a ‘friend’, he pointed out that our ‘mutual 
friends’ on Facebook included employment company owners, senior government officials in the 
ministry and BNP2TKI as well as the three labour attachés I had interviewed. This topic of ‘mutual 
friends’ frequently featured in conversations with people whom I meet for a second or subsequent 
interview. 
36 To comply with the heightened requirements for confidentiality on such a sensitive topic, I have 
not cited interviews in the body of this study. A list of interviewees can be found in Appendix A. 
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company. I helped her fill out the landing card for arrival in Jakarta, and later watched a 
BNP2TKI staff member pull her toward the special area for processing migrant workers. 
That night we spoke on the phone and she explained that the BNP2TKI driver had 
demanded an illegal fee in return for ensuring that she arrived home safely. Other such 
encounters included conversations with migrant workers on the ferry between Nunukan 
and Tawau and Johor Bahru and Tanjung Pinang as well as many taxi drivers in Jakarta. 
These unplanned conversations always provided valuable insights into how individuals 
negotiated their way through and around the system.  
 
My competence in Indonesian enabled me to develop much closer relationships with key 
informants than would have been possible had I required an interpreter. This experience 
resonates with theories about participant observation, which encourage researchers to use 
the local language and engage through informal interaction.37 It was largely for this 
purpose that I ceased recording interviews. While my first respondent consented to having 
her responses taped, the second interviewee visibly lost enthusiasm after I explained my 
wish to record the conversation. As my line of questioning developed to include requests to 
divulge information that was not in the public domain, this respondent asked me to turn off 
the recorder so that he could talk more openly about internal politics around administration 
of the programme. Frequently, I found that compromises such as these were necessary to 
take fullest advantage of direct contact that my competence in Indonesian enabled. They 
helped to develop rappor with respondents that was crucial for obtaining relevant and 
useful data for this study. 
 
A major risk associated with this method is that of ‘going native’.38 I managed this risk by 
ensuring that I not only noted the ‘explicit’, such as accounts communicated directly to me 
by respondents,39 but also the ‘tacit’, a term that ethnographers use to describe forms of 
knowledge that result from enculturation, whereby researchers come to adopt the 
perspective of their respondents.40 Some degree of enculturation is inevitable, but its 
                                                          
37 DeWalt, K and B DeWalt, Participant observation: a guide for fieldworkers, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Altamira Press, 2011), 4. 
38 Participant observation: a guide for fieldworkers, 2nd ed. (New York: Altamira Press, 2011), 11. 
39 Participant observation: a guide for fieldworkers, 2nd ed. (New York: Altamira Press, 2011), 1. 
40 Participant observation: a guide for fieldworkers, 2nd ed. (New York: Altamira Press, 2011), 4. 
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negative effects such as bias can be mitigated by careful treatment of data. I problematized 
implicit knowledge developed through regular and sustained contact with BNP2TKI 
personnel in my field notes, including the impression that the ministry had no interest in 
meeting the needs of labour migrants. I did this by writing up short, critical analyses in 
which I identified supporting and countering evidence soon after each interview. These 
analyses were complemented by the use of a ‘he/she’ narrative technique, which recorded 
respondents’ perspectives in third person.41 I then used qualitative analysis software to 
mine the field notes for patterns that were not intuitive at the time such as changes in 
narratives of key informants. Together, these methods guarded against risk of bias in the 
final analysis. 
Primary and secondary documentary sources 
Primary documentary sources were crucial for understanding how the overseas labour 
migration programme evolved and was administered. After reading academic studies that 
offered detail about the programme’s institutional history,42 I worked through Indonesian 
government policy documents from the 1970s, 80s and 90s to determine when adjustments 
were made to the programme.43 Knowing when it was administered through a division, 
centre, directorate, directorate-general or stand-alone agency was essential for narrowing 
the search for relevant presidential decrees. To complement this analysis, I developed a 
second timeline that included details of relevant laws, regulations, decrees and policies. 
Together, these tools allowed me to identify possible events that motivated their 
                                                          
41 Emerson, R, R Fretz, and L Shaw, Writing ethnographic fieldnotes (London and Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 39. 
42 Tirtosudarmo, R, Mencari Indonesia: demografi-politik pasca-Soeharto (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 
2007); Cremer, G. "Kebijaksanaan pengiriman tenaga kerja Indonesia ke luar negeri: keadaannya 
sekarang dan prospeknya." Jakarta: Research and Documentation Centre for Manpower and 
Development - Yayasan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
(1988): 24; "Deployment of Indonesian migrants in the Middle East: present situation and 
prospects," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 24, no. 3 (1988); Silvey, R, "Transnational 
domestication: state power and Indonesian migrant women in Saudi Arabia," Political Geography 
23 (2004); Jones, S, Making money off migrants (Hong Kong: Asia 2000 and Centre for Asia Pacific 
Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, 2000). 
43 Australian libraries hold many Indonesian government policy documents that would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in Indonesia, as they have been lost, destroyed and stolen from 
the ministry’s library. 
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promulgation. As a starting point, I developed a third timeline of events I extracted from 
the annual Asia Survey publication on Indonesia, which recaps internal economic, political, 
social and external developments for the year. This helped situate the institutional and legal 
history of the overseas labour migration programme in a broader context. 
 
Having reconstructed the programme’s history, I built yet another timeline of media reports 
that involved either the ministry or the BNP2TKI during the period under study. I then used 
this timeline to check my respondents’ version of events. In the field, I discovered that the 
BNP2TKI employed a team of former journalists to help communicate the agency’s 
activities and position to the public. Based on this information, I expected that newspapers 
with links to those former journalists, such as Seputar Indonesia and Detik.com, may have 
been more accessible (and perhaps more amenable to publishing pieces presenting the 
BNP2TKI’s version of events) than other media outlets.44 I sought to minimize the bias that 
this might introduce to my analysis by reading two major English medium newspapers 
(The Jakarta Globe and The Jakarta Post) and two major Indonesian newspapers (Kompas 
and Republika), as I expected the BNP2TKI to have weaker links to the larger media 
outlets. An analysis of these media revealed that they also reproduced material generated 
by the BNP2TKI’s public relations division. Nevertheless, newspaper sources provided a 
way of cross-checking when events occurred and how the BNP2TKI sought to present 
them in the public domain. 
 
I also reviewed over 1,000 Indonesian government documents that related to the overseas 
labour migration programme. In addition to the regulations and decrees that pertained to 
political organization of the programme, I examined documents that pertained to 
implementation matters sourced from the BNP2TKI and its regional units, the Ministry of 
Manpower, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provincial 
governments and the Supreme Court. The large majority of these documents were 
communication between these government units, which were useful for checking and 
                                                          
44 Another factor that encouraged me to think critically about these publications is the ‘envelope 
culture’ whereby those with something to say – or hide – make cash payments to reporters. See 
Aspinall, E and G van Klinken, "Introduction: the state and illegality in Indonesia," in The state and 
illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011), 16. 
 
17 
 
 
correcting details provided by informants, such as dates. I became aware of the necessity of 
double checking these details against a range of sources after I watched a government 
official backdate a document to secure a budget allocation for an event that he had decided 
to hold the next day. Such irregularities notwithstanding, it was these documents that 
ministry and BNP2TKI officials cited in media interviews and in meetings with lawmakers. 
This documentary chain of evidence provided an alternative vantage point to complement 
the informal narrative that I assembled through interviews with those involved. 
Limitation and gaps 
 
This study focuses on the relationships between different parts of the bureaucracy and on 
individual bureaucrats’ motivations for action. It is not an account of how Indonesian 
citizens experience the migration system. I have referenced the literature on the latter 
where it demonstrates that the administration and politics around implementation have 
produced a particularly exploitative tendency for labour migrants – and especially women – 
in the system. The thesis thus does not include a sustained examination of the nexus 
between the migration system and exploitation of migrants. For similar reasons, the thesis 
does not attempt to make policy prescriptions about how to improve the lot of migrant 
workers. The existing literature already makes a significant contribution with this objective 
in mind. Where this study makes a contribution to policy, it is through providing more 
material to inform the kinds of recommendations that will gain traction with policymakers 
and encourage them to implement a fairer system for Indonesia’s labour migrants. 
 
Another limitation of this study is that it does not examine every major administrative site 
of the overseas labour migration programme, as it was not feasible to visit all 18 cities 
where the BNP2TKI operated regional units. Rather, the study captured and presented a 
snapshot of implementation in a limited number of strategically selected locations so as to 
illustrate the remarkable heterogeneity of the system. A benefit of this selective approach is 
that it lends itself as a research agenda for the future examination of a wide range of 
government programmes in Indonesia. Of particular interest to researchers at the time this 
study was undertaken was the impact that regime change has had on the state’s capacity 
and commitment to provide services in the education, health and labour policy areas. The 
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multi-sited and cross-scalar approach used in this study to examine the relationships 
between different parts of the bureaucracy and on individuals’ motivations for action as 
they pertain to migration systems could also be used to work out how and why certain 
programmes enjoy greater or lesser degrees of success across the country. 
 
A third limitation is that this study deals exclusively with the western part of Indonesia, 
excluding some of the country’s poorest regions. Eastern Indonesia is much less densely 
populated than the west and the islands lie much further away from the international 
borders that Indonesian citizens frequently cross in search of work. However, this is not to 
say that Eastern Indonesians do not migrate to Malaysia, for example, to look for work. 
They do; however, the majority do not do so through the government’s overseas labour 
migration programme. Of those who are recorded, 75 per cent are processed in Mataram, 
the capital city of the westernmost island in Eastern Indonesia. This focus limited data 
collection to the extent that it does not enable conclusions about how and why state 
formation as it pertained to development of the overseas labour migration programme 
changed not just over time but also across the entirety of Indonesian territory. Further 
research work with a focus on Eastern Indonesia has the potential to reveal details about 
the politics of administering labour migration to East Malaysia, East Timor and Papua New 
Guinea. 
 
It is also important to note that the study focuses squarely on the programme’s operation in 
urban areas in the final stages of the pre-departure process. It does not examine in detail the 
relationship between government agencies and the motivations of individuals at the stages 
where labour migrants are recruited and registered, which mostly takes place in rural areas 
and always involves a combination of direct and indirect interaction with the relevant local 
government office. Interview data was collected in a range of rural areas in East Java, but 
was omitted from the thesis because on the basis of this small sample it was not possible to 
draw rigorous, evidence-based conclusions about the nexus between recruitment and 
administration in the 150 or so local government jurisdictions that fell within the 
geographic scope of this study. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the chapter on administration of the overseas labour 
migration programme from within Indonesian consular offices draws exclusively on data 
collected in the Asia-Pacific region. Attention to the politics around implementation of the 
programme in the Gulf region would have yielded more data about the factors that drove 
the Ministry of Manpower and the BNP2TKI to compete with each other for control of the 
programme between 2007 and 2010. Discussion of the role and work of Indonesian labour 
attachés in Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore provides a starting point for a wider, 
comparative analysis of implementation in the Gulf as well as certain parts of Africa, the 
Americas, Europe and Oceania. 
The structure of the thesis 
Chapter One presents the theoretical framework of the thesis, which distinguishes between 
institutions and the law as two major components within the state’s broader architecture. 
This provides a means of focussing specifically on alignments and tensions between the 
state’s constituent parts and a lens through which to interpret the relationship between 
them. Its subsequent examination of how institutional structures, distance and discretion 
create differentiation within the state, meanwhile, demonstrates that the idea of discretion 
has not featured strongly enough in accounts of the workings of the modern state. The final 
section of this chapter discusses situations in which formal institutions break down, 
drawing on examples of administrative culture that have developed a deep informal 
dimension in response to deficiencies in formal structures.  
 
Chapter Two provides a history of the institutional and legal evolution of Indonesia’s 
overseas labour migration programme in its changing economic and political context. The 
first section shows that state infrastructure grew around international labour migration in 
the context of attempts to address problems in the Indonesian economy. This motivation 
led to the development of structures that encouraged the rise of a purpose-specific 
recruitment industry, which in turn fuelled an increasingly authoritarian approach within 
the programme as officials worked to accommodate private sector interests in return for 
access to their economic resources. Second, the chapter shows how the context shifted in 
the late 1980s, prompting further adjustments to bring the programme more in line with the 
trend toward greater economic and political liberalization that characterized the years that 
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followed. This section also explains how the consequences of the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis made meaningful reform difficult in the period immediately following the 
resignation of President Suharto in 1998. The final section of the chapter documents 
changes over the nine years before the BNP2TKI took control of a programme that was 
formerly the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Manpower. 
 
Having set up the context of the struggle between the ministry and the BNP2TKI, the 
following three chapters show how the institutions tasked with developing and managing 
the overseas labour migration programme responded to the conflict. Organized 
geographically (centre, periphery, extra-territory), these contributions examine the 
operationalization of discretion as a strategy for achieving personal, but also institutional 
interests. Focusing on institutional conflict in Jakarta, Chapter Three uses this single site to 
analyse the interests and actions that set the ministry and BNP2TKI on a path through 
rivalry to eventual compromise between 2007 and 2010. Chapter Four shows how the 
conflict played out in six sites in Indonesia’s periphery, while Chapter Five shows how 
labour attachés, operating a long way from Jakarta, responded to the resulting policy 
vacuum, paying close attention to their exercise of discretion in their handling of particular 
migrant worker cases. 
 
Chapter Three presents a worm’s eye view of the dynamics of the relationship between the 
ministry and the BNP2TKI between January 2007 and October 2010. The chapter starts 
with an analysis of the factors that initially drove the two government agencies into 
conflict. This first section reveals that disagreement concerning their respective roles as 
operator or regulator, access to labour recruitment companies as an economic resource, and 
the career advancement ambitions of bureaucrats fuelled the conflict. The chapter then 
describes the phase in which the agencies duplicated services, with a focus on the 
consequences of duplication for administration of the programme in Jakarta. The 
discussion examines judicial and legislative interventions in the dispute as well as the way 
in which the ministry and the BNP2TKI engaged with the public in a battle for popular 
support. Its final section begins with a discussion of the event at which the ministry and the 
BNP2TKI agreed to seek a compromise, explaining the president’s role and the 
implications of past staffing decisions for those negotiations. It ends with an analysis of the 
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events that precipitated a speedy closure of the most obvious gaps between the legal 
framework and institutional practice in this policy area. 
 
Chapter Four uses one of the many dilemmas that this conflict created for bureaucrats as a 
starting point for six case studies on how the conflict was accommodated in the regions. 
The BNP2TKI issued notice that in January 2010 labour recruitment companies must 
organize overseas identity cards for migrant workers. These identity cards could be 
obtained at its units in 21 locations across the country. A contradictory notice was issued 
by the ministry, which instructed companies to arrange for the documents to be issued at its 
unit in Jakarta or by a provincial government office. The case studies presented in this 
chapter use the BNP2TKI’s regional institutions and their position in each particular site as 
the unit of analysis to explain why the consequences of these conflicting policies differed 
from place to place. The Jakarta and Tanjung Pinang cases reveal that bureaucrats in some 
locations prioritized their horizontal relationships with officials in other government 
agencies over their relationship with Jakarta. However, Medan and Semarang show that 
scale-related elements, such as tier of government, may trump place-specific factors, such 
as collegiality. The third set of case studies describes the different institutional fixes that 
emerged in Nunukan and Surabaya, where an institutional layer was missing. 
 
Chapter Five analyses the role that Indonesian consular officers played in setting up 
systems to deal with labour migration in Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore during 
the period examined in Chapters Three and Four. The chapter is divided into two sections, 
the first of which details how systems were established, including the role played by 
individual officers and how each consular office was affected by its extraterritorial setting. 
In Hong Kong, the system was designed to facilitate the outsourcing of migrant labour 
matters to local labour recruitment companies. The system in Kuala Lumpur, by contrast, 
was designed to harness the economic resources of labour recruitment companies in 
Indonesia to help meet the costs of labour migrants who fall foul of Malaysian immigration 
law. In Singapore, adjustments to the system sought to synchronize the embassy’s 
standards with those of the ministry in Indonesia in response to lobbying on the part of the 
recruitment industry for greater legal certainty. The second section of the chapter examines 
how labour attachés handled cases of passport confiscation by labour recruitment 
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companies, lack of capacity in the emergency women’s shelter, and the uncovering of fake 
data in official documents, revealing the extent to which those individuals’ personal 
decision-making, rather than the system’s legal framework or a set of institutional 
procedures, determines the day-to-day operation of the programme.  
 
This study shows that individuals and agencies in contemporary Indonesia operationalize 
discretion as a key resource to deal with disjuncture between the legal framework 
governing the overseas labour migration and institutional practice, as embodied in the 
activities of individuals as they decide how carry out their tasks within particular local 
contexts. The case studies presented offer a snapshot of interaction between formal and 
informal institutions, demonstrating how the discretionary acts of individuals and networks 
of actors can drive the production of new rules that formalize elements of previously 
informal practice. Based on these cases, the thesis concludes that these informal processes 
provide an institutional fix to problems caused by the misalignment of the state’s formal 
structures. It confirms that, while discretion can pose a threat to legal certainty, it can also 
make it possible for formal institutions to continue operating in the absence of workable 
processes and procedures.
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Chapter One 
Law and Discretion in Administrative Culture 
The law is not always the primary determinant of institutional objectives, nor is it the only 
resource available to help administrators achieve them. Institutional objectives may be 
driven by the desire to meet an institution’s legal mandate, but they may also be driven by 
place-based considerations, such as local politics or collegial relationships. In such cases, 
law is just one of many tools at bureaucrats’ disposal. Indeed, attention to the actual 
process of decision-making suggests that place-specific considerations can sometimes be 
more important than the law. This may not always result in decisions to act illegally, but 
sometimes it does. When institutional practice contravenes the law, concern is often 
focused on that illegality. What tends to be overlooked is the most important factor 
enabling illegal practice in the first place: the legal authority of the individual authorized to 
act. To Indonesian bureaucrats seeking to avoid being accused of acting illegally, what 
matters most is that they are authorized to act, and that they can justify the institutional 
objectives they have chosen.  
 
The setting and achievement of institutional objectives is further complicated by the 
structural fragmentation of government agencies. It is not unusual for agencies to be 
divided in their views. Moreover, their ability to pursue particular institutional objectives 
hinges on the kind and quality of institutional capacity that they have at their disposal. 
Administrative culture is a concept that focuses attention on the aspect of institutional 
capacity most likely to determine the kinds of tools used by institutions to achieve their 
objectives. As this chapter argues, discretion is an element of administrative culture that is 
particularly important in contexts where anomalies are introduced by multilayered legal 
frameworks or when institutions break down. 
Mapping institutional objectives 
Place-specific considerations can rank highly when determining institutional objectives. 
States are not monolithic actors and the sites where their institutions are situated influence 
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their orientation, thereby shaping their objectives to suit the place-specific demands of their 
location. The embeddedness of institutions in local contexts has sparked interest in what 
Joel Migdal describes as ‘patterns of interpenetration’.1 These ties to place go a long way to 
explaining the mutually transformative and constitutive power of state and society. 
Differentiation caused by this embeddedness can also be interpreted as a result of a kind of 
‘patchiness’ in the distribution of state institutions, especially in large states with sprawling 
territories and uneven population distributions.2 Distance from a capital city is a major 
geographical element that enables the particular social and economic structures found in 
particular locations to influence how state institutions function in those locations.  
 
In locations where multiple levels of state structure are present, institutions come to share 
place-specific objectives regardless of scale. The geographic homes to intermediate levels 
of government – in Indonesia’s case, the provincial capitals – often have the densest 
administrative landscapes. In many unitary states, they have the full suite of provincial 
agencies and city institutions as well as national government agencies, such as Immigration 
and Tax Offices.3 The orientation of the latter is nominally to the state’s centre, where the 
national government’s main administrative seat is located. But just as institutional relations 
in national capitals have centres and peripheries within them, so too do peripheral sites, 
such as the provincial capitals described here. Regardless of their orientation to the national 
capital, provincial branches of national institutions constitute part of the centre-periphery 
pattern of relations in their particular location, where distance is measured not only in 
kilometres but in economic, political and even ethnic terms.4 By decentring formal 
accounts of how relations between those scales of institutions ought to be, this idea of 
                                                          
1 Migdal, J, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 263. 
2 Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker take the example of Indonesia to illustrate how state 
agencies and units are densest in urban areas, and how the proportion of state personnel to 
population is largest in sparsely populated ones. See van Klinken, G and J Barker, "Introduction: 
state in society in Indonesia," in State of authority: the state in society in Indonesia, ed. G van 
Klinken and J Barker (New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2009), 36. 
3 van Klinken, G, "Decolonization and the making of middle Indonesia," Urban Geography 30, no. 
8 (2009). 
4 Mény, Y and V Wright, "General introduction," in Centre-periphery relations in Western Europe, 
ed. Y Mény and V Wright (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 1. 
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centre-periphery relations offers a useful starting point for examining the relationship 
between different tiers of government and its impact on their agencies’ efforts to achieve 
their institutional objectives. 
 
These inter-scalar relationships are also affected by the larger system of government of 
which they are a part. In principle, the design of a federal system disperses power between 
multiple centres, making it easier to accommodate local political demands in a wide range 
of locations.5 But, as a result, federal states tend to be characterized by greater disharmony 
and poorer integration of policies between their various centres than unitary states.6 By 
contrast, unitary systems, in theory, offer a neater, top-down organization of power through 
a series of tiers (central, intermediate and local).7 In small unitary states, such as Singapore, 
or special administrative regions, such as Hong Kong, these tiers are not necessary. Instead, 
the organization of power aligns with the centre-periphery model that – as in the case of the 
dense administrative landscapes described above – provides a template for structuring 
relationships between institutions in a particular location.  
 
In countries like The Netherlands, the model of the ‘decentralized unitary state’ has 
emerged as a compromise between the unitary system, which puts a premium on unity, 
uniformity and hierarchy, and the federal system that is structured to better accommodate 
plurality, diversity and autonomy.8 As a result, sub-national, political contexts, which are 
arranged according to place, are formalized within a single frame of the state. Within such 
contexts, decentralization programmes affect the pattern of relations between national and 
sub-national government institutions. In colonial India, for example, the introduction of 
competitive elections at the sub-national level enabled social groups that were formerly 
underrepresented in the centralized system to at least participate in electoral processes as 
                                                          
5 Elazar, D, "Contrasting unitary and federal systems," International Political Science Review 18, 
no. 3 (1997): 243. 
6 Pennock, J, "Federal and unitary government-disharmony and frustration," Behavioural Science 4, 
no. 2 (1959): 147. 
7 Elazar, D, "Contrasting unitary and federal systems," International Political Science Review 18, 
no. 3 (1997): 243. 
8 Toonen, T, "The unitary state as a system of co-governance: the case of The Netherlands," Public 
Administration 68 (1990): 282. 
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candidates.9 But problems with the implementation of decentralization raise questions 
about using the concept as a proxy for democratization. Free from the level of scrutiny 
found higher up in the hierarchy,10 decentralization sometimes promotes the development 
of a local oligarchy.11 It can also widen opportunities for corruption and other illegal 
practices.12 Sub-national institutions may indeed become more representative of the 
segment of society in which they are embedded. But this says little about how those 
institutions then relate to national government units that continue to operate in those places. 
Institutional relations 
The formal dimension of institutional relations can be understood from documents, such as 
regulations. However, exclusive focus on this dimension runs the risk of reproducing an 
‘illusory account of practice’.13 For bureaucrats, such accounts of practice are useful to 
convey the impression that the diverse array of institutions that comprise the state share the 
same purpose.14 Such accounts also make it possible for those bureaucrats to represent their 
activity as legal-rational and therefore more or less disinterested, even though this is rarely 
                                                          
9 Leonard, J, "Urban government under the Raj: a case study of municipal administration in 
nineteenth-century south India," Modern Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (1973). 
10 Koppelman, A, "How "decentralization" rationalizes oligarchy: John McGinnis and the Rehnquist 
Court," Constitutional Commentary 20 (2003). 
11 Oligarchy is understood to be made up of people who inherited the ability to not only earn higher 
income but also the ‘desire to influence and participate in public choices’. See Bourguignon, F and T 
Verdier, "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics 62 
(2000). For examples of the Indonesian literature on oligarchy, see Ford, M and T Pepinsky, 
"Beyond oligarchy? Critical exchanges on political power and material inequality in Indonesia," 
Indonesia 96, no. 2 (2013); Winters, J, "Oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia," Indonesia 96, no. 2 
( 2013); Hadiz, V and R Robison, "The political economy of oligarcy and the reorganization of 
power in Indonesia," Indonesia 96, no. 2 (2013). 
12 Choi, N, "Local elections and party politics in post-reformasi Indonesia: a view from 
Yogyakarta," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (2004): 281, 97; Kristiansen, S et al., "Public 
sector reforms and financial transparency: experiences from Indonesian districts," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 31, no. 1 (2008). These predictable consequences are often relegated in favour of 
claims that decentralization will ultimately help deepen democracy. See Heller, P, K Harilal, and S 
Chaudhri, "Building local democracy: evaluating the impact of decentralization in Kerala, India," 
World Development 35, no. 4 (2007): 627-28. 
13 Abrams, P, "Notes on the difficulty of studying the state (1977)," Journal of Historical Sociology 
1, no. 1 (1988): 58. 
14 "Notes on the difficulty of studying the state (1977)," Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no. 1 
(1988): 68. 
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the case.15 Critics recognize that these efforts produce something akin to a ‘state effect’, 
whereby the ‘complexities of the various networks, factions, and institutions’ that 
constitute the state are kept from public view.16 Nevertheless, the belief that state 
institutions work in unison to produce ‘acts of the state’17 has endured, reproduced by 
theoretical accounts that infer that the state, as a monolithic actor, has in fact the capacity to 
act.  
 
A fuller range of institutional relations can be identified by observing the actual nature of 
interactions between institutions. Careful consideration of how these interactions constitute 
the state helps ensure that, in avoiding the false premise of a monolithic state, the trap of 
dismissing the state ‘as a grab-bag of every-man-out-for-himself, corrupt officials’18 is also 
avoided. The task here is to uncover the conditions under which the various actors within 
the state’s institutional structure work together or in opposition. This approach has been 
useful for examining cases where governments engage in some kind of illegal practice.19 A 
starting point for interrogating the state-illegality nexus is to dispense with the assumption 
that ‘states always uphold the law’.20 This makes it possible to identify elements of state 
practice that would not have otherwise been possible to articulate. In the context of a study 
such as this, then, a necessary first step is to do away with the assumption that the state’s 
constituent parts always seek to act in unison. This usefully turns the line of inquiry to the 
questions of how, when – or if ever – interactions between those constituent parts 
encourage them to collaborate. 
 
                                                          
15 Matheson, C, "Rationality and decision-making in Australian Federal Government," Australian 
Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (1998). 
16 Pierce, S, "Looking like a state: colonialism and the discourse of corruption in northern Nigeria," 
Comparative Study of Society and History 48, no. 4 (2006): 898. 
17 Kelsen, H, General theory of law and state, trans. A Wedberg, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 359. 
18 Migdal, J, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22-23. 
19 Heyman, J and A Smart, "States and illegal practices: an overview," in States and illegal 
practices, ed. J Heyman (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999), 1. 
20 "States and illegal practices: an overview," in States and illegal practices, ed. J Heyman (Oxford 
and New York: Berg, 1999), 1. 
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This focus on interaction between institutions suggests that the state might also be usefully 
viewed as a collection of relationships and strategies. Attention then shifts from the 
conditions that produce unity or conflict to the particular actors and the logic they employ 
when deciding how best to achieve institutional objectives, such as policy implementation. 
Critics of the top-down approach to understanding policy implementation argue that, 
because it frames policy as having a statutory origin, the quality of implementation is 
frequently assessed in terms of administrative and technical capacity.21 This approach 
might fail, for example, to consider the degree to which administrators agree with his or her 
institution’s agenda. By contrast, the bottom-up perspective recognize that local 
environment bears heavily on the capacity of institutions to implement policy22 since 
strategies for policy implementation depend partly on the available resources in a particular 
context.23 Moreover, the resources they mobilize to achieve such objectives may include 
elements that are not strictly part of the state’s formal institutional structures.24 
 
The network model provides a way to reinterpret the state in terms of institutional 
interaction.25 In an attempt to build a stronger process-oriented perspective of the state’s 
institutions, this model recasts the state as ‘an elaborate web of distributed agency’, in line 
with the belief that the state exists in a particular moment in time rather than being a stable 
entity.26 It depicts the state in a diagram of nodes (actors) and ties (relationships), which 
may vary in strength between the same sets of actors in different settings. For example, the 
head of an Immigration Office in one regional city may have a much stronger relationship 
                                                          
21 Matland, R, "Synthesizing the implementation literature: the ambiguity-conflict model of policy 
implementation," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5, no. 2 (1995): 147. 
22 "Synthesizing the implementation literature: the ambiguity-conflict model of policy 
implementation," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5, no. 2 (1995): 147. 
23 Skocpol, T, "Bringing the state back in: strategies of analysis in current research," in Bringing the 
state back in, ed. P Evans, D Rueschemeyer, and T Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 15-16. 
24 van Klinken, G and J Barker, "Introduction: state in society in Indonesia," in State of authority: 
the state in society in Indonesia, ed. G van Klinken and J Barker (New York: Southeast Asia 
Program Publications, 2009), 8, emphasis in original. 
25 Passoth, J-H and N Rowland, "Actor-network state: integrating actor-network theory and state 
theory," International Sociology 25, no. 6 (2010): 823-26. 
26 "Actor-network state: integrating actor-network theory and state theory," International Sociology 
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with local government than the head of the same kind of office in another city because of 
factors such as kinship ties. The network model, then, reveals how structurally the state’s 
institutions might be ‘open to emotion, desire, interpretation and conflict’.27 
 
Actor-network theory dictates that the state’s constitutive parts lack the capacity to act in 
their own right. Rather, any act in their name is a product of efforts by and interactions 
between multiple actors, known as a ‘network achievement’.28 It is therefore not possible to 
speak of a ministry (or even minister) as an autonomous actor because its capacity to 
performeven a simple administrative act is dependent on a network of actors, including, for 
example, the head of the legal bureau, a relevant director-general, directors, and so on. 
Particular government agencies are nevertheless important as conduits for action and, 
therefore, a meaningful unit of analysis. Furthermore, an analysis of relations between 
similar groupings of government agencies in different locations offers a concrete way to 
understand both the heterogeneous nature of the state and to identify causal links between 
the institutional objectives that government agencies and units adopt and the demands of 
particular locations. 
Institutions, law and legal authority 
The state’s institutions and the legal frameworks that govern them are mutually 
constitutive. An institution is a ‘network of formal, norm-created and norm-creating’ 
entities operated by individuals who have authority to command others.29 In practical 
                                                          
27 Marston, S, "The 2003 annual political geography lecture: space, culture, state: uneven 
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terms, this means that law authorizes the establishment of state institutions and then 
delegates to them legal authority to apply the law. One way to visualize the relationship 
between institutions and the law is to see them as two congruent pyramids: a normative 
structure of positive law and an institutional one that organizes individuals and 
organizations into hierarchies and sectors with authority to implement policy within an area 
over which they hold legal authority.30 This structural approach, which has its origins in the 
thought and work of Hans Kelsen, has provided those who study the state with a schema to 
examine the relationship between laws, regulations and policies on the one hand, and 
government agencies, units and individual officials on the other.31 Proponents of this 
approach argue that, by reducing the state to two structures, it also becomes possible to 
examine spaces of tension and harmony that exist between these two mutually constitutive 
elements of the state.32  
 
The fact that institutions generate law, which produces institutions, makes it logically 
impossible to write about the origins of either entity without mentioning the other. Kelsen 
reasons that the law in its unwritten form pre-dates institutions,33 a chronological 
positioning that enables the law to legitimate the state’s institutions. However, as HLA 
Hart points out, if legal norms are prioritized over all others, it is counterproductive to 
suggest that there is some more basic norm than the highest law. The very existence of 
such a norm opens up space for conflict between law and morals.34 Moreover, the ‘living 
                                                          
naskah akademik dalam pembentukan peraturan daerah," Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia 10, no. 2 
(2013): 111-12. 
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31 "Analysis of state and law structure," in Law, state, and international legal order: essays in honor 
of Hans Kelsen, ed. S Engel and R Métall (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1964), 3. 
32 This has been examined extensively in the literature on administrative law. For a comprehensive 
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reality’ in most situations is that bureaucrats treat law as their primary referent when 
assessing the validity of not just other laws but their own acts.35 This ‘rule of recognition’ 
describes a reality in which the institutional structure recognizes legal-normative 
structure.36 The identification of such rules provides a starting point for examining how and 
why institutions use law. Examined from this perspective, relationships between 
institutions and law are not ordered in terms of chronology. Rather, they can be mapped in 
terms of their interactions around particular issues. 
 
Legal authority is a core concept in the analysis of relationships between institutions and 
laws. The ‘identity thesis’,37 which treats the law and institutions as ‘two words for the 
same thing’,38 provides a way to test the limits of how law is used.39 The first reading of 
this thesis – that the law is the state – has repercussions for the legal authority of 
institutions in the sense that they lack the ability to contravene the law. 40 To explain the 
fact that institutions can and do engage in illegal practices, blame is shifted to individual 
officials who come to use their legal authority inappropriately because of ‘laziness, 
viciousness, rebelliousness’ or human error.41 That said, however, the law’s substance is 
sometimes so vague that it makes room for discretion on the part of individuals and 
                                                          
35 The concept of law, 3rd ed., Clarendon Law Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 293. 
36 The concept of law, 3rd ed., Clarendon Law Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 293, note 
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37 Kelsen, H, Pure theory of law, trans. M Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
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Toronto Law Journal 58, no. 4 (2008): 523. 
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institutions accorded legal authority to act.42 In other words, the law may not specifically 
authorize everything that is performed under its auspices.43 
 
An inverse reading of the identity thesis – that the state is the law – reveals another debate 
about the boundaries of legal authority: that all acts done in the state’s name are legal. 
Because the state is the law, everything done in its name is legal. Some are uncomfortable 
with this reading because it legitimizes practically any use of institutions, ‘including [for] 
the most barbaric’ purposes.44 In practice, however, most institutions have internal 
mechanisms to deal with instances where those with legal authority authorize activity that 
somehow conflicts with the law, be it the constitution, statutes, implementation regulations 
or even a policy.45 The purpose here is to reverse uses of legal authority that do not 
conform to some aspect of the law.46 This does not mean, however, that ‘that the state 
cannot conceivably depart from the law’.47 In fact, it demonstrates that quite the opposite is 
true. 
 
By recognizing the capacity of institutions to act beyond the strictures of the laws that 
govern them, it becomes possible to focus on how political relationships between state 
agencies can over-ridetheir technical relationship. Unpacking the identity thesis enables a 
discussion of the technical and political aspects of legal authority, which is key to 
understanding how institutions come to engage in illegal practices. This depiction of the 
state is necessarily partial, both because institutions and law are not identical, and because 
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the state is a much more complex structure than its institutions and legal framework. These 
tools nevertheless provide an evidence-based technique to examine situations in which 
legal authority is used to authorize illegal acts. The purpose here is not to reconceptualize 
the state, but rather to ‘open up new topics .. [and] find new things’48 about the state’s 
relationship to legality by moving beyond the focus of ‘legal authority’ on the illegal acts 
of individual state officials to the network that constitutes the state. 
Law, institutions and legal relations 
There are many layers of law, which can make it difficult to see which one should apply in 
a particular situation. In the Kelsean view, the law is a hierarchical structure of norms, 
which has fewer and often more general laws at the top and a greater number of more 
particular ones closer to its base. This formulation of law as structure gives the impression 
that law has a form. Moving away from this concern with rules and where they fit into the 
hierarchy of norms to focus on their production puts law in a different light. This idea of 
‘law as process’ redirects attention to three major areas of inquiry.49 It enables questions to 
be asked about why a particular norm came to stipulate a particular view at a particular 
point in time, what the norm adds or takes away in that context, and how that norm is 
interpreted with the passage of time.50  
 
Identifying the most appropriate law can be a technically difficult task. Even with (and 
sometimes because of) the ‘finesse and erudition of the trained lawyer’, it is not always 
possible to precisely determine which law applies.51 The concept of legal relations offers 
one way to narrow down the possibilities. A legal relation is a tie between the person who 
is affected by the law – which stipulates that ‘certain facts will normally be followed by .. 
consequences in the form of action or non-action’ – and one or more government officials 
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authorized to impose those consequences.52 Terms of the law, such as marriage and 
property, never represent a single relationship.53 To identify specific legal relations that 
relate to these objects, it is necessary to ask what the person who is affected by the law may 
do without penalty, must do under the threat of penalty or can do to change legal relations. 
Doing so not only teases out legal relations but also establishes the rights, privileges, 
powers and immunities of all those involved in that relationship.54 
 
The task of identifying the most appropriate law is further complicated in contexts where 
there is a strong political dimension to the weight given to particular laws. A study of legal 
hierarchy in the former Soviet Union shows that the ordering principle may be ‘nothing at 
all … like Hans Kelsen’s “pure” normativist theory of the law’.55 There, the hierarchy of 
laws reflected power relations between state agencies. Laws that could somehow be traced 
back to the Communist Party, or more specifically to groups of powerful individuals within 
it, were often prioritized over laws that had their origins elsewhere.56 In the Soviet system, 
this adaptation of the hierarchy was in part possible because only a portion of law was 
accessible to the general public. While not illegal, this practice meant that it was not always 
possible to know all of the legal relations an individual was party to.57  
 
Another complicating factor in the legal landscape is that the legislative branch delegates 
significant amounts of rulemaking authority to executive agencies. This bureaucratic 
dimension of the law is a hallmark of the modern democratic state,58 which is arguably 
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essential for achieving ‘good government’.59 Through it, the state can quickly adapt to 
developments in ways that statutes – which require parliamentary approval to change – do 
not allow.60 At the same time, bureaucratic rulemaking can give executive agencies, which 
lack a popular mandate, significant latitude to apply the law in line with the institutional 
objectives they set for themselves. What emerges is an administrative state, in which the 
executive branch – which does not necessarily understand or accept the legislature’s 
intention behind a particular law – is free to make rules. This executive rulemaking results 
in the proliferation of regulations that may reflect the institutional objectives of particular 
agencies and the interests of those who staff them rather than the intention of the legislature 
when promulgating the initial law. The law thus cannot be separated from the individual 
and collective interests of the people who staff institutions. 
Authorization and justification 
In response to criticisms of their actions, bureaucrats often make the claim, ‘I do not make 
law, I follow it’.61 Bureaucrats are encouraged to adhere strictly to rules in the name of 
consistency, which can in turn help prevent caprice and whimsical exercise of discretion.62 
Viewed more critically, strict adherence to procedure provides bureaucrats with a ‘way to 
avoid emphatic understanding and a way to deny moral choice in legal decision-making’.63 
By paying attention to ‘the games bureaucrats play’, it also becomes apparent that while 
they might follow the law, they might do so in pursuit of an entirely different objective 
from that envisaged by legislators.64 For example, bureaucrats may use elements of 
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36 
 
 
procedure to avoid granting general access to internal documents. In such situations, the 
law is a resource bureaucrats can use to ‘shield the incompetence and corruption which 
often exist in administrative agencies’.65 
 
In their narratives about how law is used, bureaucrats are primarily concerned with two 
concepts: authorization and justification. Bureaucrats deem it necessary that their actions 
are authorized by the law, begging the question: what aspect of the law authorizes them to 
choose a particular legal norm to justify their work? The distinction between formal and 
material authorization provides a starting point to address this question. Unlike material 
authorization, which enables bureaucrats to use the law in line with higher order norms, 
formal authorization is related to the power that a particular individual has to use the law.66 
Formal authorization can in effect enable officials to create and apply norms that conflict 
with higher order ones, such as statutes. In other words, provided that officials act ‘within 
the limits of their authorization’, their decisions have normative force regardless of their 
legality.67 Although the state has internal mechanisms for invalidating illegal decisions, 
these norms retain their compulsory nature.68 In this way, formal authorization constitutes a 
resource that allows a government institution to act illegally when those who are authorized 
to do so deem it necessary. 
 
To access this resource, officials need only justify their use of the law through reference to 
some higher level legal or political principle.69 For example, in Indonesia, implementing 
regulations are usually justified by reference to a statute. The substantive provisions of 
most types of Indonesian laws are preceded by two sections that serve to justify the 
decision. A ‘considering that’ (menimbang) section makes arguments for the necessity of 
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the decisions that follow, usually citing the enactment of a new statute, a meeting or some 
development that requires an amendment. This is then followed by a ‘remembering that’ 
(meningat) section, which for many types of implementing regulations lists the higher level 
laws that authorize the issuing bureaucrat to issue the decision, and that justify that 
decision. There is broad agreement that bureaucrats should not have a ‘recourse role’70 that 
enables them to justify their refusal to follow the letter of the law. However, it is possible 
for them to do just that by pointing to ‘some other basic end of the legal and political order’ 
to justify their position.71 An agency might choose, for example, to list the statutes that 
support the regulation while making an argument about how a conflicting law is out of step 
with the broader political programme of the government in power. 
 
This section has examined some of the factors that differentiate state agencies and the 
institutional objectives they set. Institutions everywhere are influenced to some degree by 
place-specific factors for the reason that bureaucrats never strictly act alone. They may 
follow routines and procedures but their decisions are more akin to a network achievement, 
which in a particular place can involve not only officials from the issuing agency but also 
colleagues from other agencies and even other tiers of government. This is especially the 
case when an administrative act has implications for a common policy area. As for the 
decision itself, the biggest concern from an administrative perspective is that it is issued 
procedurally by officials with legal authority to do so. The substance of the decision, and 
whether it accords with relevant statutes, is a second-order concern. The fact that the law is 
multilayered makes it challenging to identify the most appropriate norm. But it also 
provides officials with opportunities to pursue their own private or institutional interests – 
sometimes in contravention of the law. It is to the pursuit of these objectives to which I 
now turn. 
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The achievement of institutional objectives 
Formal structures and informal institutions help the state to achieve its objectives. Formal 
structures provide a ‘blueprint for activities’, setting out goals and policies that constitute a 
kind of rational theory about how institutional objectives ought to be achieved.72 They are 
‘facts which must simply be taken into account’.73 But there is a sharp distinction between 
this blueprint and how institutional objectives are actually achieved.74 The distinction is 
most visible in situations where formal structures fail to take account of local context.75 In 
places where this is the case, bureaucrats tasked with administration of the law may 
struggle to achieve the objectives that their institution has set. 
 
One reason that officials in such locations may undermine the law is, of course, because it 
enables them to pursue private interests, such as accumulation of wealth through the 
collection of bribes.76 However, examination of the principal-agent problem inherent in 
their role as an agent opens up another dimension to this activity. Principal-agent theory 
describes a ‘relationship that arises when one person (‘a principal’) manifests assent to 
another person (‘an agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to 
the principal’s control’.77 Officials’ role as agents gives them the capacity to advance their 
own interests while acting on their principal’s behalf.78 They may – or may not – take the 
principal’s interests into account when they do so.79 When the head of an institution is 
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identified as the principal, it becomes possible to see how officials as agents are internally 
accountable. Heads of institutions have the necessary tools to level administrative sanctions 
against officials who do not toe the line. It is partly for this reason that officials come to 
practise a high level of fealty to public office.80 This fealty can in turn be harnessed as part 
of an attempt to direct officials towards achievement of institutional objectives irrespective 
of what is promoted or permitted by formal structures. 
 
Officials may also look for opportunities to augment their power vis-à-vis one another. This 
may entail augmenting the power of their institution in relation to another state agency or 
in their relationships with society and the market.81 The theory that state institutions seek to 
maximize their budget allocations rather than their outputs offers one way in which to 
study these phenomena.82 According to the theory of utility maximization, bureaucrats will 
generally push for a greater budget allocation because of the increase in ‘income, prestige, 
power, emolument and other amenities’ that come with it.83 However, empirical studies 
show that government agencies do not always seek to maximize their budget, nor do 
individual officials always seek to maximize the private utility of resources under their 
control.84 These assumptions nevertheless provide a starting point for examining just how 
resources relate to power in the state system, despite the risk that they ‘acquire a certain 
believability’ without regard for the limited, theoretical purpose that they serve.85 
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The power to pursue individual and institutional objectives can manifest itself in forms 
such as competition, pitting individuals, units, agencies and branches and even tiers of 
government against one another, for example, over access to economic resources. 
Competition is also structured into the state’s insitutional design, as some government 
agencies are designed to monitor and even challenge other institutions. States frequently 
create such agencies as part of an attempt to enhance the credibility of their policies.86 
Although independent agencies, for example, may ‘create severe problems of coordination, 
legitimacy and control’, states may institute them regardless.87 Independent anti-corruption 
agencies are a popular choice in countries where the government is seeking political 
legitimacy ahead of a general election or fulfilling conditions for access to funds from 
international donors.88 In cities like Hong Kong and Sydney, experience shows that the 
more structurally independent agencies are, the more effective they are likely to be at 
achieving their institutional objectives.89 And while achievement of those objectives 
certainly benefits from cooperation with other state agencies, in terms of purpose, they are 
tasked to do quite the opposite.  
 
State agencies, then, not only do not share a single view on how things should be done; 
they may also have opposing purposes. Even where there is general agreement in a 
particular policy area, individual agencies can hold different interpretations about what 
factors are relevant in that policy area.90 Extreme forms of institutional fragmentation are 
evident in parts of the developing world, where at times the state is unable to project an 
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appearance of unity due to deep internal divisions.91 In less extreme cases, a plurality of 
understandings may reflect the fact that state institutions use legal terminology that relates 
to their particular function and so tend to re-interpret situations and practices in those 
terms. Such fragmentation can weaken the state’s capacity to ‘coordinate and plan’,92 
leading to ‘functional and jurisdictional overlap’, which can reduce efficiency through 
‘duplication and waste’.93 
  
Institutional fragmentation is influenced by geography and hierarchy. As a consequence, it 
has a horizontal plane (co-located agency branches) and vertical plane (tiers of 
government). The degree to which they fragment the state’s position on particular matters 
can be understood through an analysis of policy implementation by different agencies. 
Most countries adhere to the separation of powers, under which the legislative, executive 
and judicial arms of the state respectively produce, apply and decide on the interpretation 
of particular laws.94 Of course, this separation is not clear-cut in practice. The judiciary 
may defer to executive agencies, effectively accepting their interpretation and application 
of the law95 because the legislature delegates rulemaking authority to the executive. In 
some contexts, however, deference is also frequently a consequence of ‘bribery, extortion, 
and other methods of co-optation’.96 In this example, while formal structures seek to 
maintain the separation of these institutions, those within them create informal institutions 
that bring them together. 
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Cultures of administration 
The concept of an administrative culture offers a way of thinking about how institutions 
achieve their objectives. Bureaucrats operate within an administrative culture that instructs 
them on why and how to use the state’s formal structures.97 Within organization studies, 
administrative culture describes the distinctive values and patterns of behaviour found 
within communities of individuals working in formal institutions. One model divides 
administrative culture into four broad analytical categories using a two-by-two grid with 
‘preferences regarding structure’ (control or flexibility) on the vertical axis and 
‘organizational focus’ (internal and external) on the horizontal plane.98 As tiered 
organizations, states fall into the bottom two quadrants. Those with a strong external focus 
tend to have correspondingly strong legal-rational cultures, which include productivity and 
efficiency as objectives in the performance of public functions. Those with an inwardly 
focussed orientation generally have more hierarchical cultures that have as their primary 
objective ‘management of internal communication … stability and control’.99 
 
Scrutinizing patterns ‘of and for’ administrative behaviour makes it possible to identify the 
value that bureaucrats attribute to a particular course of action.100 These values are 
sometimes articulated in formal documents, which may claim to promote impartiality, 
commitment to service, accountability, respectfulness and ethics among those in its 
employ. However, particular kinds of administrative culture might encourage other values, 
such as fairness, consensus, trust, secrecy, pragmatism, accommodation and 
territorialism.101  
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The physical elements in a given institution’s environment mould the contours of 
administrative culture,102 which in turn shapes the informal institutions that develop in 
response to those contextual elements. For example, certain structural features make some 
forms of interaction easier than others. In office spaces that feature photocopiers and water 
coolers, staff are likely to have informal conversations with one another, and in so doing 
develop informal social networks.103 Informal interactions in these spaces tend not only to 
be brief and unplanned but also much more frequent, serving to support ‘execution of 
work-related tasks; co-ordination of group activity; transmission of office culture; and 
social functions such as team building’.104 However, there are also disadvantages to this 
informality from the organization’s point of view, as it can replace formal modes of 
communication, such as email, which are important for documenting conversations and 
decisions. This analysis of physical environments within a single office setting can be 
extended to the administrative landscape in a particular location. Physical proximity can 
assist officials, regardless of their institutional affiliation, to develop the kinds of informal 
institutions for communication recognized to support, undermine or even displace formal 
structures.105  
 
As a manifestation of administrative culture, then, informal institutions may develop in 
response to formal structures, such as the political organization of government agencies 
and the law. However, there are other factors at play. Some informal activity has its origins 
in ‘malfunctionings of bureaucracy’.106 For example, institutionalized corruption poses a 
significant challenge to a new generation of agency managers,107 who are forced to work in, 
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with and against it in pursuit of their goals. Wholesale break down of these persisting 
institutions is in fact a rare phenomenon.108 More frequent is ‘minor change’, which is 
incremental and adaptive.109 But informal networks within formal systems can also help 
address situations where state institutions are less accountable to the wider public than they 
could otherwise be.110  
 
The flatter, horizontal contours of informal networks may include strategic partners across 
organizations, regardless of their position in the formal system. This affects vertical chains 
of command in various ways. Members of an informal network may also respond to 
lobbying by external actors.111 Of course, this is not unique to bureaucratic settings: 
informality is, for example, frequently key to securing political support and gaining access 
to resources. However, a feature of such networks within the context of state institutions is 
that vertical actors, such as unit heads, directors and so on, ultimately determine what is 
permissible.112 
 
Corruption is one form of administrative culture in which informal institutions serve to 
support formal structures, where bureaucrats may engage in illegal acts that help achieve 
institutional objectives. Although some see the practice as evidence of institutional break 
down,113 in some contexts corruption can provide a means by which to bolster 
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administrative hierarchies.114 This was the case during the 1990s in Ukraine, where 
President Leonid Kuchma allowed bureaucrats to siphon off funds from the budget in 
exchange for compliance with government programmes.115 Fear of prosecution for this 
corruption provided the president with a mechanism of control that allowed his inner circle 
to exercise greater coercive power over the bureaucracy than would have otherwise been 
possible.116 These kinds of networks can prove difficult to unravel, not least because those 
with power to do so often benefit from them most. While in place, they can nevertheless 
serve as a cohesive device in what might otherwise be a chaotic system, effectively 
instituting an alternative but nevertheless ‘potent and much more hierarchical state 
command structure’.117  
Law and discretion as resources 
Law is only one of many sets of institutionalized norms that inform bureaucrats’ decision-
making process within a particular administrative culture. The law claims autonomy from 
the social system in which it is embedded,118 but must in reality compete against other 
norms that seek to regulate everyday life.119 Part of the reason why the law is not always 
prioritized is that officials with the authority to apply it might not agree with, for example, 
the way in which it orders the economic, political and social interests of different groups.120 
In effect, law is framed in terms of ‘good rules’ and ‘bad rules’ by the bureaucrats charged 
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with its implementation.121 A designation of ‘bad’ may then be used to legitimate practices 
that subvert it, such as accepting bribes.122  
 
Those advocating better institutional enforcement of law recommend practical solutions, 
such as increasing the salary of those authorized to use the law.123 But just as the agencies’ 
relationship to the law is complex, so too is the concept of enforcement. Enforcement is 
generally judged in terms of its ‘success’ or ‘failure’,124 where failure is characterized by a 
low probability of enforcement and light sanctions.125 But it is also possible to frame law 
enforcement in terms of degrees and levels to reflect the fact that it is determined in large 
part by factors such as effort and resources.126 The extent to which agencies enforce law is 
thus a function of institutional capacity, as institutions must be able to exercise legitimate 
authority, make strategic choices and deliver incentives and sanctions.127  
 
Bureaucrats’ capacity to prioritize ethical, moral or social norms over the law is also made 
possible by the fact that law enforcement is seldom the only – or even primary – purpose of 
government institutions. Institutional objectives are rather a commitment to bring about 
‘some desired set of … consequences’128 such as a change in social behaviour or the raising 
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of more revenue.129 Within that context, law may prove a useful tool, for example, helping 
to garner support for political projects and justify interventions that might otherwise be 
deemed illegitimate.130 By making alternatives illegal, it becomes possible to generate 
legitimacy for otherwise ‘insupportable and intolerable’ activity.131 A legal mandate may 
also – though not always – have the effect of foreclosing further discussion about the 
inherent complexity of the issue at hand.132 This effect flows partly from the assumption 
that the law not only provides ‘clean-cut answers’ to problems,133 but that it is also in some 
sense right. This idea of illegality as a narrative rather than a technical category, as it is 
most commonly understood, opens up space to examine why and how law is used for 
purposes that sometimes have little or nothing to do with enforcement. Recognition of such 
uses of the law provides an alternative logic for explaining why state institutions can be so 
inconsistent in how they apply law.134  
 
As this logic suggests, discretion is not only a primary resource in the creation and 
maintenance of informal institutions but also a key resource in bureaucrats’ application of 
law. Defined as ‘the power or the right to decide according to one’s own judgement’,135 
bureaucratic discretion is vital in the modern state. As a consequence of the delegation of 
rulemaking authority described in the earlier discussion of Kelsen, executive agencies have 
a great deal of discretion in the design and implementation of government policy.136 The 
exercise of discretion can result in the creation and implementation of informal, 
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discriminatory, personalized regimes for performing their public function.137 However, this 
is neither a certain nor necessary outcome. 
 
The concept of legitimacy offers a way to move the debate around the effects of discretion 
forward. It is not always possible to infer legitimacy based solely on whether an act is 
techically legal.138 Rather, the rubric for determining legitimacy derives standards from an 
external source, such as ‘tradition, following established procedures, reflecting shared 
values, and so on’.139 An act can never be ‘legitimate in and of itself’:140 legitimacy is 
expressed in reactions to that act. Those reactions may be pragmatic (whether the act had 
benefits), moral (whether it was the right thing to do), or cognitive (whether there was a 
view that it was inevitable.)’141 This more complex definition of legitimacy is useful when 
discussing the decisions of government officials, who are ‘asked to make choices that are 
in accord or compliance with multiple and sometimes conflicting norms, laws, values, and 
rules’.142 Discussing these acts in terms of legitimacy rather than legality offers a way in 
which to discuss why bureaucrats sometimes choose to act illegally in the pursuit of 
institutional objectives. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has suggested, discretion plays a vital role in lubricating the machinery of 
the modern state. It is particularly important, however, in instances where the formal 
structures of the state are somehow deficient, making it necessary for bureaucrats to 
                                                          
137 Rosenbloom, D, "Israel's administrative culture, Israeli Arabs, and Arab subjects," Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce 13 (1986). 
138 Dowling, J and J Pfeffer, "Organizational legitimacy: social values and organizational 
behaviour," Pacific Sociological Review 18, no. 1 (1975): 124. 
139 Vinzant, J and L Crothers, Street-level leadership: discretion and legitimacy in front-line public 
service (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 49. 
140 Street-level leadership: discretion and legitimacy in front-line public service (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998), 49. 
141 Suchman, M, "Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches," Academy of 
Management Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 578-84. 
142 Vinzant, J and L Crothers, Street-level leadership: discretion and legitimacy in front-line public 
service (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 49. 
 
49 
 
 
identify novel ways in which to achieve institutional objectives.143 These tactics may 
include strategic use of the law or less refined means, such as bribery and corruption. They 
may be primarily aimed at personal gain or the furthering of sectional interests. As has 
been argued, here, however, there is no prima facie case that they are necessarily 
detrimental to the institution concerned. 
 
The chapters that follow document the use of law and discretion as tools in the pursuit of 
institutional objectives within agencies tasked with implementing Indonesia’s overseas 
labour migration programme. They reveal how, in extreme cases, bureaucrats may abandon 
hierarchical ‘modes of steering’ entirely in favour of inter-agency bargaining and 
competition144 – or even outright conflict. In tracing the consequences of such conflict for 
those institutions and the individuals who comprise them at different scales, they 
demonstrate that discretion is the primary resource for maintaining state function when 
institutions break down. Before turning our attention to the conflict between the ministry 
and the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Overseas Indonesian Workers 
(Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BNP2TKI), 
however, it is first necessary to consider the history of the overseas labour migration 
programme.
                                                          
143 Risse, T, "Governance in areas of limited statehood: Introduction and overview," in Governance 
without a state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood, ed. T Risse (New York: 
Columbia Univesity Press, 2011), 9-10. 
144 "Governance in areas of limited statehood: Introduction and overview," in Governance without a 
state? Policies and politics in areas of limited statehood, ed. T Risse (New York: Columbia 
Univesity Press, 2011), 2. 
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Chapter Two 
Indonesia’s Overseas Labour Migration 
Programme 
Indonesia’s overseas labour migration programme has undergone considerable legal and 
institutional change in its more than 40 years of existence, during which time it both 
influenced and responded to migration flows.1 The system developed as part of the New 
Order government’s larger economic development strategy, which began in the late 1960s. 
It aimed to find overseas employment for Indonesian workers as part of a stop gap solution 
for the lack of adequate gainful employment in densely populated areas of the country, 
such as rural Java. 2  
 
In subsequent years, the initiative was harnessed to serve other objectives, such as helping 
the country tap an alternative source of foreign exchange revenue. However, not all 
adjustments were made with an eye to economic, political and social benefits at home. In 
2004 the legislature passed Indonesia’s first overseas migration law, which expanded the 
monitoring role of government agencies over recruitment industry practices that had 
negative consequences for labour migrants, such as the provision of sub-standard board and 
lodgings during training. In response to predictions that the Ministry of Manpower would 
struggle in applying these standards, the BNP2TKI was established in 2007. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Hugo, G, "Indonesian labour migration to Malaysia: trends and policy 
implications," Asian Journal of Social Science 21, no. 1 (1993); Robinson, K, "Gender, Islam, and 
nationality: Indonesian domestic servants in the Middle East," in Home and hegemony: domestic 
service and identity politics in South and Southeast Asia, ed. K Adams and S Dickey (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000); Spaan, E, "Taikongs and calos: the role of middlemen and 
brokers in Javanese international migration," International Migration Review 28, no. 1 (1994); 
Cremer, G, "Deployment of Indonesian migrants in the Middle East: present situation and 
prospects," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 24, no. 3 (1988); Lindquist, J, "The elementary 
school teacher, the thug and his grandmother: informal brokers and transnational migration from 
Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 85, no. 1 (2012); Silvey, R, "Unequal borders: Indonesian transnational 
migrants at immigration control," Geopolitics 12, no. 2 (2007). 
2 Law No. 14/1969. Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Mengenai Tenaga Kerja. 
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Broad policy shifts and the experiences of migrants themselves are a major focus of 
academic literature on labour migration from Indonesia.3 Missing from this narrative is a 
close consideration of the evolution of specific government programmes. Tracing the 
overseas labour migration programme’s policy direction over time enables the 
identification of ruptures and continuities that do not necessarily correspond with changes 
in the national political context. Close attention to the history of amendments to the 
overseas labour migration programme’s institutions and the laws that govern them reveals 
when and why various networks of executive and legislative officials authorized the 
changes they did. In addition to building a history of service provision by the Indonesian 
state, a nuanced study of policy direction in this particular context fleshes out existing 
accounts of Indonesian political history and uncovers incidents that challenge the 
assumption that government institutions respond to political change in broadly the same 
way.  
 
The chapter begins with an analysis of the economic drivers of policies governing the 
overseas labour migration programme from the 1970s until the mid-late 1980s before 
shifting its attention to the period between the mid-1980s and the immediate aftermath of 
the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. In this period, one of the primary drivers of 
migration policy was a desire to protect the business interests of individuals, ranging from 
licensed labour recruitment companies to their bureaucratic patrons. The final section 
focuses on the implications of the introduction of decentralization for the management of 
the programme. It was in this period that authority over the administrative and operational 
aspects of the programme was transferred to the BNP2TKI from the ministry, whose 
mandate was largely reduced to policy-making and regulatory functions regarding the 
licensing of labour recruitment companies. The programme’s 40 year legacy provides 
                                                          
3 See, for example, "Unequal borders: Indonesian transnational migrants at immigration control," 
Geopolitics 12, no. 2 (2007); "Transnational domestication: state power and Indonesian migrant 
women in Saudi Arabia," Political Geography 23 (2004); Jones, S, Making money off migrants 
(Hong Kong: Asia 2000 and Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of 
Wollongong, 2000). 
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instructive insights into why these two central government agencies quickly became 
embroiled in the contest for control described in Chapter Three. 
Economic development 
Indonesia’s contemporary overseas labour migration programme was first conceptualized 
in the late 1960s by the New Order regime. It was part of an attempt to claim political 
legitimacy based on an agenda that prioritized economic development and political stability 
following the turbulent decades of the Sukarno era (1945-1967).4 President Suharto had 
pledged to immediately stabilize Indonesia’s international relationships, normalizing 
bilateral relations with Malaysia and the United States and re-joining the United Nations. 
The New Order regime also promised state-led, technocratic management of the country 
that would harness human and natural resources for the purpose of furthering economic 
development with the view to make the Indonesian population wealthier.5 The New Order 
regime quickly adopted the development strategy proposed by United States-educated 
economists as part of an attempt to overcome problems created by high levels of inflation.6 
It was in this economic and political context that the international migration programme 
was also introduced. 
 
The programme took its form from an existing attempt to address imbalances in the internal 
labour market. In the early 1950s, the Sukarno government reactivated an internal colonial 
era labour supply network to address the problem,7 with the Minister for Labour requiring 
                                                          
4 Hein, G, "Indonesia in 1981: countdown to the general elections," Asian Survey 22, no. 2 (1982): 
200. By contrast, the colonial regime delivered largely Javanese workers to other Dutch territories, 
including Sumatra and Suriname, as part of a programme that ensured capital had greater access to 
labour for the production of agricultural exports. See, for example, Houben, V and J Lindblad, 
Coolie labour in colonial Indonesia: a study of labour relations in the outer islands, c. 1900-1940 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999); Feuer, L, "End of coolie labor in New Caledonia," Far Eastern 
Survey 15, no. 17 (1946).  
5 Hill, H, The Indonesian economy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
6 Anderson, B, "Old state, new society: Indonesia's New Order in comparative historical 
perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (1983): 488. 
7 For a detailed account of the colonial system, see Houben, V and J Lindblad, Coolie labour in 
colonial Indonesia: a study of labour relations in the outer islands, c. 1900-1940 (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 1999). 
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that state agencies not only act as an intermediary but also underwrite loans for workers’ 
travel expenses to other regions.8 However, the problem persisted, threatening political 
stability not only in oversupplied sub-national labour markets such as East Java, where 
social grievances could quickly turn into anti-government sentiment, but in undersupplied 
areas like East Sumatra, where a lack of labour had the potential to disrupt plantation 
exports. With a labour force of around 75 million workers, conservative estimates in the 
late 1960s set unemployment at between 12 and 15 million in the countryside. The entrance 
each year of between 1 and 1.5 million young Indonesians to the labour market 
compounded the problem.9 
 
Suharto’s First Development Cabinet (1968-1973) saw the transmigration programme’s 
potential to ameliorate problems that have their roots in underemployment, but also that it 
was not in itself enough. As a consequence, the Indonesian government looked to 
international labour markets to alleviate the pressure on labour markets at home. The 
Minister for Manpower at the time, Mursalin Daeng Mamangung, coordinated the passage 
of a new law concerning labour shortly after his appointment. Mamangung was both 
outgoing vice chair of the national legislature and chairperson of the Golkar Secretariat, 
which helped expedite the passage of the law. It also certainly helped his cause that the 
New Order government already had overwhelming support from lawmakers loyal to 
Suharto leadership,10 which had parachuted many retired defence personnel into the 
                                                          
8 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 38/1952. Panjar Biaya Perjalanan dan Pemindahan 
Tenaga Kerja; Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 11/1959. Antar Kerja Antar Daerah. During 
the Sukarno period the Ministry had developed a reputation for involvement in worker unrest. It was 
later renamed the Ministry of Manpower to remove the negative connotations of the word ‘labour’ 
following the failed coup of the 30 September Movement (Gerakan 30 September, G30S). See  
Reeve, D, Golkar of Indonesia: an alternative to the party system (Oxford, New York and 
Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 284. 
9 Pauker, G, "The age of reason?," Asian Survey 8, no. 2 (1968): 140. 
10 Emmerson, D, "Understanding the New Order: bureaucratic pluralism in Indonesia," Asian Survey 
23, no. 11 (1983); Jenkins, D, Suharto and his generals: Indonesian military politics, 1975-1983 
(Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2010). Mamangung himself had reached the rank 
of Vice Admiral in the navy and would not retire until 1977. During his time in the legislature, he 
chaired internal committees that made decisions about the institution’s budget and house rules. See 
Library of Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia. "Detail biodata: pejabat menteri." National 
Library of the Republic of Indonesia, http://kepustakaan-
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legislature to replace parliamentarians from the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia, PKI) following the anti-communist purges of 1965-66. Within a year 
the legislature had rubber-stamped the executive-authored Law No. 14/1969 on the 
Important Points about Labour, which in turn enabled Mamangung’s ministry to intervene 
in domains of activity that influence the quantity and quality of labour supply,11 including 
for the overseas labour market. 
 
The law also called on the executive to steer activity toward ways of distributing labour 
that were more ‘efficient and effective’.12 Mamangung followed up by passing a decree 
that articulated a clear administrative role for the ministry in the recruitment of Indonesian 
labour in surplus areas for employment in and outside the country.13 One of the ministry’s 
first initiatives was to harness international labour migration that was already taking place. 
Statistics show that the main destinations were European countries, such as the Netherlands 
and West Germany,14 and New Caledonia,15 which was one of the countries where 
indentured labour had been sent to work in plantations during the colonial period.16 Much 
of this labour migration was recruited through networks developed in the years since 
Indonesian independence in 1945. But in the case of some destinations, such as New 
Caledonia, the movement also included some individuals who had returned to Indonesia 
with the hope of finding gainful employment after independence, but then sought ways to 
re-migrate.17 The ministry encouraged them to do so by offering to use its clout with other 
                                                          
presiden.pnri.go.id/cabinet_personnel/popup_profil_pejabat.php?id=190&presiden_id=2&presiden=
suh. Accessed on 1 July 2013. 
11 Law No. 14/1969. Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Mengenai Tenaga Kerja, article 5(1). 
12 Law No. 14/1969. Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Mengenai Tenaga Kerja, article 5(2). 
13 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 4/1970. Pengerahan Tenaga Kerja, article 1. 
14 RDCMD-YTKI (Research and Documentation Centre for Manpower and Development). "Prospek 
pasar kerja di Arab Saudi bagi tenaga kerja Indondesia." Jakarta. (1986), 128. 
15 Departemen Tenaga Kerja Transmigrasi dan Koperasi. "Bulletin tahunan: statistik tenaga kerja 
Indonesia." Jakarta: Bagian Penelitian dan Statistik. (1972), 56-57. 
16 Feuer, L, "End of coolie labor in New Caledonia," Far Eastern Survey 15, no. 17 (1946); Maurer, 
J-L, Les Javanais du Caillou: des affres de l'exil aux aléas de l'intégration: sociologie historique de 
la communauté Indonésienne de Nouvelle-Calédonie (Paris: Association Archipel, 2006). 
17 "The thin red line between indentured and bonded labour: Javanese workers in New Caledonia in 
the early 20th century," Asian Journal of Social Science 38 (2010): 872. 
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state agencies to expedite the issuance of state documents, such as birth certificates and 
passports. 
 
Only a relatively small number of international labour migrants were registered by ministry 
officials in the first decade. Around 90,000 Indonesian workers were recorded as having 
left the country between 1969 and 1979.18 But these statistics did not record the real scale 
of international migration from Indonesia, as many more people moved through tried and 
true migration channels in which state organizations sometimes played little or no role. The 
majority of labour migrants to East and West Malaysia crossed international borders 
outside immigration checkpoints.19 In part, the reason they did so was because there was 
almost an entire absence of information about official procedures, but also because state 
agencies that issued travel documents did not have a presence in many source areas for 
irregular migration, and because authorized international carriers, such as ferry and 
airplane companies, specialized in conveying passengers with valid passports.20 Migration 
flows to Saudi Arabia, which also had strong historical roots, demonstrated by the 
existence of an Indonesian settler community (mukim),21 was also at times illegible to state 
organizations because many Indonesians travelled to the Middle East as pilgrims rather 
than with the intention of settling there.22  
 
                                                          
18 Hugo, G and W Bohning. "Providing information to outgoing Indonesian migrant workers." 
Manila: International Labour Office, (2000); Departemen Tenaga Kerja Transmigrasi dan Koperasi. 
"Bulletin tahunan: statistik tenaga kerja Indonesia." Jakarta: Bagian Penelitian dan Statistik. (1972); 
"Bulletin tahunan: statistik tenaga kerja Indonesia." Jakarta: Bagian Penelitian dan Statistik. (1975); 
"Bulletin tahunan: statistik tenaga kerja Indonesia." Jakarta: Bagian Penelitian dan Statistik. (1977); 
"Bulletin tahunan: statistik tenaga kerja Indonesia." Jakarta: Bagian Penelitian dan Statistik. (1978); 
"Bulletin tahunan: statistik tenaga kerja Indonesia." Jakarta: Bagian Penelitian dan Statistik. (1979). 
19 Spaan, E, "Taikongs and calos: the role of middlemen and brokers in Javanese international 
migration," International Migration Review 28, no. 1 (1994); Cremer, G, "Deployment of 
Indonesian migrants in the Middle East: present situation and prospects," Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 24, no. 3 (1988). 
20 Lindquist, J, "Labour recruitment, circuits of capital and gendered mobility: reconceptualizing the 
Indonesian migration industry," Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010). 
21 Diederich, M, "Indonesians in Saudi Arabia," in Transnational connections and the Arab Gulf, ed. 
M Al-Rasheed (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
22 Vredenbregt, J, "The haddj: some of its features and functions in Indonesia," Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 118, no. 1 (1962). 
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Toward the end of the 1970s, the ministry attempted to scale up the state’s involvement in 
processes that led to the employment of Indonesian citizens in these and other countries by 
introducing administrative requirements to capture part of that migration. Recognizing the 
demand for Indonesian migrant labour in the Malaysian state of Sabah in 1978, 
policymakers within the ministry participated in a coordinating meeting with relevant 
Sabahan authorities and left with ideas about how to insert the state’s administrative 
apparatus into the existing migration system.23 The ministry encouraged Sabahan 
companies to submit requests for Indonesian labour to the Indonesian consulate and asked 
them to pay for the costs associated with supplying it.24 In this particular location, the state 
only recorded a negligible 1,225 departures in the first two years (1979-1981),25 during 
which the ministry estimated that each month roughly 3,000 people used the unofficial 
system. In this and other cases, the state’s new programme had to compete with established 
migration systems in which intermediaries sourced Indonesian labour and passports were 
not considered necessary by workers or by those who facilitated international movement or 
their employers overseas.  
An alternative source of foreign exchange 
This policy was developed at a time when oil and gas revenues had started to decline, 
prompting policymakers to look for alternative sources of foreign exchange income.26 
Windfalls from the oil shocks in the 1970s had provided Indonesia with the resources to 
bankroll economic activity that created jobs at home. Indonesian crude oil had sold for only 
USD 1.7 a barrel at the beginning of the decade. Ten years later, it fetched USD 35 on the 
                                                          
23 Departemen Tenaga Kerja. "Perluasan kesempatan kerja melalui antar kerja antar negara ke 
Malaysia Timur." Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Bina Hubungan Ketenaga Kerjaan dan Pengawasan 
Norma Kerja. (February 1987), 8-9.  
24 "Perluasan kesempatan kerja melalui antar kerja antar negara ke Malaysia Timur." Jakarta: 
Direktorat Jenderal Bina Hubungan Ketenaga Kerjaan dan Pengawasan Norma Kerja. (February 
1987), 8-9.  
25 "Perluasan kesempatan kerja melalui antar kerja antar negara ke Malaysia Timur." Jakarta: 
Direktorat Jenderal Bina Hubungan Ketenaga Kerjaan dan Pengawasan Norma Kerja. (February 
1987), 18. 
26 For an edited volume that examines government policy during this period, see Booth, A, ed. The 
oil boom and after: Indonesian economic policy and performance n the Soeharto era (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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international market.27 Revenue from petroleum exports was so significant that it accounted 
for around 50 per cent of Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product and 70 per cent of the 
national budget.28 The New Order used its petrodollars to invest in the construction and 
rehabilitation of crucial infrastructure, partly compensating for the neglect during the 
Sukarno years.29 Petrodollars also meant, however, that the government was able to 
forestall restructuring work on the Indonesian economy.30 Instead, protection from 
competition was made available to investors who produced goods in Indonesia for 
domestic consumption and export, creating employment with the view to reducing 
expenditure on imports.  
 
Toward the end of the 1970s, the regime’s leading economic managers became 
increasingly uneasy about the country’s reliance on petroleum exports.31 Exports of coffee, 
tea and timber had decreased partly in response to the global recession. Further 
complicating matters, the United States denied Indonesia preferential trade status for 
maintaining its membership in the exclusive OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries).32 Rising internal consumption of petroleum products also increased 
fiscal expenditure because refined fuel was imported and heavily subsidized.33 These 
developments prompted concern about the poor diversification of Indonesia’s export 
portfolio when Indonesia’s foreign exchange reserves had started to decline. This 
                                                          
27 Pauker, G, "Indonesia in 1980: regime fatigue?," Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (1981): 232. 
28 Hein, G, "Indonesia in 1981: countdown to the general elections," Asian Survey 22, no. 2 (1982): 
206. 
29 Pauker, G, "Indonesia in 1980: regime fatigue?," Asian Survey 21, no. 2 (1981): 233. 
30 Hein, G, "Indonesia in 1981: countdown to the general elections," Asian Survey 22, no. 2 (1982): 
207. 
31 Grant, R M, "Indonesia 1978: a third term for President Suharto," Asian Survey 19, no. 2 (1979): 
146. 
32 OPEC members and Communist bloc countries were ineligible for the Generalized System of 
Preferences at the time of its implementation in 1976. See Özden, Ç and E Reinhardt, "The peversity 
of preferences: GSP and developing country trade policies, 1976-2000," Journal of Development 
Economics 78 (2005): 6, footnote 12. However, Indonesia, Ecuador and Venezuela became eligible 
in 1980 through an amendment that extended GSP eligibility to OPEC countries that entered into a 
bilateral trade agreement with the United States. See Trade Partnership. "The U.S. generalized 
system of preferences program: an update." Washington, DC: Prepared for the Coalition for GSP, 
(February 2011). 
33 Hein, G, "Indonesia in 1981: countdown to the general elections," Asian Survey 22, no. 2 (1982): 
206. 
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motivated President Suharto to intervene, establishing a taskforce for the purpose of 
coordinating Indonesia-based activity to exploit commercial opportunities in the Middle 
East,34 where the economy continued to boom as a result of rising revenues from petroleum 
exports. The president appointed the former anti-regime Muslim activist turned regime 
supporter Zainul Yasni to chair the team.35 Minister for Trade, Radius Prawiro, then 
established a structure that initially focused on tradable goods and services but would later 
come to accommodate labour.36 
 
It was at this uncertain moment that policymakers came to see international labour 
migration as a potential solution to Indonesia’s foreign exchange problems. By the early 
1980s the the global economy had started to move into recession, which had devastating 
consequences for Indonesia.37 International oil prices dropped as demand for other export 
commodities tapered off.38 Economic policymakers reacted by escalating the search for 
alternatives to oil exports. The Indonesian leadership was reluctant to invite greater foreign 
direct investment to help balance the books, not least because the collective memory of the 
15 January Incident (Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, Malari) of 1974, in which street 
demonstrations against Japanese interests turned into riots against foreign capital in 
Indonesia.39 The search for other alternatives identified labour migration as an area of 
activity that the state could encourage. Following these discussions, Prawiro expanded the 
                                                          
34 Presidential Decree No. 36/1977. Pembentukan Team Koordinasi Kegiatan Ekspor Timur Tengah. 
35 Presidential Decree No. 127/M 1978. Pengangkatan Ketua Team Koordinasi Kegiatan Ekspor 
Timur Tengah; Machmudi, Y, "Islamising Indonesia: the rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)" (Doctorate of Philosophy, Australian National University, 2008), 
32-33. 
36 Miniserial Decree (Trade) No. 242/KP/III/78. Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Team 
Koordinasi Kegiatan Ekspor Timur Tengah. 
37 Ramcharran, H, "OPEC's production under fluctuating oil prices: further test of the target revenue 
theory," Energy Economics 23 (2001): 670. 
38 Hill, H, The Indonesian economy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
Booth, A, ed. The oil boom and after: Indonesian economic policy and performance n the Soeharto 
era (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
39 Mackie, J, "Indonesia: economic growth and depoliticization," in Driven by growth: political 
change in the Asia-Pacific region, ed. J Morley (London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 129-
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taskforce to include the Ministry of Manpower. A committee was then established to work 
out precisely how international labour migration could better serve that purpose.40 
 
With a view to channelling migrant labour to Saudi Arabia, the working group 
brainstormed ideas about the necessary mechanisms for sourcing migrant labour in a more 
organized way.41 The Ministries of Manpower, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security and 
Religion were invited to join the deliberations.42 A representative from the Saudi Arabian 
embassy was also included to provide advice on policy directions to which the Middle 
Eastern kingdom might be amenable.43 Around 35,000 Indonesian citizens had reportedly 
already responded to Saudi Arabia’s call for labour, and many were believed to remit part 
of their wages, which gave the team some confidence about the programme’s potential as a 
solution to Indonesia’s economic problems.44 Participants talked about necessary 
mechanisms to move even more Indonesians to the Middle East, including a formal 
proposal by the Ministry of Defence to send an army officer with each group of 50 
migrants to survey the host environment and guide them during their time abroad.45 
Ultimately, the organizers decided that the state ought to set a limit on the cost of 
migration, produce standards for recruitment and develop a system of sanctions to manage 
the industry from within Indonesia.46  
 
                                                          
40 Chair Decree No. 6/SK/TT/VIII/81. Pembentukan Gugus Kerja Pembinaan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia. 
41 Team Koordinasi Kegiatan Ekspor Timur Tengah. "Gugus kerja pembinaan tenaga kerja 
Indonesia di Timur Tengah." Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan dan Koperasi. (March 1982), 5. 
42 Chair Decree No. 6/SK/TT/VIII/81. Pembentukan Gugus Kerja Pembinaan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia, menimbang d. 
43 Interview data, Pekanbaru, 21 April 2010. 
44 Team Koordinasi Kegiatan Ekspor Timur Tengah. "Gugus kerja pembinaan tenaga kerja 
Indonesia di Timur Tengah." Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan dan Koperasi. (March 1982), 2 of 
the foreword. 
45 Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, "Berbagai usaha pembinaan dan pengamanan tenaga kerja 
Indonesia di luar negeri khususnya di Timur Tengah" (paper presented at the Diskusi panel: 
peningkatan usaha pengiriman tenaga kerja Indonesia ke Timur Tengah: pengawasan dan 
perlindungan tenaga kerja Indonesia di Timur Tengah, Jakarta, 25-26 January 1983), 2: point b(3). 
46 Team Koordinasi Kegiatan Ekspor Timur Tengah. "Hasil diskusi panel: peningkatan usaha 
pengiriman tenaga kerja Indonesia ke Timur Tengah." Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan dan 
Koperasi. (1983), 5: points 6,10,11. 
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The fact that discussions around the expansion of international labour migration emerged 
as a response to far broader questions on economic policy contributed to a blurring of the 
boundary between migration and trade, as Indonesian companies became increasingly 
involved in both activities. Goods and people at times moved through similar – if not the 
same – transnational networks, as private individuals overseas used business partners in 
Indonesia to source goods and workers on their behalf. For example, in 1979 the Saudi 
Arabia-based Al Basri Trading Establishment appointed Eldy International to liaise with 
state institutions in Indonesia for the purpose of procuring the necessary authorization for 
workers to leave the country.47 Eldy International was first and foremost a commodity 
export company that traded in spices and wood.48 With time, however, their business 
activity came to include labour recruitment services for business partners overseas. A 
ministry official assigned to the labour division in the export taskforce recalls that then 
migrant workers were also frequently used to transport goods for sale in Saudi Arabia, 
complicating efforts to distinguish between international migration and trade. 
Policymakers’ first reaction was in fact not to separate migration and trade matters, but 
rather to increase migrant’s export allowance to USD 2,000.49 
 
One of the major obstacles to the development of the large-scale programme imagined by 
policymakers was the fact that there were no criteria for specialized migrant labour labour 
recruitment companies. In 1982, the labour division in the Ministry of Trade taskforce 
produced a list of companies approved to recruit labour, showing that many businesses 
were involved in sourcing Indonesian workers for hospitality, construction or shipping 
employment.50 Indonesia’s decision to enter the international labour market came late 
compared with to that of other labour exporting countries, such as Pakistan and The 
                                                          
47 Al-Basry Establishment. "Letter of authorization." Addressed to Departemen Tenaga Kerja 
Transmigrasi dan Kooperasi. April 2 1979. 
48 KBRI (Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia). "Company profile: Eldi International, PT." Embassy 
of Indonesia in Canada, http://trade.indonesia-ottawa.org/resources/dir-trade-
req/directories/company/?id=62. Accessed on 26 June 2013. 
49 Interview data, Pekanbaru, 21 April 2010. 
50 Ditjen Binaguna. "Garis-garis besar antar kerja antar negara." Jakarta: Departemen Tenaga Kerja 
dan Transmigrasi. (16 May 1982), 26-35. 
 
61 
 
 
Philippines.51 Furthermore, the timing was not in the country’s favour, as migrant labour 
demand from Saudi Arabia had already started to decline as a result of the oil glut and the 
reduction in foreign exchange revenue that it caused. The programme needed a niche in the 
international labour market, and private capital was necessary to help it get a foothold.52 
With this in mind, policymakers debated the need to overhaul the labour recruitment 
company licensing system in a way that would create a recruitment industry that made 
finding work for Indonesians overseas their main business rather than treating it as a side 
venture, as had been the case. 
The rise of labour recruitment companies 
The Ministry of Manpower started to seriously consider international labour migration as a 
potential solution to Indonesia’s labour market problems toward the end of Professor Harun 
Rasjid Zain’s years as minister (1978-1983). An intellectual-cum-administrator, Zain’s 
loyalty to the regime partly earned him the country’s first promotion from Governor of 
West Sumatra to minister in the New Order period.53 The fact that he had a long academic 
engagement with labour, including study in the United States, made him a suitable 
candidate for the manpower portfolio. But he was also hired based on his achievements in 
West Sumatra with the transmigration programme, which President Suharto described as a 
major government initiative in the meeting where he informed Zain of the appointment.54 
The task of finding employment outside Indonesia had already been outsourced to labour 
recruitment companies. But the programme was administered from within a section that 
itself was a sub-division of the directorate-general that was responsible for regulating the 
way in which labour was utilized. At the time of Zain’s appointment, then, the programme 
was a relatively insignificant initiative. 
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This changed under Zain, who signed the country’s first ministerial regulation on licensing 
labour recruitment companies in recognition of how significantly the programme had 
grown in importance to policymakers.55 It required that recruiters pay a Rp. 100,000 (USD 
100) application fee, have capacity to finance the migration process for at least 500 
workers a year and possess office infrastructure, personnel and other necessary facilities.56 
He also introduced a strategic dimension to the industry, requiring that labour recruitment 
companies to submit an annual plan for their job-matching business.57 This and the 
introduction of mandatory overseas identity cards for migrant labour, which cost Rp. 1,000 
(USD 1) each,58 expanded the ministry’s administrative role in the programme. As a result, 
the ministry reengaged in administrative processes that had come to be largely managed by 
the Ministry of Trade’s taskforce.59 Licensing of labour recruitment companies was a 
significant regulatory achievement that paved the way for the programme’s eventual return 
to the Ministry of Manpower. 
 
This regulatory amendment was partly responsible for the increase in recorded departures 
over ensuing months. When Zain left office, only around 20 companies were authorized to 
recruit migrant labour for work overseas. However, the number of migrant workers 
departing under the programme rose by almost 40 per cent on the previous year, with the 
increase in those heading for Saudi Arabia compensating for the 30 per cent decline in 
those bound for Malaysia and Singapore.60 That rate of increase was maintained in 1984-
1985 following a structural reorganization that shifted administration of the programme to 
the Overseas Employment Centre (Pusat Antar Kerja Antar Negara, Pusat AKAN).61 In 
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part, the reorganization was inspired by efforts in The Philippines that created a purpose-
specific agency for the migration business.62 But in Indonesia, Pusat AKAN, along with 
five other centres and a special committee, was made directly responsible to Minister for 
Manpower. Pusat AKAN was assigned 11 personnel, which, according to a ministry 
official engaged there at the time, was sufficient because they were expected to perform 
few administrative roles.63  
 
When Zain took office, the ministry already had records of Indonesian women migrating 
for work in the Persian Gulf. Requests for this category of migrant labour were usually 
communicated to the ministry via the consular office in Jeddah, which reported that 
migrant workers frequently sought consular assistance having experienced severe forms of 
exploitation.64 It is presumably for this reason that the ministry began to reject 
authorization to recruit female labour migrants for jobs there.65 To increase the viability of 
the potentially lucrative business, the ministry first sought to address some of the issues 
that led Indonesian domestic workers to seek assistance through bilateral channels. In 
response to the Saudi government’s position that it was under no legal obligation to 
implement the principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO),66 Zain imposed a 
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total ban on migration for domestic work to the country.67 His intention in doing so was to 
put pressure on recruiters to find alternative destinations for migrant workers, but it simply 
had the effect of driving the business underground.68  
 
This restriction on Saudi Arabia was lifted as an outcome of the Ministry of Trade 
taskforce’s involvement in reworking the overseas labour migration programme. In March 
1982, the team published a document that highlighted policies and standards that needed 
clarification.69 Within a relatively short period, the Ministry of Manpower produced a 
document it described as a ‘first step’ (langkah awal) to working out the necessary 
procedures and standards.70 The push toward enabling more kinds of labour migration also 
came from external sources, including requests from the royal family in Saudi Arabia, 
which sought to have restrictive policies such as the ban on overseas domestic work 
revised.71 Zain then wrote to the Indonesian consular office in Jeddah to explain that Saudi 
royals, senior government officials, and executives of ten companies were classified as 
eligible employers.72 In Indonesia, Islamic boarding schools expressed concern about plans 
to target female students already trained to speak Arabic for recruitment.73 In order to pre-
empt this kind of resistance, a ministry spokesperson clarified that unmarried women could 
only take up a position in Saudi Arabia if they were over the age of 30 and not ‘beautiful 
and sexy’.74 Unsurprisingly, given the repressive, political climate of the early 1980s, 
statements of this kind effectively foreclosed further public debate.75 
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As part of these revisions, Zain imposed the requirement that either the employer or an 
Indonesian labour recruitment company must deposit a bond with the Indonesian 
government for each domestic worker employed. In addition to providing Indonesian 
authorities with an alternative source of funds with which to buy return tickets for 
Indonesian migrant workers, 76 the bond also served to prevent Saudi Arabia from 
dominating the programme.77 Meanwhile, the re-election of Suharto to his fourth term as 
president a few months earlier had refocussed attention on the objective in the Third Five 
Year Development Plan (1979-1984) to achieve 100,000 departures at a time when the 
programme was struggling to even make 50 per cent of its annual target.78 Following a 
conversation with the relevant director-general in the ministry,79 the taskforce convened a 
discussion panel that included over 50 participants from the recruitment industry and a 
wide range of government agencies.80 The purpose of this meeting was to work out a road 
map for producing further systems and procedures to help the recruitment industry compete 
on a larger scale with other countries exporting labour to the Middle East.81 
 
The establishment of Pusat AKAN marked an end to the Ministry of Trade’s involvement 
in the programme, in line with a broader shift that had taken place. With the establishment 
of the Fourth Development Cabinet (1983-1988), new ministers were able to adjust 
institutional arrangements put in place by their predecessors. The new Minister for Trade, 
Rachmat Saleh, disbanded the taskforce, noting that it had already served its purpose. 
Members, including officials on secondment, were sent back to the Ministry of Trade to 
work on new initiatives. The taskforce’s labour division had become very profitable for 
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those involved, a fact brought to the attention of the new Minister for Manpower, Admiral 
Sudomo, who recalled officials on his ministry’s payroll. Sudomo then used his 
connections with the president to wrest control over the programme away from the 
Ministry of Trade.82 Having reclaimed the migration business for the Ministry of 
Manpower, Sudomo stationed the activity on the seventh floor of a privately-owned 
building.83 It was with this change that the programme’s purpose shifted from generating 
foreign exchange to focusing more exclusively on servicing labour recruitment companies. 
Maximizing economic benefits for the recruitment industry 
The appointment of Sudomo to the manpower portfolio marked a shift toward a more 
authoritarian approach to migrant labour, as indeed was the case for labour relations more 
generally.84 Sudomo was a retired Navy officer whom Suharto had entrusted to manage the 
intelligence and surveillance body called the Operational Command for the Restoration of 
Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Kopkamtib). 
Sudomo’s defence force background positioned him well to help suppress social discontent 
in line with the New Order’s commitment to providing political stability for foreign and 
domestic capital.85 This orientation was reflected in his approach to international labour 
migration. 
 
After two years in the minister’s seat, Sudomo passed a law that defined labour recruitment 
companies’ responsibilities concerning migrant workers.86 The Ministry of Trade had 
suggested a regulation of this kind before Sudomo took office. However, it had been 
deprioritized, only to be reconsidered when a spate of cases involving Indonesian labour 
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migrants in Saudi Arabia put pressure on the ministry intervene.87 Sudomo attempted to 
overcome this problem by requiring that labour recruitment companies take responsibility 
for resolving problems that arose overseas.88 To strengthen the state’s capacity to intervene 
more directly, Indonesia’s first labour attachés were posted to the capital cities of the 
programme’s two biggest destination countries, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. One of the 
duties of those labour attachés was to monitor migrant workers with left-wing political 
tendencies.89 Day-to-day, the Ministry of Manpower expected that the postings would 
prevent Indonesian consular offices from gate-keeping access to the local labour market by 
only approving the applications of particular companies.90 
 
Desire on the part of Indonesian bureaucrats to exercise greater control over access to 
Indonesian migrant labour grew alongside their commercial interests. The ministry 
beseeched Indonesian embassies to use their diplomatic clout with host governments to 
restrict work permits to Indonesian migrants registered with Indonesian authorities.91 
Policymakers’ interest in the control of Indonesian migrant labour from overseas was partly 
motivated by the distribution of financial rewards associated with the migration business. 
However, it can also be explained by the New Order regime’s shifting orientation. The 
early 1980s were an uncertain period for the New Order leadership, as popular support for 
the regime began to wane. During this period, the international migration programme 
became increasingly oriented towards bureaucratic ends, such as achieving targets and 
helping the recruitment industry turn a greater profit.92 
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Sudomo became increasingly concerned with the consequences that migrant workers’ 
actions had for Indonesia’s international image.93 In an attempt to control migrant workers, 
he introduced a requirement that they sign a declaration to the effect that they would 
abstain from talking about their labour migration experiences with the mass media or non-
government organizations (NGOs).94 Sudomo was concerned about the negative publicity 
that these groups could generate in Indonesia.95 He also feared that news of exploitation of 
Indonesian labour migrants by Saudi employers could jeopardize Jakarta’s bilateral 
relationship with Riyadh. This requirement reflected a general consensus among 
Indonesian policymakers that the rights and welfare of labour migrants were a lower 
priority than the programme’s economic and political objectives. In line with this view, 
they also blamed labour migrants for their own exploitation, arguing that Indonesian 
migrants could be lackadaisical and undisciplined, which in turn damaged the country’s 
good name.96  
 
Sudomo also took the opportunity to require migrant workers to remit at least 50 per cent 
of their wage to Indonesia via the formal banking system.97 Part of an attempt to make 
remittances of foreign currency to Indonesia legible to state institutions, this policy 
mirrored an attempt by The Philippines government to do so a year earlier.98 The 
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Philippines decree, which required overseas contract workers to show evidence of their 
remittances when extending their passports, was cancelled following a campaign against 
forced remittances.99 No such campaign emerged in Indonesia. In part, this was because the 
ministry did not establish administrative systems to enforce it. As a result, Indonesian 
labour migrants continued to remit money through informal intermediaries or brought their 
total earnings with them on their flight home. 
 
Further attention to state involvement in the administration of international labour 
migration in Indonesia reveals some of the ways in which the system helped generate 
greater profits for intermediaries. The ministry attempted to increase demand from 
employers by adjusting the division of recruitment costs. As part of a promotion strategy, 
the Indonesian government supported the decision to transfer the cost of recruitment from 
employers to workers with the justification that it would make Indonesian migrant labour 
more competitive.100 In Sabah, for example employers had been asked to cover the entire 
cost of recruitment in 1978.101 After the ministry changed its position, employers were 
allowed to pay the fee and then deduct it from migrants’ wages under an agreement signed 
by the minister. Sudomo reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to this financing arrangement 
at the end of 1983, helping Indonesians overtake Filipinos as the largest group of foreign 
workers in that state.102 Such agreements not only changed existing arrangements so that 
they made more economic sense to employers but also inserted the ministry into the 
migration process. 
 
The Presidential Office also intervened to make the business more profitable for labour 
recruitment companies by exempting intending migrant workers from an international 
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departure tax charged to Indonesian citizens and expatriates known as fiskal.103 In theory, 
the exemption helped make Indonesian migrant labour more competitive in the 
international labour market. In practice, it meant that labour recruitment companies 
generated higher profits, as the cost reduction was not passed on to clients. Efforts to make 
the business more profitable also benefited low-level bureaucrats. For example, one 
ministry official recalls that servicing labour recruitment companies in the early 1980s as a 
junior clerk provided him with extra income. His official salary was around IDR 18,000 
(USD 17) each month, but the extra income from ‘consultancies’ for labour recruitment 
companies helped him make five times that much. 
 
Sudomo also restricted access to labour recruitment company licences, which made it even 
easier for licenced recruiters to maximize their profits. In 1986, a Pusat AKAN team 
revoked over 80 per cent of recruitment licences from labour recruitment companies that 
supplied migrant labour to the Middle East and forced other businesses into merger 
arrangements.104 Companies that emerged intact from this first round of evaluations and 
supplied migrant labour to the Middle East were told whether they could recruit men or 
women. An overhaul on this scale would not be seen again until the mid-1990s, when 
Minister for Manpower, Abdul Latief (1993-1998), reversed the more liberal regime that 
his predecessor Cosmas Batubara (1988-1993) introduced as a correction to Sudomo’s 
downsizing.105 Companies that supplied migrants to non-Middle Eastern destinations were 
not subject to either round of evaluations, demonstrating the relatively lower priority that 
the ministry placed on the Asian region at the time. The decision to focus on the Middle 
East and the identification of companies that retained their licences took into account a mix 
of technical and political factors, including whether the outcome would affect the business 
interests of officials in the ministry or in other government agencies. 
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A different kind of intervention 
By the mid-1980s, departures to the Middle East had steadily increased and neighbouring 
countries in Southeast Asia emerged as popular destinations. The numbers of labour 
migrants travelling through the formal programme to Malaysia and Singapore were 
unstable. The ministry registered between five and eight thousand departures each year 
between 1982 and 1986, but that figure leaped to 20,000 in 1988.106 In part, this jump is 
attributable to a shift in the purpose of the programme, which policymakers increasingly 
saw as a mechanism for making Indonesian labour migration in the region more orderly. 
Indonesian labour migrants frequently crossed international borders in the region without 
passports or the need for an employment permit.107 Moreover, administrative systems in the 
region were weak, which enabled Indonesians to acquire local identity documents.108 It was 
this situation that the programme increasingly sought to address. 
 
Pusat AKAN’s re-evaluation of the recruitment industry in 1986 had not been entirely 
driven by domestic political concerns. The greater numbers of Indonesians leaving the 
country under the programme had caught the attention of policymakers in 
intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the ILO. In that circle, the prevailing view was that the poor were migrating in 
search of work because economic development had failed to generate the opportunities 
those people needed to remain at home.109 Around the same time, wealthier states became 
more interested in the idea of controlling labour migration, which some attempted to 
achieve by promoting more targeted economic development in countries of origin. The 
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logic followed that the economic incentives for migration would disappear once differences 
in the standard of living between countries diminished.110 On the other hand, however, 
these same states implemented migration policies that enabled their citizens to hire labour 
migrants for the purpose of performing work that was unattractive to local workers.111  
 
In Indonesia, international agencies sought to influence policy in ways that supported 
global processes in an orderly way. In the early 1980s the UNDP funded a project to help 
Indonesia refine its technical processes and better market Indonesian labour to the Middle 
East.112 The initiative started off as a joint project between the ILO and the International 
Trade Centre under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).113 An ILO 
consultant employed on the project recalls recommending that Indonesia treat migration 
and trade separately,114 perhaps influencing Sudomo’s 1983 decision to reintegrate the 
international migration programme into the manpower portfolio. The employment 
dimension of the joint project was gradually shifted to the ILO, which engaged a former 
Philippines Overseas Employment Office employee to work with Indonesian government 
personnel to straighten out technical aspects of the programme.115 The ILO Office in 
Jakarta has since destroyed the policy documents that this team of consultants produced.116 
However, a later document that draws on direct experience with this project indicates that a 
primary focus at that time was refining systems with the view to expanding the supply of 
migrant labour.117 
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In conjunction with Pusat AKAN, ILO consultants produced a list of recommendations for 
modifying institutional and legal structures concerning the programme. The report was 
ultimately authored by Pusat AKAN bureaucrat, Yusak Masduki, the centre’s head of 
promotion.118 Masduki examined 39 substantive weaknesses in the programme’s 
institutional and legal architecture. He reported, for example, that the centre was seriously 
under-resourced with only 52 personnel119 —in The Philippines, 520 officials were 
assigned to the same kind of work. The report also lamented that the centre was 
inappropriately located in a vocational training centre, 12 kilometres away from the 
ministry’s main administrative seat. The physical distance might not have been a serious 
problem except that Pusat AKAN lacked even basic communication infrastructure, such as 
a telephone or facsimile machine. This serious lack of resources impeded the centre’s 
capacity to communicate effectively with stakeholders in Indonesia and in destination 
countries.120 Major recommendations also included simplifying bureaucratic procedures to 
develop a competitive edge on other labour sending countries, such as India, Pakistan, The 
Philippines and South Korea.121 
 
ILO involvement in the reforms was part of an international push to make human 
movement to the global north more legible to administrators. France, Spain, Italy, The 
United Kingdom and The United States had all passed legislation by the mid-1980s that 
sought to regularize foreign nationals working without passports and/or work permits. In 
Southeast Asia, the push for regularization is illustrated by the part that Malaysian 
authorities played in negotiating bilateral labour agreements with neighbouring countries in 
those years. In 1982, Malaysia established a cross-sectoral committee to coordinate 
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recruitment of foreign workers for employment in the country.122 Two years later, it signed 
what came to be known as the Medan Agreement with Indonesia, outlining mechanisms for 
sourcing migrant labour.123 Indonesia’s Ministry of Manpower then implemented the 
agreement through a regulation that mapped out the necessary procedures for migration.124 
Ultimately, however, this attempt to include Malaysia in the programme’s scope failed, 
reportedly due to a lack of appropriate administrative systems in Indonesia.125  
Opening up to criticism from within 
In the late 1980s, the New Order government introduced a policy of ‘openness’ 
(keterbukaan), a kind of political liberalization. Economically, the regime had already 
started to move away from centralized control to a more liberal way of managing foreign 
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investment.126 As a consequence, Indonesia’s middle class had grown significantly.127 The 
Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat Indonesia, PDI) had also become more of 
an opposition force to reckon with.128 Further complicating matters for the president, 
trusted men like Ali Moertopo had died or retired. Others, like Benny Moerdani, who had 
taken a critical stance on the business activities of Suharto’s children, and Yusuf Wanandi, 
who had suggested to Suharto that he start planning for succession, had fallen out of 
favour.129 The regime also became increasingly sensitive to media coverage, which had 
become increasingly strident as media outlets grew more confident publishing critical 
articles about formerly taboo matters.130 
 
These changes in the broader political landscape had implications for the ministry and the 
implementation of its programmes. Following the 1987 elections Suharto loyalist Sudomo 
was given oversight of the portfolio that coordinated politics, law and security, partly in 
recognition of his successes as Minister for Manpower. His replacement, Cosmas Batubara 
– who in 1966 had been at the front line of the pro-Suharto student movement131 – started 
to reverse the corporatist labour relations policies of the Sudomo period.132 His approach to 
the overseas labour migration programme was also much more liberal than that of his 
predecessor. Batubara revised restrictions on the number of labour recruitment companies 
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involved in recruitment.133 In response to mass media reports that Malaysian authorities 
had progressively adopted a tougher stance in dealing with unlawful migrants, Batubara 
made trips to Sabah and Sarawak to see first-hand the severity of the situation.134 On that 
trip, he signed a bilateral agreement, which was followed by the first of a series of 
regularization programmes in Sabah.135 
 
Batubara writes in his autobiography that he saw this and the liberalization of the licensing 
system as serious attempts to tackle Indonesia’s high level of underemployment.136 Like 
Zain, Batubara claims to have tightened selection criteria to prevent migrants with poor 
skills from leaving under the programme.137 It was at this time that the ministry introduced 
higher standards for mandatory training and certification. Domestic workers had to be 
taught to cook, iron and how to use a washing machine, while nannies needed to learn how 
to watch, wash, feed and put children to sleep.138 Batubara also required that Indonesian 
migrant workers had to have a minimum competency in the target language to enable 
communication with employers, obliging labour recruitment companies to teach them at 
least 200 words.139 In practice, however, these policies were not consistently enforced. The 
mandatory training requirement thus in fact helped rogue labour recruitment companies 
charge migrants for services they did not receive.  
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As part of an attempt to expand the formal role of labour recruitment companies into other 
geographical areas, Batubara positioned them as programme partners (mitra kerja).140 He 
required these companies to perform more administrative roles to help the ministry respond 
to complicated problems, such as the non-payment of wages overseas. Mention of the 
government-recognized Indonesian Manpower Supply Association (IMSA) was included in 
regulations, where it was charged with helping communicate policy and monitoring 
implementation among members.141 The ministry under Batubara also took advantage of 
the fact that the association had formed informal groupings around destination regions and 
cities to better target its monitoring role.142 As these examples suggest, the principle that 
informed many of Batubara’s policy choices was that government ought ‘to steer rather 
than row’.143 In the context of the overseas labour migration programme, this and poor 
implementation meant that labour recruitment company owners were frequently free to 
decide their own course. 
A step backwards 
After Suharto’s re-election to the presidency in 1992, another businessman, Abdul Latief, 
was appointed as Minister of Manpower in the sixth Development Cabinet (1993-1998). 
Before the election, international commentators had stepped up their criticism of the New 
Order regime, claiming that it was falling short of its economic reform programmes 
because of red tape and corruption.144 During the campaign, critics – and even other 
members of government – described Pusat AKAN as a ‘den of thieves’ (tempat maling). 
These accusations were not without reason: an official who worked there at the time recalls 
the comfortable lifestyle he and his colleagues were able to finance through the collection 
of bribes. A portion was handed over to senior officials but the junior bureaucrats pocketed 
the rest. It is this corrupt culture of administration that reportedly prompted Latief to move 
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Pusat AKAN’s operations to the ministry’s main building, where their work could be 
monitored more easily. Formalizing Latief’s move through a decree six months later, the 
president approved his proposal to fold Pusat AKAN into the Directorate-General of 
Guidance of Labour Placement.145 
 
The following year, Latief instituted a mechanism that would allow the ministry to perform 
the kind of ad hoc evaluations of labour recruitment companies that Sudomo had used to 
restrict the industry in 1986. Evaluations could be undertaken periodically or at random by 
an Evaluation Team.146 Labour recruitment companies could be given verbal or written 
warnings, have their licences temporarily suspended or permanently cancelled.147 The 
criteria for performance were based on four main areas: quality of management, human 
resources, capital and promotion of migrant labour.148 The minister also defined the team’s 
role as helping with the technical aspects of assessing applications for licences.149 In terms 
of its structure, the team was intended to include other individuals, such as accountants and 
an industry representative from IMSA.150 In practice, however, the committee only 
included ministry personnel. As in 1986, the ministry revoked the majority of labour 
recruitment company licences, in line with the new standards for licensing. This 
predictably had the effect that survivors would be more amenable to Latief’s requests that 
they channel formal fees to his private account.151 
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The ministry delegated some of the administrative roles of the former Pusat AKAN to its 
regional implementation units, instituting an internal reporting mechanism that enabled the 
compilation of statistics on a national scale.152 The units were recast in a subordinate 
relationship to the Ministry of Manpower’s provincial offices, where they were then 
authorized to assess labour recruitment companies’ requests to recruit labour migrants.153 
Unit personnel were required to witness the signing of employment contracts and furnish 
labour migrants with the necessary note exempting them from fiskal.154 In Jakarta, most of 
these roles gradually returned to the ministry in response to complaints by labour 
recruitment companies that implementation unit staff were not adequately trained.155  
 
A state-owned company called Binajasa Abadikarya (Bijak) was established to ostensibly 
introduce competition into the recruitment industry, which was dominated by privately 
owned labour recruitment companies that had come to specialize in overseas domestic 
work.156 Bijak was set up as a subsidiary of Jamsostek, another state-owned company that 
provided employment insurance to workers in Indonesia. Latief was chair of the board of 
directors and a career bureaucrat, Soeramsihono – who would later rise to the senior-most 
position in relation to the programme – was the president director.157 Statistics for this 
government-to-government scheme were kept separate from the private-to-private scheme 
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because, although labour recruitment companies sometimes supplied labour, Bijak worked 
through a government appointed taskforce.158  
 
Latief also negotiated a deal with the Directorate-General of Immigration that would enable 
the ministry to open a ‘one stop shop’. The special unit, which formerly operated in 
Halim,159 took up occupancy in the ministry’s main building on the mezzanine floor 
between its first and ground levels, adjacent to the minister’s quarters. This arrangement 
was short-lived due to allegations of corruption. Despite being under-staffed, the 
immigration unit would sometimes produce up to 500 passports a day. Ministry personnel 
defended the extra fees the immigration officials charged as compensation for unpaid 
overtime. However, public censure by Latief prompted the Directorate-General of 
Immigration to remove the special unit to office space in Cikokol, West Jakarta, where it 
gradually abandoned its collaboration with the ministry. In retrospect, one ministry official 
who worked closely with the special unit then believes that Latief sacrificed it to shift 
attention from corrupt practices in areas of the overseas labour migration programme that 
could be directly linked to him.160 
 
Public criticism mounted as details surfaced that ministry officials siphoned off revenue for 
their own purposes. Nevertheless, between 1996 and 1997 the ministry achieved a 75 per 
cent rise in departures.161 This dramatic increase put pressure on departure and arrival 
services at Jakarta International Airport, to which Latief responded by issuing decrees that 
directed migrants away from the general return hall. In 1993 Latief gave Oring Jabu Jaya, a 
company that would later provide skills training for migrants with jobs in the Middle East, 
the exclusive right to transport returned migrant workers to their villages.162 Oring Jabu 
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Jaya failed to do so in a timely way, forcing some migrant workers to wait in its Jakarta 
compound for days while passengers were sorted according to their destination.163 
Following these failures, Latief cancelled the appointment in 1994, instead requiring 
individual labour recruitment companies to organize the transportation.164 The system was 
also not entirely effective: long-term taxi drivers recall that passengers could bribe 
gatekeepers in return for access to new arrivals. Nevertheless, it would later constitute one 
of the mandatory services in the controversial migrant worker arrival hall.165 
Stymied reform after the Asian Financial Crisis 
1997 and 1998 turned out to be turbulent years in Indonesia, as the Asian Financial Crisis 
set in motion events that would unseat the president and bring an end to his 32 years of 
autocratic rule.166 Before those events unfolded, President Suharto replaced Latief with 
Theo Sambuaga in the short-lived Seventh Development Cabinet (March-May 1998).167 
President Suharto resigned following massive riots in Jakarta in May 1998,168 and vice 
president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, assumed the top job. Habibie replaced Sambuaga 
with Fahmi Idris, Sambuaga’s immediate successor as vice secretary to the Golkar 
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Advisory Council. Like Batubara, Idris had supported Suharto’s rise to power while a 
student activist.  
 
Upon Idris’ appointment to the manpower portfolio in the Development Reform Cabinet 
(1998-1999), questions were raised about whether he could deliver a reformist programme. 
But despite his strong association with the New Order, Idris pushed through a series of 
important reforms.169 On his ninth day in office, Idris cancelled the decree on mandatory 
insurance for migrant workers – which Sambuaga had passed just a few weeks earlier – 
because he deemed it inappropriate that the Ministry of Manpower selected insurers when 
the Ministry of Finance had the expertise to do so.170 Idris followed through by declaring 
void related administrative decisions, such as the appointment of a consortium of insurers 
to handle migrants’ claims by the Director-General for Guidance of Overseas Labour 
Placement. In line with broader policy, Idris removed New Order-style officials from 
executive positions and replaced them with public figures from outside the bureaucracy. 
For example, he appointed Professor Din Syamsuddin as Director-General for the 
Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement partly because he had a public reputation for 
siding with migrant workers over labour recruitment companies.  
 
With time, it became clear that the ministry needed a cross-sectoral structure to coordinate 
other state agencies’ involvement in the administration of the overseas labour migration 
programme.171 The concept was not new: ministry officials had proposed it as early as 
1988.172 Habibie issued a presidential decree that established such a coordinating agency 
involving seven ministers, the head of the police and the governor of the Bank of 
Indonesia, while leaving the day-to-day administration to the ministry’s Directorate-
General of Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement.173 The coordinating agency partly 
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served its purpose, using its quarterly meetings to work out how different state 
organizations could align their administrative work to speed up processing. However, the 
structure was largely ineffective for two main reasons. First, the administrative expenses 
were taken from the Ministry of Manpower’s budget, making proposals for initiatives 
subject to internal ordering of priorities. Second, it was staffed by members with 
responsibilities in their own portfolios rather than by dedicated personnel, which 
complicated efforts to negotiate and implement policy. 
 
Idris also decreed a range of other changes to the programme in the weeks before the 1999 
legislative elections.174 He obtained permission to reorganize the infrastructure formerly 
established by Pusat AKAN in the regions to include sections for preparation and guidance, 
protection and evaluation and a division for managing units’ administrative, financial and 
human resources. To administrators in areas such as East Java, this initiative was 
experienced as little more than a change in name.175 However, the internal restructuring 
would become important in the context of decentralization. Before this change, the units 
were subordinate and responsible to the ministry’s regional offices, which would be 
reorganized into the provincial government under decentralization. Pre-empting this, Idris 
made the units responsible to the ministry in Jakarta but left them under the coordination of 
local manpower offices. This dealt with the growing concern that once regional autonomy 
was implemented the ministry would need its own institutional infrastructure outside the 
capital to administer the overseas labour migration programme. 
 
The fallout of the Asian Financial Crisis complicated Idris’ reform agenda, as it motivated 
greater numbers of Indonesians to migrate. The unemployment rate rose as companies laid 
off workers, and the cost of living increased due in part to the higher cost of importing 
goods with a much weaker rupiah. At the same time, overseas employment appeared more 
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attractive than ever before, as the value of wages in places like Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore increased in rupiah value. In one prominent case, the leader of an Indonesian 
migrant worker organization in Hong Kong recalls that economic hardship compelled her 
to drop out of university and register for overseas employment.176 She was not alone, as the 
number of departures to Hong Kong in that period rose from 3,142 (1996) to 19,531 
(1998).177 
 
This speedy rise in migrants’ earnings overseas has been described by some as a 
‘blessing’.178 More critical observers found that those who responded to the change still 
spent the bulk of their income paying off recruitment debts and the consumption needs of 
their families in Indonesia. Before the crisis, foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong 
earned the equivalent of IDR 700,000. By 1998 they made IDR 3,500,000 a month, five 
times more in nominal terms. Simultaneously, however, indebtedness became an even 
stronger feature of the programme. For recruitment to Hong Kong, the Association of 
Indonesian Labour Service Companies (Asosiasi Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, 
APJATI), formerly IMSA, lobbied the Minister for Manpower to authorize the charging of 
fees in pre-crisis foreign currency values.179 The request was approved with only minor 
revisions, allowing recruiters to collect the equivalent of seven months’ salary from Hong 
Kong-based workers.180 This practice would continue despite repeated attempts by the 
ministry to lower the fee in later years.181  
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Changes in employer company practice in Asian destination countries further exacerbated 
the situation. In Hong Kong, labour recruitment companies also discovered a market for 
‘discounted’ workers, promoting Indonesian labour migrants at below the legal minimum 
rate.182 In other destinations, such as Malaysia and Singapore, labour recruitment 
companies began advertising zero cost services, which transferred fees from employers to 
Indonesian migrant workers. This was largely possible because in these countries the law 
enabled labour recruitment companies to charge migrants’ fees to future employers, who 
would in turn deduct them from their workers’ wages. As a consequence, the crisis made 
the service cheaper for employers without diminishing returns to recruiters. 
The long reform 
In 1999, President Habibie pushed through an ambitious decentralization programme that 
promised to fundamentally change centre-periphery relations in Indonesia. Laws were 
introduced in the May of that year that transferred a greater proportion of the national 
budget to local government as well as authority to regulate all matters except for foreign 
affairs, defence, justice, monetary or fiscal policy, religion and other specified activity.183 
The implementation of this law was of course not immediate. The legislature delegated 
much responsibility to outline the process and systems for transferring administrative 
authority and the associated budget to sub-national governments. By 2001, the executive 
branch had still not yet produced all of the necessary regulations to implement the 
programme, and administrators sometimes found that articles in the decentralization laws 
conflicted with other laws.184 As this suggests, the years immediately following the 
promulgation of the decentralization programme were shrouded in a great deal of legal 
uncertainty. While this was particularly the case for groups seeking to form new sub-
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national units of government, the same problems faced those with the task of sorting out 
how to divide up administrative activity that had previously been handled exclusively by 
central government agencies. 
 
Habibie’s party, Golkar, only won 120 seats in the June 1999 legislative election. In 
October the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) 
rejected his accountability speech. Sensing that his bid for the presidency was no longer a 
realistic goal, Habibie then withdrew his candidacy for the presidency which at that time 
was still determined by members in the assembly, comprised of all 560 parliamentarians in 
the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the 132 
members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). As a 
result in 1999, Megawati Sukarnoputri missed out on the presidency even though the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan, PDIP) 
held the largest number of seats in the DPR. A coalition of Muslim parties called the Poros 
Tengah alliance, backed Nahdlatul Ulama figurehead Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of 
the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). Golkar then also threw 
its weight behind Wahid, which gave him enough votes to win against Megawati. This 
controversial start to Indonesia’s return to democratic rule led observers to question 
whether the political system would support the substance of the reform package introduced 
in the Habibie Interregnum.185 
 
President Wahid replaced Idris with Bomer Pasaribu, a Golkar cadre and chair of the 
Confederation of All Indonesia Workers Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh 
Indonesia, KSPSI),186 as Minister for Manpower in the National Unity cabinet (1999-
2001). In this period, administration of the overseas labour migration programme 
progressively departed from the intention to reform it.187 For the entire year that Pasaribu 
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spent in the position, he was busy dealing with the politics of negotiating the content of 
Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions. He also instructed the ministry’s legal bureau to 
produce decrees and regulations that would strengthen the position of labour against 
employers.188 As part of this initiative, a study was conducted of the 197 decrees and 
regulations issued during the New Order years, which found that they all favoured 
employers and government. It is during this time that Pasaribu passed a decree that reduced 
labour flexibility by making it more expensive to hire and fire workers.189 During this time, 
the reformist bureaucrat, Syamsuddin, who was tasked with reforming administration of 
the overseas labour migration programme, tendered his resignation three times partly out of 
frustration with the lack of support he received from the minister.190  
 
The receding drive to reform the overseas labour migration programme continued after 
Wahid replaced Pasaribu with Al Hilal Hamdi through a cabinet reshuffle in August 2000, 
during which the ministry was re-amalgamated with the transmigration portfolio.191 In the 
following month, the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 
MUI) issued a fatwa that sending women to work overseas without making arrangements 
to guarantee their honour and safety was forbidden under Islamic law.192 Hamdi responded 
that he was sympathetic to their concern but that there were simply not enough jobs in 
Indonesia.193 This policy position found traction among his senior-most staff. 
Soeramsihono, the career bureaucrat who had formerly held the programme’s top post 
under Latief, replaced Syamsuddin as director-general. Soeramsihono is on the public 
record for supporting the labour recruitment companies’ push to reverse reforms to the 
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programme that required them, not migrants, to pay for mandatory pre-departure 
training.194  
 
In 2001, Hamdi finalized the process for redistributing administrative roles between the 
three tiers of government under Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance. In line with the 
law, the ministry decentralized much of the administration relating to the selection of 
migrant workers to the city/district level. Lawmakers imagined a much less autonomous 
role for provincial authorities, which were expected to act as an administrative extension of 
the centre.195 However, an implementing regulation complicated the division of labour by 
allowing central authorities to directly provide services related to national scale 
programmes.196 For these reasons, the ministry retained control over licensing of 
employment and insurance companies, granting permission to recruit migrant labour, 
providing pre-departure training and finalizing the administrative process for labour 
migrants ready to leave Indonesia. 
 
The redistribution of assets and personnel to the sub-national level complicated matters for 
staff assigned to the implementation units. Unit staff complained about reduction in 
prestige, the loss of earning power and the lack of work after the ministry’s offices were 
turned over to the provincial government.197 Those officials, along with labour recruitment 
companies, successfully lobbied the ministry to recentralize the units under the Directorate-
General of Overseas Labour Placement. Where the unit occupied a separate office or 
building, the ministry simply assumed control of the assets and personnel. This was the 
case, for example, in Nunukan in East Kalimantan.198 Frequently, however, the process was 
more complex, as most units relied on the resources of provincial authorities for office 
space and other basic infrastructure. The ministry gradually acquired land and built stand-
alone offices as agreements between the ministry and provincial authorities expired, as was 
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the case in Yogyakarta.199 In all locations, central and provincial officials were responsible 
to managers who worked for different tiers of government, which did not always share 
priorities or purposes. Collegiality initially prevented conflict between them, but legal and 
political developments over the ensuing five years sorely tested their willingness and 
capacity to cooperate. 
 
The transition to decentralized government was an uncertain period for labour recruitment 
companies. In particular, they were confused by the laws produced by hundreds of districts 
and cities on the costs and procedures for setting up recruitment infrastructure and 
registering residents for international labour migration. Predictably, this created 
competition between local governments.200 For example, Kediri District made it easier to 
obtain the required documents if labour recruitment companies established subsidiary 
offices in its jurisdiction. Patterns of recruitment changed as a consequence of these local 
government policies, shown by reduction of recruitment in less profitable areas of the 
business, such as males for employment in Malaysia, which declined by 30 per cent in 
comparison to the previous three years.201 Conversely, more profitable segments of the 
market, such as the recruitment of women for employment in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
increased.202 In Jakarta, where the majority of migrants were processed, the central and 
provincial government authorities attempted to address competition in the system by 
introducing an informal division of administrative labour according to destination country. 
Whereas the ministry finalized the administrative process for migrants bound for the 
Middle East and Taiwan through a unit in East Jakarta, the provincial government did so 
for the rest of the Asia-Pacific region in South Jakarta.203 
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This reorganization may have helped to prevent competition between state agencies, but 
did little to improve conditions for the migrant workers participating in the state-sponsored 
system. As noted earlier, recruiters in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and other 
destination countries had arrangements with labour recruitment companies in Indonesia 
that enabled women in particular to register for migration without paying upfront fees. In 
Hong Kong, the administration took action against employers who paid the fee directly to 
recruiters, prompting them to design alternative methods, such as through loans from 
public finance companies.204 Malaysia and Singapore had no such laws, so labour 
recruitment companies there continued with arrangements whereby employers recouped 
the expense from workers’ wages. In all cases, labour recruitment companies continued 
charging for sub-standard services in an attempt to protect their investment in expenses, 
such as food and accommodation. The immediate reform period thus delivered little in the 
way of substantive change. 
When ‘reformists’ lose their drive for reform 
In 2001, the MPR impeached Wahid and installed Megawati Sukarnoputri as president, a 
position she held until 2004.205 Megawati appointed loyal supporter Jacob Nuwa Wea as 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration. Nuwa Wea had held leadership positions in the 
PDI since 1981, but his close relationship with Megawati can be traced back to 1993 when 
he derailed Suharto’s attempts to marginalize Megawati at the PDI’s fourth congress by 
organizing cars and jeeps to crash into the Hotel Tiara auditorium where party cadres were 
voting.206 A few months later Megawati was appointed leader at an extraordinary congress. 
But Nuwa Wea also had over 30 years’ experience in labour matters and was chair of 
KSPSI (2000-2005) at the time of his appointment. Nuwa Wea’s background made him a 
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suitable candidate for the manpower portfolio. But it was his decision to distance KSPSI 
from his predecessor’s political party, Golkar, and ally the trade union with PDI that 
convinced Megawati that he was the most suitable candidate for the job.207 
 
Nuwa Wea soon came under pressure to orient the country’s overseas labour migration 
programme more toward providing fully documented workers to neighbouring countries. 
At the beginning of 2002 Indonesian factory workers in Malaysia rioted, prompting 
authorities to adopt a ‘Hire Indonesians Last’ policy.208 It was following these sorts of 
developments that Nuwa Wea sought to at least reduce the number of Indonesians working 
in Malaysia without valid migration documents. He instructed officials to draft a new 
decree to introduce ambitious, pro-migrant standards, such as the capping of recruitment 
fees. In the case that migrants had to pay the fee, Nuwa Wea limited it to the equivalent of 
one month’s wages and forbade post-deployment payment schedules that required migrants 
to hand over more than 25 per cent of their income at any time.209 However the decree 
failed to effect change partly because Nuwa Wea refused to compromise with labour 
recruitment companies regarding the limits it imposed on financing labour migration. 
Recruiters of course preferred the status quo and the ministry was unable to control the sum 
that they, financiers and employers in destination countries charged to Indonesian migrant 
workers. 
 
The situation quickly worsened after Malaysian authorities started deporting what would 
soon amount to over 400,000 people to various ports in Indonesia in August.210 Almost 70 
people died in camps in East Kalimantan, which came to be known as the Nunukan 
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Tragedy. By and large, the deaths were caused by the failure of Indonesian authorities to 
coordinate an appropriate response despite knowing for some time that an influx of return 
migrants was inevitable. At the heart of the problem was the fact that central government 
agencies in Jakarta, including the manpower portfolio, refused to commit resources to 
handling it. The local government in Nunukan had set up a repatriation taskforce as part of 
its response, but quickly stepped back after realizing that a large proportion of deportees 
had no interest in going back to their province of origin.211 The ministry’s labour 
recruitment companies stepped in, seeking to make a profit out of deportees’ desire to 
return to Malaysia for work. It was in these recruiters’ camps where so many people died. 
Mounting public pressure around the deaths compelled the central government to intervene 
by acquiring land to construct temporary barracks. However, these were never fully built 
and national, provincial and local authorities stopped coordinating their efforts, leaving the 
military with the task of feeding the deportees.212  
 
This administrative debacle became the basis of a class action against the government. In 
January 2003 a group of 53 people filed a citizen’s lawsuit against nine senior government 
officials, who had authority to respond to the humanitarian crisis, including Megawati and 
Nuwa Wea.213 In May, the Central Jakarta court accepted the case for hearing based on the 
finding that Indonesian law permitted citizens who were not directly aggrieved to sue the 
government for negligence. The court decided in December that the government had failed 
to act appropriately, ordering the enforcement and ratification of all relevant laws.214 The 
Jakarta High Court would annul that order a year later, but not before four alternative bills 
concerning the overseas labour migration programme and migrant workers were tabled in 
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the national legislature. Nua Wea represented the government in meetings with lawmakers, 
who decided that migrant labour was a complex governance problem that deserved a 
separate law.215 Two months after the citizen’s law suit was registered, the president signed 
into law the statute on labour that paved the way for one of the migrant labour bills to itself 
become law some eighteen months later.216 
 
The following year would prove to be a particularly difficult time at which to push through 
legislative change. Counter-terrorism measures dominated in the aftermath of the Bali 
Bombings in October 2002 and the resumption of conflict in Aceh well into 2004.217 
Economically, the balance of domestic and foreign investment was lower than expected 
partly because textile, footwear and other light manufacturers had started to relocate to 
other countries, such as China, which had a stronger reputation for containing labour 
costs.218 Other internal developments indicate that 2003 was a significant ‘detour, if not a 
setback’, concerning the reform agenda.219 The rise of military power, the ability of New 
Order cronies to regain influence, an increase in the number of people prosecuted for 
insulting the president and the ease with which the wealthy and well-connected avoided 
legal sanction are all cited as evidence of a widening cleft between reformist rhetoric and 
implementation of the reform agenda.220 These developments successfully sidelined the 
Nunukan Tragedy in the mass media and forced the proposal to introduce legislation that 
dealt with migrant workers’ needs to be put on the backburner.  
 
It was not until the bill became part of the president’s effort to get re-elected that 
parliamentarians recommenced deliberations. Campaigns in the lead-up to the March 2004 
legislative elections did not take up the issue of migrant workers. In May, however, the 
high profile case of Nirmala Bonat, an Indonesian domestic worker who was tortured by 
her employer in Malaysia, caught the attention of Indonesia’s presidential hopefuls. 
                                                          
215 Law No. 13/2003. Ketenagakerjaan, articles 33-34. 
216 Law No. 39/2004. Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
217 Malley, M, "Indonesia in 2002: the rising cost of inaction," Asian Survey 43, no. 1 (2003); Kipp, 
R, "Indonesia in 2003: terror's aftermath," Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2004). 
218 "Indonesia in 2003: terror's aftermath," Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2004): 64. 
219 "Indonesia in 2003: terror's aftermath," Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2004): 68-69. 
220 "Indonesia in 2003: terror's aftermath," Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2004): 68-69. 
 
94 
 
 
Candidates had just started campaigning for the first round of the country’s first direct 
presidential elections set for early July. Megawati invited Bonat’s mother to her private 
residence in Jakarta for a 15 minute meeting, and then Amien Rais also met with her, 
offering moral and financial support.221 She was then chaperoned to Kuala Lumpur by the 
Minister for Manpower and the chairperson of APJATI to visit her teenage daughter in 
hospital. One week later, the government announced the intention to sign a bilateral 
agreement with Malaysia concerning Indonesian workers in the formal sector, just one 
month before the election.222 The following month the minister was instructed to represent 
the government in the legislature to develop a law on overseas labour migration. 
A migrant worker law focussed on recruitment  
Megawati would ultimately lose the presidency in the September 2004 election, but not 
before signing a migrant worker bill into law. The legislative process took longer than 
anticipated partly because the government was at times uncooperative, refusing to attend 
meetings to discuss the bill.223 The process was complex and difficult, reflected in the fact 
that four draft bills were registered with the legislature.224 The Consortium for the Defence 
of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Konsorsium Pembela Buruh Migran Indonesia, 
KOPBUMI) had already tabled a bill for consideration that used as its basis the 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
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Members of their Families.225 The other three drafts consisted of versions authored by the 
law faculty at Brawijaya University, the legislature’s own legislation division and the 
ministry’s legal bureau.226  
 
Migrant worker groups lobbied intensively against the ministry’s draft, arguing that it 
offered an elaborate system of administrative procedures for recruitment in Indonesia but 
was vague about what the state would do to improve the weak position of labour migrants 
overseas.227 This draft was nevertheless eventually chosen as a starting point for 
deliberation. According to an ILO official, the decision to use the government draft was 
made during backroom deals in which ministry officials, labour recruitment companies and 
lawmakers, whose interests are not easily disentangled, exchanged political and financial 
favours.228 For example, an all-expenses paid trip to Bali financed using the ministry’s off-
budget funds succeeded in securing lawmakers’ support for the ministry bill over their 
own. Critical observers claim that the legislature simply upgraded the status of Nuwa 
Wea’s ministerial decree. In fact, one ministry official goes as far to say that the content 
was simply ‘copy-pasted’ (dikopipaste). As a result of this process, the ministry acquired 
significant discretionary power to set standards and procedures that, according to them, 
needed to be flexible in order to respond appropriately to developments concerning 
recruitment. 
 
The logic informing the law was that practices within Indonesia were in a large part to 
blame for migrant workers’ problems overseas, and that the ministry was best positioned to 
intervene to improve these practices.229 Attention to the parliamentary debates, however, 
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confirms that migrant worker support groups were excluded from the conversation about 
what the emphasis of the law should be. The legislature would learn to invite migrant 
worker advocacy groups in the capacity of experts, as was the case for deliberations 
concerning Law No. 21/2007 on the Eradication of Crime of Trafficking in Persons, but 
deliberations for the migrant worker law were a classic case of ‘jobs for the boys’, 
including only senior government officials and academics on the state’s payroll. 
Lawmakers, too, had little sense of the migrant perspective so focused instead on processes 
concerning the business activities of recruiters.  
 
Tough criminal sanctions were introduced for recruiters who circumvented procedures. 
This predictably drove much of the frequent illegal activity underground. Criminalization 
raised the stakes for recruiters who still aspired to do business the old way by using real but 
fake (asli tapi palsu, aspal) documents, such as birth certificates that contained false 
data.230 A former company employee recalls making alterations to ages recorded on state 
documents on a daily basis.231 However, after the police began pursuing cases of 
falsification more aggressively, labour recruitment companies came to fear the demands for 
bribes and threats of prosecution that followed. In response, the industry outsourced the 
responsibility to intermediaries who ensured that recruits arrived with a full set of 
documents. Women and men were treated differently, not least because there is more 
competition for ‘men’s jobs’, such as employment on construction sites. By contrast, 
demand for female workers often outstrips supply so networks of intermediaries with 
access to migrant labour source areas (kantong TKI) became more necessary.232 Before the 
law intermediaries were paid IDR 500,000 (USD 50) for the service, but within a year 
collected up to IDR 5,000,000 (USD 500) to partly compensate for the greater risk 
involved in ensuring recruits were fully documented. 
                                                          
halaman." Detik, 2011; "80 persen masalah BMI terjadi di dalam negeri." VHR Media, 20 July 2012; 
"Menlu: moritorium penempatan TKI." Kompas, 17 June 2009. 
230 For a detailed discussion of the ‘real but fake’ phenomenon, see Ford, M and L Lyons, 
"Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' labour migration through an Indonesian border town," in The state 
and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). 
231 Interview data, Blitar, 17 March 2010. 
232 Lindquist, J, "Labour recruitment, circuits of capital and gendered mobility: reconceptualizing 
the Indonesian migration industry," Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010). 
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When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the 2004 presidential election, he reappointed Idris 
as Minister for Manpower. Within a few months, the ministry had produced a string of 
implementation regulations based on authority delegated to it under the overseas migration 
law. Among them was a regulation that formalized a more elaborate version of the system 
of administrative sanctions that the ministry already had in place.233 It outlined procedures 
for applying those sanctions, which were formerly not clear to those outside the ministry. 
Another regulation set standards for accommodation facilities, requiring labour recruitment 
companies to provide recruits with at least 2,500 calories of food and two litres of water a 
day.234 These two regulations were among the first that Idris signed into law because the 
systems and standards they mandated were more or less already developed. In other words, 
they required little in the way of further negotiation with recruiters. In fact, the ministry 
already had a reputation for using its control over other administrative roles, such as 
issuing recruitment certificates, to punish unruly recruiters.  
 
As one of his first acts upon his return to office, Idris re-established the inter-departmental 
network for coordinating state responses to migrant workers’ problems, first established by 
the president when Idris was Minister for Manpower in 1999. Idris issued a decree calling 
on this inter-departmental network to support an effort to suppress recruitment for ‘non-
procedural’ migration.235 The decree also emphasized the provision of return services to 
migrants re-entering Indonesia, complementing activities of the team.236 However, a 
cursory examination of the list state organizations included in the taskforce established 
reveals a greater interest in uncovering and intercepting recruitment that circumvented the 
official system. The team included just one official from the Coordinating Ministry of 
                                                          
233 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 5/MEN/III/2005. Ketentuan Sanksi Administratif dan 
Tata Cara Penjatuhan Sanksi dalam Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
234 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 7/MEN/IV/2005. Standar Tempat Penampungan Calon 
Tenaga Kerja Indonesia. 
235 For the use of the term ‘non-procedural’ in relation to labour migration in formal state 
documents, see Ministerial Decree (Manpower) No. 14/MEN/I/2005. Tim Pencegahan 
Pemberangkatan TKI Non-Prosedural dan Pelayanan Pemulangan TKI. 
236 Presidential Decree No. 106/2004. Tim Koordinasi Pemulangan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia 
Bermasalah dan Keluarganya dari Malaysia. 
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People’s Prosperity, and none from the Ministries of Health or Welfare, which would be 
necessary partners for providing quality return service to the large number of migrant 
workers who re-entered Indonesia each day.  
Opportunities for career advancement 
Under the 2004 law, this coordinating mechanism was reorganized into an independent 
agency tasked with taking responsibility for operational aspects of the migration 
programme, to be known as the BNP2TKI. However, by mid-2006 the technical team 
within the Ministry of Manpower had made little progress on the draft regulation for the 
president to formally establish such a body. The legislature delegated the responsibility to 
flesh out the detail concerning its form, function and operating procedures in an 
implementation regulation to the president in October 2004.237 During an official visit to 
Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 and a visit to Qatar in May 2006, the president had the 
opportunity to talk with migrant workers about the overseas labour migration programme. 
Common themes emerged that indicated a serious problem with the system was its 
unnecessarily complicated processes.238 Upon returning to Indonesia, the president 
instructed the Minister for Manpower to organize a high level technical coordination 
meeting that included a session personally chaired by the president in which targets were 
set to reform the programme’s administration.239 
 
One week before he left for Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, the president appointed 
Erman Suparno as Minister for Manpower as part of an attempt to include at least one 
representative from each major faction within PKB in cabinet. In order to make room for 
Suparno, Idris was moved to the Ministry of Industry. At the same time, Alwi 
Abdurrahman Shihab, who had been Coordinating Minister for People’s Prosperity, was 
dropped from cabinet and made special emissary to the Middle East. The president hoped 
by this appointment to capitalize on the networks that Shihab developed during his 
appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Wahid presidency (1999-2001). In 
                                                          
237 Law No. 39/2004. Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, 
article 97. 
238 Krisnawaty, T. "Reformasi dibelenggu birokrasi." Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan, (2006). 
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addition to being treasurer of PKB, Suparno had formerly chaired Commission V, which 
focused on trade, industry and investment matters. He had a Masters of Business 
Administration from the United States and would later complete a PhD and write two 
books on Indonesian labour.240 
 
In March 2006, Suparno followed up on his predecessor’s ministry-wide reorganization 
with a regulation that took account of the programme’s infrastructure outside the capital, 
including its implementation units.241 However, the momentum to establish the BNP2TKI 
did not gain pace until after August, when the president issued an instruction to 11 
ministers, the head of police, all governors, district heads and mayors to take action.242 
Finally, a draft regulation, which outlined the form and function of the agency, was 
produced for the president to sign into law.243 The ministry-authored draft specified that a 
bureaucrat be appointed as head of the new agency, a condition that was dropped in the 
regulation’s final form.244  
 
In principle, regulatory functions were to stay with the ministry, while operational activity 
fell within the BNP2TKI’s mandate; however, the Directorate-General for Guidance of 
Overseas Labour Placement was abolished.245 The minister followed up with a regulation 
that folded residual domains of activity, such as policymaking and standard setting, into a 
more general division whose mandate included administering the recruitment activity of 
                                                          
240 Suparno, E, National manpower strategy: (strategi ketenagakerjaan nasional) (Jakarta: Kompas, 
2009); Grand strategy: manajemen pembangunan negara bangsa (Jakarta: Empowering Society 
Institute, 2009). 
241 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 6/MEN/III/2006. Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Unit 
Pelaksana Teknis di Lingkungan Departemen Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi; Ministerial 
Regulation (Manpower) No. 14/MEN/VII/2005. Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen Tenaga 
Kerja dan Transmigrasi. 
242 Presidential Instruction No. 6/2006. Kebijakan Reformasi Sistem Penempatan dan Perlindungan 
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243 Presidential Regulation No. 81/2006. Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia. 
244 Presidential Regulation No. 81/2006. Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga 
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labour recruitment companies that supplied labour internally and overseas.246 The ministry 
also retained authority to license and discipline labour recruitment companies, which the 
ILO rightly predicted would complicate the relationship between the ministry and the new 
agency in years to come.247  
Conclusion 
Attention to policy direction in the historical overview of Indonesia’s overseas labour 
migration programme presented in this chapter has revealed congruencies and 
inconsistencies within particular periods of Indonesia’s political history. During the New 
Order era, bureaucrats more or less administered programmes in line with the wishes of the 
president and his allies. The resignation of Suharto did not significantly interrupt the 
provision of services: the immediate post-New Order period was one of ‘business as usual’ 
for the recruitment industry, not least because of the demand generated by the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. The five ensuing Ministers for Manpower implemented reforms, but those 
alterations effected little change in the day-to-day management of migration. The 
decentralization programme produced equally disappointing results, with significant 
changes to the institutional structures of the overseas labour migration programme delayed 
until after the passage of the overseas migration law in 2004. This law paved the way for 
the establishment of the BNP2TKI in 2007.  
 
Over this period, what began as a technical solution to the challenges of shrinking foreign 
income gradually developed into a strategy to address Indonesia’s labour market problems. 
To further interrogate the claim that the programme effectively deals with the country’s 
‘labour surplus’, an examination of the population segment that obtains overseas 
employment under it is necessary.248 But, for the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to 
note that policy directions in the 1980s and 1990s created a system that enabled private 
                                                          
246 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 5/MEN/IV/2007. Organisasi dan Tata Kerja 
Departemen Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi. 
247 Interview data, Jakarta, 16 December 2010. 
248 As a next step, research must critically assess what segment of society the Indonesian 
government refers to with the term ‘labour surplus’. See Pye, O et al., "Precarious lives: 
transnational biographies of migrant palm workers," Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53, no. 3 (2012). 
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intermediaries – both public and private – to maximize their ability to profit from their 
involvement in recruitment. These years saw the rise of a dedicated recruitment industry, 
concentrated by periodic re-evaluations that culled non-compliant labour recruitment 
companies. It is in this period that many of the challenges that complicated matters for 
administrators decades later have their roots. This narrative provides the background 
necessary to make sense of the conflict that was to develop between the ministry and the 
BNP2TKI and its impact on the management of overseas labour migration, described in the 
chapters that follow.
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Chapter Three 
Contestation at the Centre 
Intra-state conflict around the administration of the overseas labour migration programme 
emerged after the BNP2TKI was established in 2007. The President of Indonesia appointed 
a non-career bureaucrat to lead the agency instead of senior officials in the Ministry of 
Manpower who had years of experience with the programme. The appointment caused 
concern for the Minister for Manpower and senior officials, which was not without basis. 
Policy-making authority was to remain in the ministry, but the newly established agency 
was slated to assume authority over operational aspects of the programme, such as the 
provision of pre-departure training and finalization of administration. This textbook 
division of labour separated the operational and regulatory dimensions of administration 
concerning migrant workers, which partly addressed an old criticism that handling both 
matters in a single agency posed a conflict of interest. However, there was no precedent for 
sharing control. For this reason, senior Manpower bureaucrats entered the relationship 
anxious about the fact that, while the BNP2TKI was required to coordinate with them, it 
was not subordinate to the ministry.  
 
The relationship quickly descended into a spate of conflicts around the way in which 
migrant workers ought to be administered. The ambiguity of the systems in place created a 
fertile field in which the BNP2TKI could use ‘symbolic politics’1 to pursue aims and 
objectives contrary to the immediate concerns of the ministry. The BNP2TKI used its 
operational mandate to enforce a number of procedures and standards that had formerly 
been neglected, and which the ministry was reluctant to see implemented. Conflict 
concerning the BNP2TKI’s enforcement policy gradually resulted in the ministry revising 
the division of labour that gave the BNP2TKI power to do so by first reducing its role and 
then abolishing it altogether. The processes for handling these conflicts laid bare the 
troubled nature of interactions between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of 
                                                          
1 Matland, R, "Synthesizing the implementation literature: the ambiguity-conflict model of policy 
implementation," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5, no. 2 (1995): 169-70. 
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government in post-New Order Indonesia. The immediate effect did not result in a 
compromise between the ministry and the BNP2TKI. Rather, the processes served to shift 
public opinion, raising awareness of power relations between the various branches of 
government.  
 
The sum of these parts reveals a use of law that emphasizes the place of procedure and 
authority over other considerations such as legal substance and intention. Emphasis on 
procedure over substance is not unique to Indonesia, as bureaucrats in a wide variety of 
states are encouraged to prioritize a procedural approach, which entails ‘formalized 
repetition’, over empathy and ‘individual justice’.2 But in Indonesia, this disjuncture is the 
source of a great number of intra-state conflicts, which have led many observers to claim 
that Indonesian administrators and politicians have little respect for law.3 In a high profile 
case, the Indonesian government has been criticized for permitting a mayor to stop the 
construction of a Christian church in his jurisdiction despite instructions by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Supreme Court to the contrary. However, as this chapter shows, 
through attention to the inter-agency contest for control over administration of the overseas 
labour migration programme, there is another parallel narrative: rather than simply using 
law as a prescription of what they must do, officials also use it as a resource for justifying 
what they want to do. 
 
The first section of the chapter analyses the main sources of conflict that pushed the 
ministry and the BNP2TKI into a competitive relationship despite aspirations that they 
would share control of the programme. Disagreement about scope of authority, access to 
labour recruitment companies’ economic resources and the career ambitions of senior 
ministry officials all contributed to the development of that conflict. The next section 
examines the different spaces in which the BNP2TKI contested the legitimacy of the 
                                                          
2 Massaro, T, "Empathy, legal storytelling, and the rule of law: new worlds, old wounds?," Michigan 
Law Review 87, no. 8 (1989): 2100. 
3 For an historical analysis of why this might be the case, for example, see Cribb, R, "A system of 
exemptions: historicizing state illegality in Indonesia," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E 
Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). For a contemporary examination which argues 
that they law does matter in Indonesia and provides a detailed account of when and how, see Butt, S, 
Corruption and law in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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ministry’s push to reclaim the BNP2TKI’s main administrative roles. This discussion 
draws attention to the complex environment in which Indonesian administrators work, 
where narratives of legality and political legitimacy are frequently harnessed as resources 
to support or undermine their authority. The final section focuses attention on the factors 
and developments that motivated stakeholders within these government agencies to end the 
most aggressive aspects of the conflict. Compromise only became a possibility, however, 
after a shift in the political context and once obstacles, such as senior government officials 
with an interest in maintaining the status quo, had been removed.  
Conflict 
Within a few months of the BNP2TKI’s establishment in March 2007, its relationship with 
the ministry had started to break down. From the outset, those not transferred to the 
BNP2TKI resented the missed opportunity to take up more senior positions in the new 
agency.4 The Minister for Manpower, Erman Suparno, had reservations about the 
BNP2TKI because his preferred candidate for the agency’s top position was overlooked by 
the president, who appointed Jumhur Hidayat, a non-career bureaucrat.5 Soon after the 
appointment, rumours began circulating that those to be reassigned to the BNP2TKI were 
paying for management positions. Those seeking specific appointments were expected to 
make up-front payments – unlike some other government positions, where appointees 
could pay retrospectively.6 Appointment to the most senior posts was not an entirely 
internal process in the BNP2TKI, as a special committee involving many other agencies 
makes such decisions. But the second tier is more or less appointed at the discretion of the 
agency manager. According to a senior official in the BNP2TKI, positions in the placement 
and protection divisions, which interact directly with employment and insurance 
                                                          
4 They were also eager to criticize its head, Hidayat, for faux pas such as parking in areas that were 
dedicated for ministers at official events. 
5 Shortly after the surprise appointment was made public, Suparno told the mass media that Hidayat 
had made a political contract with the president. The president, in turn, attempted to reassure him by 
explaining that Hidayat would only remain in place if he performed his public function 
appropriately. See "Penempatan TKI: PPTKIS berharap BNP2TKI terbuka terhadap masukan." 
Suara Karya, 16 January 2007. 
6 For a discussion of this phenomenon more broadly, see Kristiansen, S and M Ramli, "Buying an 
income: the market for civil service positions in Indonesia," Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 2 
(2006). 
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companies, were the most costly, not least because of the opportunities they offer for 
greater rent-seeking.  
 
As an ILO official remarked a few years later, it was thus inevitable BNP2TKI officials 
would attempt to recoup the investment through illegal means, such as manipulating the 
budget under their control.7 However, the appointment process also had an impact on 
relations between the BNP2TKI and the ministry. Flows of ‘fees’ between different levels 
within the BNP2TKI bureaucracy created strong vertical relationships with the agency 
managers at the expense of horizontal relationships with former ministry colleagues, 
reducing their capacity to cooperate. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that 
Suparno believed that the BNP2TKI was first and foremost intended to implement the 
ministry’s policies. To his mind, coordination entailed following instructions, an 
interpretation that foreclosed any possibility that the BNP2TKI might hold different views 
about how the international migration programme should be handled. This combination of 
factors produced an institutional context in which neither had a formal mechanism to 
coerce the other agency into cooperation, and in which an informal command structure 
evolved to keep staff in line with the policy direction set by their respective institutions 
regardless of its legal status. 
 
The break down in the relationship became quite public by early July 2007, when the 
BNP2TKI’s policies concerning the recruitment of migrant labour for employment in 
South Korea came into effect. A coalition of non-government organizations wrote to the 
president, the head of the national legislature and the Minister for Manpower complaining 
that the BNP2TKI had outsourced operational activity to an ad hoc committee that 
involved a large number of labour recruitment company owners.8 The ministry instructed 
the BNP2TKI to revise the decree and exclude private individuals from the committee, 
arguing that the scheme was a government-to-government only initiative.9 Previously, the 
                                                          
7 Interview data, Jakarta, 16 December 2010. 
8 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Komite 
pelaksanaan penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia ke Korea dalam rangka program G to G." Jakarta. 
KEP.130/KA-BNP2TKI/V/2007, (May 2007). 
9 Secretary-General Memorandum (Ministry of Manpower) No. 34/MEN-SJ/V/2007, 31 May 2007 
cited in Ministry of Manpower. "Penjelasan Komite Pelaksanaan Penempatan TKI ke Korea." 
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ministry had involved private recruiters in the programme as part of an attempt to meet the 
bilaterally agreed quota, but the system had quickly gained a reputation for charging illegal 
fees to migrants and routinely fell short of the target nonetheless. Those who were cut out 
of the business lobbied against the BNP2TKI, writing to the Minister for Manpower to 
report nepotism, such as the requirement that Hidayat’s brother handle international 
ticketing.10 In spite of this and the resulting formal censure from the ministry, Hidayat 
persevered, based on the belief that policymaking within the BNP2TKI’s area of activity 
was his prerogative.11 This provided yet more evidence that Hidayat had little patience for 
the Ministry of Manpower’s culture of procedure (budaya prosedural).12 
 
Such experiences reaffirmed the ministry’s decision to limit the administrative 
responsibilities to the BNP2TKI. According to the presidential regulation that established 
the new agency, the ministry was to hand over full responsibility for administration of the 
overseas labour migration programme. This was not what happened in practice. Authority 
to provide the full suite of administrative services to finalize the pre-departure process was 
also specifically mentioned in the law.13 But the ministry downgraded the BNP2TKI’s role 
from one of setting standards to one of fleshing out procedures for implementation.14 
Anticipating the imminent transfer of administrative control, the ministry had already 
upgraded authority to issue recruitment certificates from the Directorate-General of 
Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement to the minister,15 arguably because the law 
                                                          
Jakarta. B.300/SJ-HM/VI/2007, (5 June 2007). Government-to-government refers to initiatives in 
which the BNP2TKI holds an agreement with a foreign government agency to supply migrant 
labour.  
10 "BNP2TKI tangani TKI ke Korsel." Suara Merdeka, 26 July 2007. 
11 "BNP2TKI diminta benahi komite Korea." Investor Daily, 4 July 2007. 
12 Nasution, S et al., "Blunder Jumhur Hidayat (Kepala BNP2TKI): amburadulnya pengelolaan TKI 
dan suburnya praktik percaloan di BNP2TKI," (Jakarta: media-jabar@yahoogroups.com, 2007). 
13 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 18/MEN/IX/2007. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, 95(2b). 
14 c.f. Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 19/MEN/V/2006. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, article 28; and Ministerial Regulation 
(Manpower) No. 18/MEN/IX/2007. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
15 c.f. Ministerial Decree (Manpower) No. 104A/MEN/2002. Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia 
ke Luar Negeri, article 38; and Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 19/MEN/V/2006. 
Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, 2(2). 
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stipulated that this was a function for the minister to delegate.16 The ministry also retained 
other administrative roles, such as licensing labour recruitment companies, appointing 
insurers and issuing administrative sanctions against them. The official reason given was 
that they pertained to the set-up and regulation of the programme’s wider infrastructure, 
whereas the BNP2TKI’s mandate involved administration of the migrant workers it 
registered. 
Operator versus regulator 
The ministry’s manoeuvring irritated senior officials in the BNP2TKI, prompting them to 
quickly establish control over the operational dimension of the programme. The BNP2TKI 
sought to intervene in a range of situations, for example, responding to evidence that 
ineffective systems were partly responsible for the large number of Indonesian migrant 
workers returned by employers with the explanation that they were ‘unfit’ for 
employment.17 It also introduced a rating system to evaluate the work of mandatory 
training centres with a reputation for providing competency certificates without the 
necessary courses, putting them on notice of its intention to follow up with a crackdown.18 
In addition, the BNP2TKI intermittently took action against medical clinics that issued 
                                                          
16 Law No. 39/2004. Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, article 
32. 
17 The President issued a regulation concerning physical and psychological fitness in September 
2011 although Law No. 39/2004 stipulated that the Minister for Manpower was required to do so 
with the expectation that the BNP2TKI would implement it. But the President often intervenes in 
this way when the office comes under pressure because two or more of the cabinet’s ministers – in 
this case those in charge of the Manpower and Health portfolios – cannot work out how to cooperate 
in pursuit of a government objective. See Presidential Regulation No. 64/2011. Pemeriksaan 
Kesehatan dan Psikologi Calon Tenaga Kerja Indonesia. 
18 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Ade Adam 
Noch: rating BLK LN akan dilakukan tiap tahun." BNP2TKI, 17 January, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/77-ade-adam-noch-rating-blk-ln-akan-dilakukan-
tiap-tahun.html. Accessed on 19 June 2013; "BNP2TKI juara II anugerah Media Humas Pemerintah 
2010." BNP2TKI, 31 July, http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/2824-bnp2tki-juara-ii-
anugerah-media-humas-pemerintah-2010.html. Accessed on 22 June 2013; "Drs Nurfaizi MM 
terpilih sebagai ketuah APJATI 2008 - 2012." BNP2TKI, 14 August, 
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health certificates without undertaking the full suite of examinations.19 Causing a row with 
the ministry, the BNP2TKI blacklisted negligent clinics and then launched a computerized 
system that made it more difficult for labour recruitment companies to register their 
recruits without first presenting the necessary health certificates. Their rigid enforcement of 
these requirements upset labour recruitment companies, which were accustomed to meeting 
administrative obligations shortly before departure, something made possible by the 
manual system formerly used by the ministry. 
 
The BNP2TKI also used its operational role to level sanctions against insurance companies 
that the Ministry of Manpower had failed to discipline. In June 2007 the agency took action 
against the state owned enterprise Jasindo for holding up the payment of migrant workers’ 
insurance claims. Hidayat informed labour recruitment companies that the BNP2TKI 
would temporarily cease to accept the insurer’s policy.20 Following procedure, he reported 
Jasindo to the ministry, which had authority to impose administrative sanctions such as 
warning letters, moratoria and retraction of the right to participate in the business.21 
However, the BNP2TKI deemed that the ministry’s response was too lenient. One week 
after the BNP2TKI claims to have sent a warning letter to Jasindo, the insurer posted an 
announcement on its website to the effect that it would finalize claims within seven days 
when all the necessary documents were submitted.22 Jasindo denied receiving the warning 
letter on that date, citing this as a reason why the company was unable to come good on its 
                                                          
19 "Kepala BNP2TKI sidak tempat pelayanan kesehatan TKI." BNP2TKI, 28 February, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/75-kepala-bnp2tki-sidak-tempat-pelayanan-
kesehatan-tki.html. Accessed on 19 June 2013; "Kasubdit Fasilitas Kesehatan BNP2TKI: 
pemeriksaan kesehatan TKI harus serius, bukan formalitas." BNP2TKI, 12 August 2008, 
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"BNP2TKI segera sidak sarkes." BNP2TKI, 29 August 2008, http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-
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20 "Ijin operasional Jasindo dibekukan BNP2TKI." Pos Kota, 2 July 2007. 
21 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 23//MEN/V/2006. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, 
article 18. 
22 Jasindo, A. "Jasindo bayar klaim 4.985 TKI." Ministry of State-Owned Entreprises, 13 June, 
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promise in time to meet the deadline set for it to start paying claims on time.23 In addition 
to these failures, the BNP2TKI justified taking action against Jasindo for procedural 
reasons such as having ignored calls to enter policy details in the BNP2TKI’s data 
management system. 
 
Acquiescing to the view that the BNP2TKI had in this case overstepped its mandate, 
Hidayat reversed the moratorium.24 However, the issue of insurance continued to be a 
major irritant in the relationship between the BNP2TKI and the ministry.25 The ministry 
justified setting the price above the market rate and forcing insurers into a consortium on 
two grounds. First, the arrangement is said to prevent price competition that leads to the 
offering of bare-bones cover, and second, it ensures that the industry had sufficient 
resources to handle expensive items such as hospitalization. However, according to labour 
recruitment company owners, the ratio of payouts is so low that insurers offer to channel 
part of the policy cost back to recruiters through kickbacks. Insurers and recruiters 
cooperate to further reduce the probability of pay outs by concealing the fact that migrant 
workers have insurance policies.26 Labour recruitment companies have an interest in hiding 
claimable items from the state that could result in legal sanctions (which also frequently 
entailed some form of extortion) such as incidents that occur during the pre-departure 
phase.27 When incidents occur overseas, migrants frequently return home without all of the 
necessary documents for a successful claim, such as a cover letter from the closest consular 
                                                          
23 "Tanggapan atas pemberitaan "pembekuan asuransi TKI Jasindo"." Ministry of State-Owned 
Entreprises, 5 July, http://www.bumn.go.id/jasindo/publikasi/berita/tanggapan-atas-pemberitaan-
pembekuan-asuransi-tkijasindo/. Accessed on 20 June 2013. 
24 "Pembekuan asuransi TKI Jasindo dicabut." Ministry of State-Owned Entreprises, 16 July, 
http://www.bumn.go.id/jasindo/id/publikasi/berita/pembekuan-asuransi-tki-jasindo-dicabut/. 
Accessed on 20 June 2013; "BNP2TKI akan cabut pembekuan Jasindo." Ministry of State-Owned 
Entreprises, 12 July, http://www.bumn.go.id/jasindo/id/publikasi/berita/bnp2tki-akan-cabut-
pembekuan-jasindo/. Accessed on 20 June 2013. 
25 Following a meeting about the consortium, Hidayat made a widely quoted statement outside the 
Minister for Manpower’s office those insurers were ‘all assholes’ that could not be trusted to come 
good on their policies. See "Jumhur: asuransi TKI berengsek semua." Detik, 9 January 2008. 
26 Palmer, W, "Discretion and the trafficking-like practices of the Indonesian state," in Labour 
migration and human trafficking in Southeast Asia: critical perspectives, ed. M Ford, L Lyons, and 
W van Schendel (London: Routledge, 2012). 
27 Hernawan, A and Supriyadi, "Penerapan sanksi terhadap pelanggaran PPTKIS dalam pra 
penempatan TKI di luar negeri," Mimbar Hukum 19, no. 3 (2007). 
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office. As this suggests, payment of compensation is generally not a high priority for 
insurers.  
 
A key problem with the system was the way in which insurance companies were appointed. 
In 1998, the Minister for Manpower turned over authority to appoint insurers to the 
Ministry of Finance, which managed the licensing system.28 But by 2006, the Ministry of 
Manpower had returned to the New Order practice whereby the minister decided which 
insurance companies could provide mandatory cover to migrant workers.29 Consistent with 
the relevant ministerial regulation, a selection team sought applications from insurers 
claiming to meet the minimum criteria.30 As the most important criterion was that the 
company had a licence to insure from the Ministry of Finance, a list of applicants was sent 
to the relevant division there to seek confirmation. A bureaucrat from the ministry’s 
selection team recalls that he then helped to organize applications from most to least 
qualified, according to the ministry’s technical criteria. After doing so, however, he was 
asked to leave the room by the ‘boys club’,31 which included Director-General for 
Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement, Gusti Made Arka, Director for Placement, Abdul 
Malik Harahap, and the head of the legal bureau, Sunarno.32 In conjunction with the 
minister, this team then worked out between themselves which companies to appoint.  
 
Similarly, although the ministry maintained formal authority to set migrant wages, the 
BNP2TKI intervened with the intention of challenging the status quo. In the first 100 days 
of operation, the BNP2TKI sought wage rises for Indonesian migrant workers in eight 
countries. For employment in Singapore, labour recruitment companies in Indonesia were 
told that the BNP2TKI would only process recruits for whom employers in Singapore had 
                                                          
28 See Chapter Two. 
29 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 23//MEN/V/2006. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia. 
30 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 23//MEN/V/2006. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, 
article 4. 
31 This term was used in English by my informant. 
32 In a later role, he could honestly say to colleagues in other agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, that he only knew from hearsay that the team exchanged appointment for a 
combination of financial contributions to the minister’s political party and the ministry’s off-budget 
account as well as that they gave preferential treatment to an insurer which was closely associated 
with the minister’s son. 
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agreed to pay twenty per cent more than the going rate, raising monthly wages from SGD 
280 (USD 188) to SGD 350 (USD 226).33 In another example, recruiters dealing in migrant 
labour for Saudi Arabia were given two years to comply with a larger increase from SAR 
600 (USD 156) to SAR 800 (USD 208),34 the first pay rise they had received in more than 
two decades.35 These higher wages enabled recruiters to collect more fees, as the 
recruitment charge is generally calculated as months of salary rather than a set figure. In 
principle, the ministry was supportive of the BNP2TKI’s initiative because Indonesians’ 
wages are relatively low compared to those of other nationalities doing the same work. 
Nonetheless, officials in the ministry expressed frustration at BNP2TKI circulars, released 
without prior consultation, instructing them, for example, to reduce the proportion of wages 
that the migration industry collects from migrant workers each month for repayment of 
recruitment debts.36  
 
As these examples suggest, in seeking to establish a pro-worker image for the BNP2TKI, 
Hidayat acted in ways that exacerbated tensions in the agency’s relationship with the 
ministry. The ministry responded by progressively excluding the BNP2TKI from direct 
involvement in administration of the private-to-private scheme.37 In the case of insurance, 
the ministry reduced the BNP2TKI’s role to that of monitor and reporter in an amendment 
to the law in September 2007, a few months after the Jasindo debacle.38 The ministry then 
                                                          
33 "Upah minimum TKI di Singapura naik 20 persen." Antara, 4 June 2007. 
34 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Gaji TKI 
PLRT Singapura dan Hong Kong naik pada 2012." 19 December, 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:_6Hdatf7G1kJ:www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-
mainmenu-231/7734-gaji-tki-plrt-singapura-dan-hong-kong-naik-pada-
2012.html+&cd=1&hl=id&ct=clnk&gl=au. Accessed on 4 July 2013. 
35 "Arab Saudi tunda 50 ribu visa calon TKI." Tempo, 7 August 2007. 
36Agency Circular Memorandum (BNP2TKI) B.307/BNP2TKI/VI/2007. Pemotongan upah TKI dan 
penindakan terhadap agency di Hong Kong, 31 May. 
37 Private-to-private describes the scheme in which private employment company owners supply 
Indonesian workers directly to employers or through partner recruiters overseas. 
38 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 20/MEN/X/2007. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, 
articles 16(1) and 24. The amendment was made when the Minister revised the law before the 
administrative court was set to hear make a decision about whether it contravened the constitution as 
claimed by one of the country’s associations of employment companies. The Government rarely 
wins these cases so the Minister is thought to have sought to pre-empt the court with a revised law. 
See "Perlindungan TKI, antara asuransi dan jaminan sosial." Pelita, n.d. 2008. 
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overrode the BNP2TKI’s authority to finalize the migration process in March 2008 after 
labour recruitment companies complained that rigid enforcement of procedures was 
causing a bottleneck in the system.39 Ultimately, these different understandings of what 
constituted operation and regulation culminated in decisions on the part of the ministry to 
cut the BNP2TKI out of processes involving labour recruitment companies altogether. To 
those in the ministry, the BNP2TKI’s pro-migrant posturing further complicated their 
already complex relationships with the migration industry. 
Labour recruitment companies as an economic and political resource 
Another factor that complicated the relationship was competition over access to the 
recruitment industry’s economic resources. The ministry has a long history of outsourcing 
financial responsibility for problems encountered by migrant workers to labour recruitment 
companies.40 Insurance companies covered the cost of handling frequent incidents such as 
death and sickness. However, labour recruitment companies generally footed the bill for 
costs that require immediate payment.41 The budget cycle invariably allocates inadequate 
funds for flights and other expenses, which puts consular offices in a difficult position 
given that the law increasingly requires them to handle those issues regardless of their 
financial capacity to do so.  
 
Labour recruitment companies also bankroll government agency activities.42 In 2009, for 
example, the Secretary-General of APJATI accompanied the ministry’s Directorate-
General Secretary for Guidance of Labour Placement on an official trip to Malaysia for the 
                                                          
39 Director-General Decree (Guidance of Labour Placement) No. 68/PPTK/III/2008. Pembentukan 
Tim Pelaksana Pembekalan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja, 14 March 2008. 
40 Palmer, W, "Public-private partnerships in the administration and control of Indonesian migrant 
labour in Hong Kong," Political Geography 34 (2013). 
41 "Discretion and the trafficking-like practices of the Indonesian state," in Labour migration and 
human trafficking in Southeast Asia: critical perspectives, ed. M Ford, L Lyons, and W van 
Schendel (London: Routledge, 2012). 
42 Employment companies’ involvement in the migration business has grown at the expense of 
opportunities for defence personnel, which were greatest when Admiral Sudomo was Minister for 
Manpower. However, the 2002 establishment of the police as a separate institution from the defence 
forces took with it jurisdiction over law enforcement, which strategically positioned police officers 
to grant exemptions from the law. 
 
113 
 
 
purpose of working out a new bilateral agreement on recruitment with the Malaysian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.43 An informant in the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower 
explained that the initiative on this particular occasion came from Indonesian labour 
recruitment companies wanting the Indonesian delegation to demand a larger cut of the 
fees that their Malaysian business partners charge to migrant workers.44 The association 
covered the cost of international travel, hotel accommodation, entertainment and even paid 
the delegation a per diem. The close relationship between Indonesian officials and labour 
recruitment companies has not gone unnoticed by Malaysian recruiters, who suspect that 
Indonesian officials and recruiters work together to maximize their ability to privately 
profit from the business.45 But while labour recruitment companies in Indonesia appear 
keen to subsidize the state’s political work, there is a strong feeling of resentment among 
them that the state’s administrative apparatus is oriented to first and foremost serve the 
private interests of government officials.46 
 
The motivation to compete for access to the economic resources of labour recruitment 
companies is partly tied to the patronage that government officials offer. In the ministry, 
the relationship is expressed in terms of patrons and ‘protégés’ (binaan). In practice, this 
relationship enables labour recruitment companies to negotiate exemptions from the law 
and avoid sanctions for illegal behaviour. Government officials in strategic positions can 
make other such interventions, as indicated by the line-up for the election of APJATI’s 
chairperson in 2008.47 Two contending police officers (an Inspector-General and a Grand 
Commissioner) had come to own labour recruitment companies in retirement and promised 
to use their clout with the state to further the industry’s interests. The winner was formerly 
the head of the police division that investigated evidence of illegality and compiled cases 
for prosecution. Prior to that, he was the head of Jakarta’s metropolitan police office, in 
                                                          
43 Interview data, Kuala Lumpur, 21 December 2009. 
44 Interview data, Jakarta, 17 February 2010. 
45 Interview data, Kuala Lumpur, 7 September 2010. 
46 Interview data, Jakarta, 3 December 2009. 
47 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Drs 
Nurfaizi MM terpilih sebagai ketuah APJATI 2008 - 2012." BNP2TKI, 14 August, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/431-drs-nurfaizi-mm-terpilih-sebagai-ketua-apjati-
2008--2012.html. Accessed on 19 June 2013. 
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whose jurisdiction the majority of labour recruitment companies are formally registered. As 
this suggests, relevant administrative and law enforcement roles can bring government 
officials to become privately involved in the recruitment industry. 
 
Close association with labour recruitment companies has also helped bureaucrats and 
recruiters with political leadership ambitions to win elections. There are rumours that those 
who profit from the business occupy positions in the national legislature. However, their 
presence is much more obvious at the sub-national levels. In 2000 Masduki Yusak, who 
was the Overseas Employment Centre’s contact person for the ILO in the 1980s,48 was 
elected vice regent by the Kendal District legislature in Central Java. His campaign was in 
part funded using wealth that he accumulated during his time working in the Ministry of 
Manpower.49 In another example, a labour recruitment company owner from PKB – the 
party of the Minister – was elected to the Surabaya City legislature in 2009. The same man 
was subsequently appointed secretary for the East Java chapter of the government 
recognized labour recruitment companies’ association APJATI in 2011.50 APJATI’s 
chairperson ran as a Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, 
Gerindra) candidate in the 2010 election for Vice Regent of Malang District. He lost the 
election but convinced the victor to switch parties and take over his role as head of the 
local Gerindra chapter. As demonstrated by these examples, competitive elections have 
installed those who profit privately from recruitment industry in positions of power that 
span the executive and legislative branches of government. 
 
Labour recruitment company owners without personal political aspirations have been 
known to make financial contributions to political parties that control strategic government 
agencies, including the ministry. It is common practice for leaders of political parties to 
                                                          
48 See Chapter Two. 
49 Masduki Yusak was unseated two years into the position on the basis of irregularities in his report 
of personal wealth. See "Di balik pelengseran Wakil Bubati Kendal (2-Habis): bagaimana tanggung 
jawab panitia pemilihan dulu?" Suara Merdeka, 20 July 2002; "Wakil Bupati Kendal diberhentikan: 
putusan aklamasi dewan." Suara Merdeka, 18 July 2002; "Kilas balik perjalanan Masduki Yusak." 
Suara Merdeka, 18 July 2002. 
50 Manpower Transmigration and Population Office (East Java). "Mundur dari APJATI, 
deklarasikan IEMSA." 20 April, http://disnakertransduk.jatimprov.go.id/edisi-122-februari-
2011/371-mundur-dari-apjati-deklarasikan-iemsa. Accessed on 20 June 2013. 
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solicit financial support from such interest groups.51 Suparno and his successor, Muhaimin 
Iskandar – both cadres of the PKB – are no exception. Bureaucrats within the ministry 
claim that labour recruitment companies made all manner of contributions to the party as 
part of an attempt to secure benefits for their businesses in amendments to regulations 
pertaining to migrant labour. These contributions reportedly grew under Suparno as part of 
a lobby to have the ministry curtail the BNP2TKI’s role.52 BNP2TKI staff were not 
surprised when Suparno’s successor, Iskandar, announced that he would continue with the 
controversial curtailments immediately after taking over the leadership of PKB. Even 
ministry of Manpower officials believed that Iskandar’s position was inevitable given the 
large number of labour recruitment company owners who attended the national congresses 
of PKB and its affiliated organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, the following year. As party 
chairperson, Iskandar was largely responsible for securing the funds necessary to hold the 
conventions; and, as is the case with so many other government officials in this area of 
administration, labour recruitment companies sought, and may have even responded to 
opportunities to exchange money for, more influence over the overseas labour migration 
programme. 
Career advancement and personalities 
These structural forms of competition were complicated by institutionalized corruption. 
The New Order regime bequeathed a generation of officials to post-authoritarian Indonesia 
that expected to secure appointments and promotions through financial contributions in 
addition to merit.53 Appointment processes always have a political dimension, but never 
                                                          
51 Indonesian political leaders are well known for using private resources to finance party activity. 
See for example Jusuf Kalla’s admission that he distributed money to party cadres to pay for the 
national congress in which he was elected chairperson. See "Jusuf Kalla akui bocoran Wikileaks 
benar." Tempo, 11 March 2011. There is a positive correlation between this and corruption cases 
involving governors, mayors, district heads and legislators. See Mietzner, M, "Funding pilkada: 
illegal campaign financing In Indonesia’s local elections," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, 
ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). 
52 "Erman Suparno siap lepas posisi Bendahara Umum PKB." Detik, 6 December 2005. 
53 McLeod, R, "Institutionalized public sector corruption: a legacy of the Soeharto franchise," in The 
state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011); 
Kristiansen, S and M Ramli, "Buying an income: the market for civil service positions in Indonesia," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 2 (2006). 
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more so than in New Order Indonesia, where President Suharto introduced a ‘franchise’ 
system in which officials could buy promotions.54 In addition to making him and his family 
wealthy, this system had the effect of instituting a strong but informal command structure 
that sought to maintain compliance within the rank and file. Political leaders and senior 
bureaucrats often paid the highest fees in return for appointment to positions that would 
give them power to bestow privileges on clients, a phenomenon described by the concept 
of patrimonialism.55 During the New Order era, this system encouraged government 
officials to seek rents in their relationships with business or ‘privately tax’ the economy.56  
 
These practices have continued in the ministry since that time. What has changed is that 
political parties rather than an autocratic president now determine who is appointed to most 
positions in the executive branch. By the end of 2009, the ministry had had six different 
ministers, originating from four different parties, under just as many presidents since 
Suharto’s resignation in 1998. Bureaucrats lament that the political parties have effectively 
hollowed out the ministry’s human resources division, which does little more than rubber-
stamp appointments upon the minister’s recommendation.57 Although successful candidates 
had previously been expected to make financial contributions in exchange for 
appointments, the formal process included a performative dimension, where personnel 
made presentations in a tender-like system. Although it was clear that this aspect had not 
counted for more than financial contributions, bureaucrats appreciated the ritual, which has 
since disappeared. Those who experienced that system directly were flummoxed to learn 
that political parties allowed payments to be made in instalments after taking up the new 
posts.58  
 
                                                          
54 On this phenomenon in Indonesia, see McLeod, R, "Institutionalized public sector corruption: a 
legacy of the Soeharto franchise," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van 
Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011); "Soeharto's Indonesia: a better class of corruption," Agenda 7, no. 
2 (2000). For a comparative perspective, see this article on the Ukraine: Darden, K, "The integrity of 
corrupt states: graft as an informal state institution," Politics and Society 36, no. 1 (2008). 
55 Crouch, H, "Patronialism and miliary rule in Indonesia," World Politics 31, no. 4 (1979). 
56 McLeod, R, "Government-business relations in Indonesia," in Reform and recovery in East Asia: 
the role of the state and economic enterprise, ed. P Drysdale (London: Routledge, 2000), 148. 
57 Interview data, Jakarta, 9 February 2010. 
58 Interview data, Kuala Lumpur, 10 February 2011; Interview data, Singapore, 25 January 2011. 
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Those who were inducted into the bureaucracy during the ‘thuggish days’ (hari preman) of 
the New Order period quickly discovered that bureaucrats had to be less brazen when 
seeking rents in the post-authoritarian context. Senior bureaucrats convicted of corruption 
in the years following the rise of political parties are partly a symptom of financially driven 
appointments. At least two former directors-general were convicted of corruption between 
2007 and 2010.59 Under the New Order, one low-ranking official reported being required to 
collect contributions for his directorate-general’s off-budget account.60 Kickbacks became 
more prevalent, as these officials grew less convinced that their managers could guarantee 
immunity to criminal punishment after anti-corruption laws were introduced in 1999.61 As 
this suggests, the post-authoritarian years have presented a much more complicated – but 
not impossible – context in which to encourage bureaucrats to toe the line. 
 
Individuals with personal ambition to hold top posts have nonetheless taken advantage of 
the opportunities that this institutional context continues to offer. In 2007 Arka, for many 
                                                          
59 "Eks pejabat Depnakertrans divonis 3 tahun bui." Detik, 5 January 2010; Judicial Commission. 
"Mantan pejabat Depnakertrans divonis 4 tahun penjara." Government of Indonesia, 30 April, 
http://www.komisiyudisial.go.id/berita-2081-mantan-pejabat-depnakertrans-divonis-4-tahun-
penjara.html. Accessed on 21 June 2013. One of those found guilty lamented that the courts showed 
little understanding of how the budgeting process worked in practice, while another complained that 
Jacob Nuwa Wea, who was Minister for Manpower at the time, was not interrogated, although only 
he could have authorized the corrupt activity. See hukumonline.com. "Mantan Dirjen Depnakertrans 
divonis tiga tahun penjara." Jakarta, 5 January, 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4b4367464ee12/mantan-dirjen-depnakertrans-divonis-
tiga-tahun-penjara. Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
60 This official worked in the directorate that authorized foreign nationals to work in Indonesia, 
would collect part of the Rp 7,000,000 (USD 700) fee was paid to the Ministry of Manpower, 
Directorate-General for Immigration and the Indonesian National Police, and then deposit part of it 
in the off-budget account each week. 
61 Law No. 31/1999. Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. This law mandated the creation of the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), which was established 
in 2003. The commission uses ‘aggressive tactics’ in the investigation of corruption. See Horowitz, 
D, Constitutional change and democracy in Indonesia (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 230. It has had a high success rate securing conviction of corruption cases 
relative to the attorney-general Butt, S, Corruption and law in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 
2010). Although these anti-corruption measures have targeted the ‘big fish’ (ikan kakap), the 
conviction of senior government officials has sent a clear message to more junior staff that they 
might sooner or later be held accountable for corrupt behaviour. See, for example, Interview data, 
Jakarta, 21 December 2010. 
 
118 
 
 
years the most senior executive official in the overseas labour migration programme, was 
appointed caretaker for the Directorate-General of Guidance of Labour Placement in a 
move that was widely understood as compensation for the fact that he missed out on the top 
position in the BNP2TKI.62 That position remained in caretaker mode for the next four 
years, attracting the attention of other bureaucrats who, like Arka, aspired to hold a top post 
before retirement. Harahap and then Sunarno would later be appointed to the position by 
Iskandar. In part, the fact that none of these bureaucrats made a successful bid for a full 
appointment is a consequence of the role each had played in shoring up greater control for 
the ministry over the overseas labour migration programme at the expense of the BNP2TKI 
between 2007 and 2010. 
 
One official who succeeded in advancing his career in this institutional context was Abdul 
Malik Harahap. Harahap had gained a reputation for being competent and forceful after 
ending an industrial relations dispute between the state owned enterprise Pertamina and 
workers during a two and a half year assignment to Bengkalis District in Mainland Riau as 
head of the ministry’s regional office between 1999 and 2001.63 It is as a consequence of 
this experience – and wealth that he accumulated there – that Harahap was then appointed 
as Labour Attaché to the Embassy of Indonesia in Malaysia, a post in which he served from 
2002 to 2005. During this overseas assignment, he was involved in an informal system that 
collected illegal fees from Indonesian migrants through intermediaries in exchange for 
services such as issuing passports.64 Harahap emerged from the scandal unscathed, 
although a former Suharto financial advisor claims to have seen boxes of Malaysian 
                                                          
62 Arka had replaced Soeramsihono as Director-General for the Guidance and Placement of 
Overseas Labour in 2003. The position was left vacant largely because the Minister for Manpower 
was unable to put forward a suitable candidate for consideration by the Presidential Office and a 
string of other government organizations, such as the National Intelligence Agency. See "Indonesia 
siapkan evakuasi TKI dari Timur Tengah." Tempo, 12 February 2003. 
63 Interview data, Kuala Lumpur, 14 September 2009. 
64 In a particularly high profile case, his Ambassador was later convicted for permitting the Embassy 
to charge these fees to migrant workers who sought to take advantage of the Malaysian 
government’s amnesty for unlawful migration status. Harahap’s involvement is based on discussions 
with his former colleagues. For detail about the corruption case, see hukumonline.com. "RUU 
perlindungan tenaga kerja diharapkan hapus monopoli PJTKI." Jakarta, 24 January, 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol9552/ruu-perlindungan-tenaga-kerja-diharapkan-
hapus-monopoli-pjtki%20pada%2015%20Desember%202012. Accessed on 21 July 2013. 
 
119 
 
 
currency in his office at the time. Harahap subsequently secured appointment as secretary-
general to assist Arka with management of the Directorate-General of Guidance of 
Overseas Labour Placement uncharacteristically soon after returning to Indonesia (2005-
2007).  
Contestation 
At the time of the BNP2TKI’s establishment, Arka and Harahap held the highest positions 
in the overseas labour migration programme. They were most aggrieved when Hidayat and 
Edi Sudibyo were given the equivalent positions within the BNP2TKI.65 Arka and Harahap 
lobbied the Minister for Manpower to reassign them to another division in the ministry 
before the automatic transfer of officials in the Directorate-General of Guidance of 
Overseas Labour Placement to the BNP2TKI, scheduled for 1 March 2007. 66 The Human 
Resources Bureau reassigned them to the Directorate-General of Guidance of Internal 
Labour Placement as general staff with no executive authority. This in itself was not 
unusual, as other senior officials frequently spend some time in limbo between executive 
appointments.67 The Directorate-General of Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement was 
abolished six months later and its residual domains of activity, such as policymaking and 
standard setting, were organized into the newly-minted Directorate of Overseas Placement, 
charged with overseeing the country’s various labour placement programmes.68 Harahap 
was immediately appointed Director for Overseas Placement. Arka had to wait for Tjetje 
Al Anshori, who had served as director-general in their temporary division, to serve a term 
as director-general in the new division before Arka was given the post. 
 
This disgruntlement effectively made a bad situation even worse in terms of the agencies’ 
institutional capacity to share control. By the end of 2008, the uncooperative relationship 
between the ministry and the BNP2TKI was openly antagonistic. In March, the ministry 
                                                          
65 Interview data, Kuala Lumpur, 21 December 2009; Singapore, 31 December 2009; Jakarta, 9 
February 2010. 
66 Interview data, Jakarta, 10 June 2009. 
67 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 5/MEN/IV/2007. Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen 
Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi. 
68 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 5/MEN/IV/2007. Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Departemen 
Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi. 
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had intervened against the BNP2TKI in response to complaints from the recruitment 
industry that BNP2TKI’s policies had prevented 8,000 Indonesians from leaving the 
country for jobs overseas. Harahap, now Director for Overseas Placement, announced plans 
to temporarily take control of the BNP2TKI’s administrative roles in an urgent meeting 
with labour recruitment company owners.69 In April, the minister met with the head of the 
BNP2TKI to discuss an alternative division of labour in which the ministry would 
administer the private-to-private scheme and the BNP2TKI would administer government-
to-government arrangements.70 Hidayat disagreed, but by May it became clear that the 
ministry had no intention of disbanding the ad hoc team it had set up in March. In 
response, Hidayat and his Deputy for Placement, Ade Adam Noch, discussed legal 
measures that would stall the ministry’s attempt to do so. The result was a BNP2TKI 
regulation in which the agency claimed authority to issue recruitment certificates.71 The 
BNP2TKI justified the measure on the grounds that the minister had been required to 
appoint an official for the purpose since promulgation of the overseas migration law in 
2004 but had not yet done so. In this way, the BNP2TKI compensated for loss of control 
over administrative functions at the end of the pre-departure process by claiming legal 
authority to permit recruitment of labour migrants. 
 
As part of the ministry’s attempt to reclaim control, the Directorate-General of Guidance of 
Labour Placement set up a sub-unit on ministry owned land behind the BNP2TKI’s 
technical implementation office in East Jakarta. In September 2008, the Minister for 
Manpower decreed that Harahap would assume responsibility for issuing recruitment 
certificates.72 Within the next month the director-general, Anshori, launched operations, 
                                                          
69 Direktur Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri. "Undangan." Addressed to list of invitees 
(attached). UND No. 136/PP-TKLN/III/2008, 14 March 2008. 
70 Agency Regulation (BNP2TKI) No. 31/KA/V/2008. Prosedur Tetap Pelayanan Penerbitan Surat 
Izin Pengerahan dan Persetujuan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia untuk Kepentingan 
Perusahaan Sendiri, 28 May. 
71 Agency Regulation (BNP2TKI) No. 31/KA/V/2008. Prosedur Tetap Pelayanan Penerbitan Surat 
Izin Pengerahan dan Persetujuan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia untuk Kepentingan 
Perusahaan Sendiri, 28 May, Menimbang b. 
72 Ministerial Decree (Manpower) No. 200/MEN/IX/2008. Penunjukan Pejabat Penerbitan Surat 
Izin Pengerahan 25 September; Ministerial Decree (Manpower) No. 201/MEN/IX/2008. 
Penunjukan Pejabat Penerbitan Persetujuan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri 
untuk Kepentingan Perusahaan Sendiri. 
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moving to the role of service provision, instructing labour recruitment company 
associations to inform members that the BNP2TKI had been called on to cease activity. 
The ministry also announced that any recruitment certificates issued by the BNP2TKI had 
to be re-registered with their office in East Jakarta.73 Anshori threatened labour recruitment 
companies with sanctions under the overseas migration law or anti-trafficking legislation.74 
The director-general copied in the Indonesian National Police to inform them of the policy 
shift. However, the BNP2TKI continued to communicate with the police primarily through 
the Director for Security, who was a reassigned police officer.75 In response, the minister 
followed up by requesting the police to limit coordination concerning private labour 
recruitment companies to his portfolio. Labour recruitment companies were given until the 
beginning of February 2009 to redirect their business to the ministry.  
 
Hidayat and senior officials in the placement division of the BNP2TKI greeted this policy 
shift in high dudgeon. They publicly accused the ministry of letting labour recruitment 
companies dictate policy direction and subvert the law. A strong political motivation for 
establishing the BNP2TKI had been a drive for improvement (semangat perbaikan), which 
the ministry had proved incapable of delivering. The overseas migration law mandated that 
the BNP2TKI provide all public services that migrant workers required, which further 
strengthened their official’s refusal to accept the substance of the ministry’s new 
regulation. The BNP2TKI even refused to acknowledge the new regulation in formal 
correspondence with provincial governors and local government manpower offices.76 
Labour recruitment company owners were wary of the BNP2TKI’s approach because they 
wanted the valid regulation to form the basis of administration, since it gave them legal 
                                                          
73 Director-General Memorandum Circuluar (Guidance of Labour Placement) No. 14/PPTK-
TKLN/X/2008. Penerbitan Surat Ijin Pengerahan (SIP) dan Surat Persetujuan Penempatan (SPP) 
Tenaga Kerja Indonesia untuk Kepentingan Perusahaan Sendiri, 20 October. 
74 Law No. 21/2007. Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Perdagangan Orang; Law No. 39/2004. 
Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
75 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Jumhur: 
penempatan TKI 2008 lebih banyak." BNP2TKI, 24 December, http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-
mainmenu-231/763-jumhur-penempatan-tki-2008-lebih-banyak.html. Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
76 hukumonline.com. "PPTKIS siap mengirim TKI meski tanpa BNP2TKI." Jakarta, 7 February, 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol21131/pptkis-siap-mengirim-tki-meski-tanpa-bnp2tki. 
Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
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access to the system. However, company owners in Jakarta and Malang admitted to 
obtaining recruitment certificates from both government agencies in order to avoid creating 
the impression that they supported one group of officials over the other while the policy 
shift remained contested. 
 
The Minister for Manpower, meanwhile, claimed that its attempts to cut the BNP2TKI out 
of the private-to-private scheme were motivated by a commitment to the government’s 
ongoing decentralization programme. In 2007 the government issued a detailed regulation 
that mapped out a division of labour for all policy sectors, identifying the principal roles 
that each tier of government was expected to perform.77 The overseas labour migration 
programme was one of seven areas that required intervention within the Manpower 
portfolio.78 Using these principles as a justification for amendment, the ministry removed 
any mention of the BNP2TKI, which it claimed was out of step with the decentralization 
agenda, having maintained its implementation units in fifteen provinces. The minister 
reserved authority to issue recruitment certificates but left open the possibility of delegating 
the provision of pre-departure training and finalization of the pre-departure processes to 
provincial authorities.79 Ministerial Regulation No. 23/MEN/XII/2008 on Overseas 
Indonesian Workers Insurance, issued a few days later, required local government to help 
organize migrants’ insurance claims.80 Together these regulations offered a new division of 
labour in which sub-national governments were called on to play a much larger role in the 
administration of the private-to private scheme, and the BNP2TKI no role at all. 
Negotiation in the regions 
The ministry claimed that the reorganization of authority was necessary to bring the 
overseas labour migration programme’s institutional structure into line with the 
decentralization agenda. However, the fact that the ministry as a central government 
                                                          
77 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 18/MEN/IX/2007. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
78 Government Regulation No. 38/2007. Pembagian Urusan Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah, 
Pemerintahan Daerah Provinsi dan Pemerintahan Daerah Kabupaten/Kota, appendix N5. 
79 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 22/MEN/XII/2008. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri. 
80 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 23/MEN/X/II/2008. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia. 
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agency had taken on the BNP2TKI’s administrative roles in the Jakarta Special Region 
reveals a different motivation. Labour recruitment company owners immediately 
understood that the ministry’s main target was to take control of the overseas labour 
migration programme in Jakarta. After all, they had successfully lobbied for the ministry to 
intervene against the BNP2TKI to expedite finalization of the pre-departure process in 
March 2008. By contrast, mid-career bureaucrats in the ministry took a little longer to 
understand the complex motivations behind the policy shift. One official who was 
reassigned to the unit in East Jakarta operation left the ministry under the impression that 
the arrangement was only temporary. However, as months passed she grew increasingly 
uncomfortable meeting BNP2TKI officials at the front gate because by then it was clear to 
all that the ministry had no intention of relinquishing control to Jakarta’s provincial 
government. 
 
The ministry could intervene directly in Jakarta because it already had structures in place to 
provide the services that were needed. The ad hoc committee, which was established to 
take control of BNP2TKI’s administrative roles in March 2008, was never disbanded. The 
Directorate of Overseas Placement had subsumed BNP2TKI’s roles into its placement 
section and officials had already set up systems to verify necessary documents, such as 
health and training certificates. The minister never entertained the idea of delegating 
authority to issue recruitment certificates to provincial governments mostly because he 
wanted to maintain centralized control of authorization to recruit migrant workers. But by 
December 2008, the ministry had promulgated a regulation that enabled the minister to 
delegate authority to provide pre-departure training and finalize the pre-departure process. 
However, the minister never formalized the delegation of authority through a ministerial 
decree, largely because he had no intention of doing so in Jakarta, where the ministry was 
still embroiled in a struggle with the provincial government.81 After all, one of the reasons 
for the ministry’s March intervention had been to shield labour recruitment companies that 
sent around 20,000 migrant workers to Saudi Arabia through Jakarta each month from 
interference by other state agencies.82 
                                                          
81 See Chapter Four. 
82 This is not to say that these workers are from Jakarta. The opposite is in fact true, as the majority 
come from provinces in Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands and only transit there. By contrast, the 
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The ministry was far less interested in administration of labour migrants leaving regional 
centres. It had lost the best part of its foothold outside Jakarta after assets were transferred 
to sub-national governments and the BNP2TKI. The land and buildings that the ministry 
retained in regional centres were generally located far from the major embarkation points. 
It was politically difficult to negotiate the acquisition of new buildings to directly perform 
administrative roles, first because the BNP2TKI had assets and staff in place, and second 
because the ministry would have to make a case for why the administration could not 
otherwise be carried out by a sub-national authority. With little chance of performing these 
roles itself, the ministry approached provincial governments with the proposal that it 
assume responsibility for the processing of recruits in the province’s jurisdiction.83 The 
ministry outreach team began working out arrangements with provincial government 
authorities that would enable informal delegation of responsibility to perform the 
administrative roles, starting in Yogyakarta.84  
 
The outreach team used a range of strategies to disseminate the new procedures and 
standards through what bureaucrats in Indonesia refer to as sosialisasi, which includes 
public hearings, announcements in the mass media, technical coordination meetings and 
negotiations that involve some form of horse-trading in order to secure compliance. 
Negotiations were difficult, as the ministry was effectively asking provincial governments 
to take on responsibility for elements of the overseas labour migration programme without 
a formal budget allocation. The 2009 budget for providing pre-departure training, verifying 
migration documents and producing overseas identity cards was allocated to the BNP2TKI 
                                                          
major destination for workers transiting through regional centres is frequently Malaysia BNP2TKI 
(Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Data penempatan TKI ke 
luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan Informasi. (2009), 10-
23. 
83 The major destination for workers transiting through regional centres is most often Malaysia 
"Data penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan 
dan Informasi. (2009), 10-23. 
84 hukumonline.com. "PPTKIS siap mengirim TKI meski tanpa BNP2TKI." Jakarta, 7 February, 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol21131/pptkis-siap-mengirim-tki-meski-tanpa-bnp2tki. 
Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
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by the president in 2008.85 The ministry reclaimed the BNP2TKI’s roles on 9 December 
before securing the Minister for Finance’s support for a budget amendment to bankroll the 
program. From the BNP2TKI’s perspective, the budgeting cycle had already begun. The 
budget would not be accessible until 1 January 2009 but, as is common practice in 
Indonesia, the BNP2TKI had already started arranging expensive procurements from 29 
November 2008, the date on which it was formally announced. As this suggests, any 
attempt by the ministry to appropriate that allocation would be met with fierce resistance 
from the BNP2TKI. The ministry outreach team, therefore, sought to convince provincial 
governments to assume responsibility without a formal budget allocation in that budget 
cycle in exchange for promises of compensation in the future. 
 
Outside Jakarta, the outreach team was forced to be more tentative in its approach because 
it had to work through governors, who are line managers for the provincial manpower 
office. This particularly frustrated the team leader, Director for Overseas Placement, 
Harahap, who had headed a regional manpower office in the final years before 
decentralization.86 By contrast, the BNP2TKI was still able to directly perform its 
administrative roles in the regions through its implementation units. Through strategic 
appointments, these units sought to cultivate working relationships with relevant sub-
national government units in each location, whose cooperation was key to achieving their 
objectives. The quality of these relationships differed from site to site, and the BNP2TKI 
frequently recalled staff who had failed to build strong links with the local officials who 
controlled civil administration, labour and immigration matters. In 2009 for example, the 
head of the BNP2TKI unit in Pekanbaru was replaced by a colleague from Jakarta because 
relationships with the provincial manpower office had deteriorated to such an extent that 
the units rarely communicated. In more successful sites, manpower staff were frequently 
quite happy with the status quo, whereby the BNP2TKI office performed the 
administration with its own formal budget allocation, and were thus reluctant to respond to 
the ministry’s urgings for them to assume control.87  
                                                          
85 Presidential Regulation No.72/2008. Rincian Anggara Belanja Pemerintah Pusat Tahun 
Anggaran 2009. 
86 See Chapter Two. 
87 See Chapter Four. 
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The outreach team used technical coordination meetings as a forum through which to sell 
the new procedures to stakeholders in the regions – an initiative that quickly gained a 
reputation for falling short of its objectives. At one such meeting in Pekanbaru, the heads 
of relevant local government agencies were invited to a two day event that included 
payment for return transportation, two nights’ accommodation and a per diem as permitted 
by the law.88 The meeting was cut short after the first day, ostensibly because agencies had 
sent officials who not only lacked understanding of context beyond the narrow focus of 
their own responsibilities but also were too junior to influence internal policymaking 
processes. This problem was partly due to the fact that attendance at such meetings is never 
strictly determined by rank. Rather, officials are sent based on consideration of other 
principles that help to manage relationships within individual agencies, such as ensuring 
that everyone gets their turn. Such meetings are important financially not just for 
individuals given the opportunity to participate, but for their institutions. Participants attend 
with the expectation that they will sign invoices for expenses in excess of what they 
receive, as it is understood that the kickbacks are a way of funding government activity for 
which there is not an adequate budget allocation. 
 
The technical coordination meetings were just one of many strategies used by the ministry 
to generate funds to support their attack on the BNP2TKI. In Jakarta, the Directorate of 
Overseas Placement charged labour recruitment companies for the inclusion of each recruit 
in the pre-departure seminars at its unit in East Jakarta. The revenue it earned contributed 
around USD 100,000 to government coffers each month, creating a source of income to 
finance the provision of other services, such as the production of overseas identity cards.89  
 
From the perspective of provincial agencies critical of this approach, the issue was not so 
much the backstage forces that motivated policy change. The stronger consideration was a 
matter of legitimacy, as they doubted whether they could justify the new policy direction in 
                                                          
88 Participant observation at the BNP2TKI’s Technical Coordination Meeting in Pekanbaru, April 
2010. 
89 See the BNP2TKI’s PowerPoint slides at the Open Hearing Meeting in Jakarta at the People’s 
Representative Council, 14 February 2010.  
 
127 
 
 
ways that allowed them to claim that they were acting within the ‘boundaries of the law’ 
(jalur hukum). The argument that provincial authorities could point to another political 
objective in the system – decentralization – did not allay their concerns that the Ministry of 
Manpower’s regulation conflicted with a presidential regulation and the overseas migration 
law. Furthermore, the fact that the BNP2TKI was in a position to provide the services free 
of charge also meant the proposal was very difficult to justify. 
 
Provincial authorities generally preferred the status quo for these reasons. Equally 
important, however, was the fact that the contest had not yet produced a clear victor. As a 
consequence, they were reluctant to choose sides, hedging their bets on whatever the 
outcome might be. Shortly after the contested ministerial regulation came into force, a 
trade union, whose advisory council Hidayat chaired, filed a judicial review that challenged 
the legality of sidelining the BNP2TKI.90 Harahap was in Tanjung Pinang, the provincial 
capital of Riau Islands province (Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, Kepri), when the court ordered 
the Minister for Manpower to cancel the regulation. Incidentally, only a day earlier, 
Harahap had told the head of the BNP2TKI’s technical implementation unit there privately 
that the ministry had taken the necessary measures to ensure victory. But after the verdict, 
Harahap ended the ministry’s mission prematurely, recognizing that the provincial 
manpower office would prove even more reluctant than before to agree to assume control 
of the BNP2TKI’s roles. The team returned to Jakarta, where the relevant ministry officials 
presumably held conversations about what measures were necessary to maintain control in 
the interim.  
Mediation by the judicial and legislative branches 
As this example suggests, the BNP2TKI involved the judicial and legislative branches of 
government in its attempt to erode support for the ministry. These interventions were 
ultimately ineffective because the ministry chose to ignore its intervention. However, it 
showed that the other branches of government deemed the minister’s policy direction and 
treatment of the BNP2TKI to be illegal. As a consequence, the ministry became ensnared 
                                                          
90 Supreme Court. MA No. 5 P/HUM/2009, decided on 19 March 2009. 
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in an ‘illegality trap’,91 which prevented the outreach team from framing the ministry’s 
strategy in positive terms.  
 
The first judgement, which the ministry ignored, was a Supreme Court decision in which 
the judiciary invalidated the content of disputed ministerial regulation. Convinced that the 
judiciary would use its authority to invalidate the regulation, the BNP2TKI took the case to 
the Supreme Court. As soon as the regulation came into force, Hidayat coordinated the 
registration process for judicial review through his connections in the Amalgamated Free 
Trade Unions of Indonesia (Gabungan Serikat Pekerja Merdeka Indonesia, 
GASPERMINDO). The court immediately took on the case partly because of claims that 
the regulation was inconsistent with the principle of the hierarchy of laws, and because the 
decrees caused legal uncertainty. Just over a month later, the court invalidated the 
regulation, arguing that it contravened three higher level laws and indeed caused 
confusion.92 The ministry was given 90 days to reverse the rules and realign the system 
with the law. Experience in post-New Order years has taught government to expect to lose 
cases in the National Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara, PTUN).93 
Their experience in the Supreme Court has been no different. However, the ministry and 
associations of labour recruitment companies were surprised that the Supreme Court not 
only invalidated the laws but did so swiftly. 
 
The judicial review process alerted the ministry to the tenuousness of the legal basis of the 
regulation. The ministry was given fourteen days to provide the Supreme Court with a 
written response to its query. In that response, the ministry’s legal bureau head, Sunarno, 
reasoned that there were articles in the law that authorized the ministry to delegate 
                                                          
91 Jones-Correa, M and E de Graauw, "The illegality trap: the politics of immigration & the lens of 
illegality," Daelus 142, no. 3 (2013): 185; Presidential Regulation No. 64/2011. Pemeriksaan 
Kesehatan dan Psikologi Calon Tenaga Kerja Indonesia.  
92 Rajagukguk, E. "Teori hukum positif (legal positivism) 1: kuliah 3 firsafat legal positivism 
menyangkut ekonomi." 25 Januari, http://lawismyway.blogspot.com.au/2011/01/teori-hukum-
positif-legal-positivism-1.html. Accessed on 22 June 2013. 
93 McLeod, R, "Soeharto's Indonesia: a better class of corruption," Agenda 7, no. 2 (2000); Bedner, 
A, Administrative courts in Indonesia: a socio-legal study (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2001). 
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administrative roles.94 He also argued that the regulation was consistent with the objective 
of decentralizing administrative authority. Simultaneously, the Bureau drafted a regulation 
that involved more ministry divisions in the programme’s administration, serving to further 
ensconce it within the ministry’s structures. In this draft, the Directorate-General of 
Guidance of Labour Placement retained control of the responsibility to provide pre-
departure training, to finalize the administrative process and to issue overseas identity 
cards. The Directorate-General of Training and Productivity and the Agency for Research 
and Development were required to assist with vocational and data management aspects of 
their work.95 
 
The ministry expected the Supreme Court to take this regulatory innovation into account 
when assessing the legality of its attempt to decentralize administrative authority at the 
expense of the BNP2TKI’s mandate. Because the ministry had had advance warning, it had 
time to repeal and reissue the decree that authorized the Director-General for the Guidance 
of Labour Placement to issue recruitment certificates before the Supreme Court invalidated 
the regulation.96 The minister then informed stakeholders that, as per the Supreme Court 
decision, the invalidated ministerial regulation would remain legally binding for the next 
90 days or until the minister repealed it, whichever date is earliest. Almost 90 days later – 
on the day that the BNP2TKI was prepared to reassume control97 – the ministry repealed 
the regulation and reissued the invalidated regulation’s content in three new regulations. 
While procedurally legal, the widely held view was that this tactic was in fact an abuse of 
the law (pelecehan hukum).  
                                                          
94 hukumonline.com. "Depnakertrans jawab permohonan uji materi Permenakertrans No. 22/2008." 
Jakarta, 5 March, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol21362/depnakertrans-jawab-
permohonan-uji-materi-permenakertrans-no-22-2008-. Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
95 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 5/MEN/II/2009. Pelaksanaan Penyiapan Calon TKI 
untuk Bekerja di Luar Negeri, article 3(3). 
96 Ministerial Decree (Manpower) No. 156/MEN/V/2009. Penunjukan Pejabat Penerbit Surat Izin 
Pengerahan, 7 May. 
97 The BNP2TKI had counted down from the day on which the judgment was finalized (8 May 
2009), whereas the Ministry of Manpower started when the legal bureau received it (18 May 2009), 
which meant that they held different understandings about when the ministry’s regulation would 
become void. As a result, the BNP2TKI announced plans to reassume control before the ministry 
was ready to cancel the invalidated regulation. See Memorandum Circular (BNP2TKI) No. 
3/KA/VIII/2009. n.d., 5 August. 
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In addition to further enhancing the BNP2TKI’s political legitimacy, the ministry’s failure 
to garner support from other arms of government emboldened the BNP2TKI to publicly 
announce its intention to duplicate the administrative roles that the ministry had reclaimed. 
The BNP2TKI’s Director for Preparation and Departure, Arifin Purba, wrote to the 
ministry informing it that his division would continue providing the contested services, 
copying in the head of police investigations, immigration, airport management and all 
senior officials in the ministry and provincial manpower offices, as well as labour 
recruitment companies.98 In it, he noted reports that ministry officials had threatened labour 
recruitment companies that were found using the BNP2TKI’s services with blacklisting 
and, more drastically, cancellation of their recruitment licences. He also emphasized that 
labour recruitment companies using the BNP2TKI’s services were doing so because only 
the BNP2TKI had the necessary infrastructure to issue overseas identity cards as required 
by the law, which stipulates punishments of up to five years in prison and/or five billion 
rupiah in fines.  
 
In correspondence with the ministry, the head of the East Jakarta Tax Office questioned the 
legality of ministry issued exemption letters, which sought to replace the overseas identity 
cards issued by the BNP2TKI. The BNP2TKI interpreted this query to mean that other 
executive agencies were also critical of how the ministry had ignored the substance of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. The BNP2TKI successfully lobbied the legislature for an open 
mediation session involving the BNP2TKI, the Ministry of Manpower and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. To Commission IX, Director for Protection of Indonesians Abroad within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave evidence that the fact that the BNP2TKI and the 
ministry ran separate administrative systems and refused to share data with each other had 
complicated efforts by Indonesian consular offices to support migrant workers overseas.99 
Hidayat then presented a PowerPoint slideshow that explained the legal and political 
background to the conflict, pointing out policy concerns that might interest legislators, such 
                                                          
98 Direktur Penyiapan dan Pemberangkatan. "Pelayanan Penempatan TKI." Addressed to D 
Binapenta. B. 539/PEN/VIII/2009, 13 August 2009. 
99 Personal observation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director for the Protection of Indonesian 
Citizens and Legal Entities Overseas at the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s Representative 
Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
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as inefficiency and corruption involved with the ministry’s handling of the programme.100 
When asked to explain the ministry’s position, Arka delegated the task to the legal bureau 
head, Sunarno, who he argued could better clarify the legal reasoning.101 Arka also refused 
to publicly divulge information about the ministry’s political motivations after activists and 
news reporters heckled him from the observation deck.102 He offered instead to send a 
written response, which was never provided.103 The head of the commission expressed his 
disapproval, but acknowledged that they lacked a mechanism to force Arka to respond.104 
Commission members then passed a unanimous resolution instructing the ministry to return 
administration of the programme to the BNP2TKI. Unsurprisingly, the motion was ignored. 
 
The hearing did, however, serve to make public the nature of the relationships between the 
key players in the conflict. Hidayat shouted that the ‘purpose of the government is to 
govern’ rather than in-fight for control of administration of the scheme and greater budget 
allocations.105 In response, Arka and Harahap shook their heads, clearly seeing the outburst 
as yet another example of what happens when a non-career bureaucrat is given executive 
power.106 Sunarno, the only other ministry representative present, was unresponsive, 
suggesting that he was not entirely comfortable with the ministry’s tactics. In fact, Sunarno 
was seen to have an apologetic conversation with a BNP2TKI director and former ministry 
colleague during the hearing break. When later prompted for details, that director recalled 
asking Sunarno to explain what was going on, as they had both been involved in the design 
of the BNP2TKI in 2006, at which time there was a strong consensus about the division of 
                                                          
100 Personal observation of the head of the BNP2TKI at the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s 
Representative Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
101 Personal observation of the Ministry of Manpower’s head of the legal bureau at the Open 
Hearing Meeting in the People’s Representative Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
102 Arka asked for the lawmakers to exclude observers but was told that it was a public hearing and 
that observers were entitled to sit in. Personal observation of Arka and head of Commission IX at 
the at the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s Representative Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
103 Personal observation of Arka at the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s Representative 
Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
104 Personal observation of the head of Commission IX at the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s 
Representative Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
105 Personal observation of the head of the BNP2TKI at the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s 
Representative Council, Jakarta, 10 February 2010.  
106 Personal observation of the Open Hearing Meeting in the People’s Representative Council, 
Jakarta, 10 February 2010. 
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administrative labour between the two agencies. Sunarno apologized but explained that his 
job as legal bureau head was to justify the minister’s policy choices. These observations, 
along with the fact that BNP2TKI officials dominated the hearing in numbers, indicated to 
all present that the ministry was fighting an uphill battle in its attempts to regain control. 
Engaging with the public 
The BNP2TKI’s judicial and legislative strategies complemented other attempts to develop 
a stronger reputation for public accountability. In 2009 and 2010 the National Audit 
Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK) gave the BNP2TKI the highest award for 
integrity in managing public money – appropriate with no exception (wajar tanpa 
pengecualian).107 The BNP2TKI publicized this significant achievement. The ministry, by 
contrast, consistently falls short of this assessment, receiving the middle ranking – 
appropriate with exception (wajar dengan pengecualian) – for its poor internal systems and 
non-compliance with the law.108 The BNP2TKI also won an award for innovative public 
relations strategies in recognition of its use of multimedia to communicate their activities 
and convey relevant developments to the public.109 This award was developed and 
presented by the Ministry of Communication and Information, which strongly encourages 
government agencies to increase the volume of information that they channel to the 
                                                          
107hukumonline.com. "Awas, sesat pikir tentang Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian." Jakarta, 1 August, 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5018b694aa3f8/awas--sesat-pikir-tentang-wajar-tanpa-
pengecualian. Accessed on 22 June 2013; BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan 
Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "BNP2TKI juara II anugerah Media Humas Pemerintah 2010." BNP2TKI, 
31 July, http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/2824-bnp2tki-juara-ii-anugerah-media-
humas-pemerintah-2010.html. Accessed on 22 June 2013. Note that the designation does not 
necessarily indicate good public service or low levels of corruption. Rather, it is recognition that the 
agency has adhered to Indonesian accounting standards, produces the necessary reports and is not 
hiding anything. Moreover, convictions demonstrate that the National Audit Agency has accepted 
bribes in exchange for the most positive assessments. 
108 "Muhaimin target 'lulus' laporan keuangan BPK: pada 2009, Kemenakertrans mendapat label 
Wajar Dengan Pengecualian (WDP)." Viva News, 4 January 2011. 
109 "BNP2TKI juara II anugerah Media Humas Pemerintah 2010." BNP2TKI, 31 July, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/2824-bnp2tki-juara-ii-anugerah-media-humas-
pemerintah-2010.html. Accessed on 22 June 2013. 
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public.110 In the Ministry of Communication and Information’s citation, the BNP2TKI was 
praised as a model for public relations that enhances legitimacy by influencing public 
perception. 
 
As these achievements suggest, the media was an important tool for the BNP2TKI. Hidayat 
hired journalists to develop the agency’s capacity to produce and publish its own mass 
media-style reports, starting at the end of 2007. The career journalists instructed the 
BNP2TKI’s public relations division in the format used by the mass media for delivering 
information to the public. At first, they attended formal events, such as technical 
coordination meetings and then supervised the write up of reports for publication on the 
BNP2TKI’s official website. With time, however, BNP2TKI officials developed the 
capacity to do so independently and were soon publishing multiple reports every day. This 
mode of communication gave the BNP2TKI an advantage over the ministry’s Directorate-
General for Guidance of Labour Placement, which relied on more conventional public 
relations methods, such as making announcements in the ministry’s press room. Hidayat’s 
advisors, meanwhile, had recommended that the press room was an appropriate venue for 
question and answer events with executive level bureaucrats and specialists, but was less 
effective for channelling bite-size information to the public about daily activities. Statistics 
show that some of the reports produced by BNP2TKI attracted tens of thousands of hits, 
and the content is often reproduced in the mass media.111 
 
Another media strategy used by the BNP2TKI to build a public profile was direct 
communication. Indonesian language media include almost daily reports on migrant 
worker matters, whereas the English language venues, such as Jakarta Post and Jakarta 
Globe, carry only occasional pieces. Partly, the reason for this discrepancy is perceived 
reader interest. Whereas the English language newspapers publish an occasional update, 
Indonesian media report on the government’s ongoing response to migrant worker 
                                                          
110 "Sesdirjen Kominfo appresiasi pemberitaan BNP2TKI." BNP2TKI, 30 October, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/7487-sesdirjen-kominfo-appresiasi-pemberitaan-
bnp2tki.html. Accessed on 1 August 2013. 
111 "Mengupayakan peningkatan pasar TKI-LN." BNP2TKI, 26 June, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/236-mengupayakan-peningkatan-pasar-tki-ln.html. 
Accessed on 19 June 2013. 
 
134 
 
 
matters.112 Indonesian language media, especially Kompas, Republika and Detik.com, 
regularly cite the BNP2TKI as a source of information about a wide range of issues. The 
reports claim that Hidayat passed on the information through an email or by short message 
service (SMS), providing content that would otherwise be difficult to gather.113 Indonesian 
media outlets rely heavily on such updates about the Indonesian government’s activities in 
other countries due to limited resources. While many have foreign correspondents and 
agreements with media agencies in neighbouring Malaysia, fewer have a presence further 
abroad in regions such as the Middle East, where the Indonesian government is frequently 
involved in bilateral initiatives to do with Indonesian migrant workers. 
 
Twitter has also helped to deliver the BNP2TKI’s message in a country where the middle 
class eagerly engages in social media conversations. The BNP2TKI’s public relations 
division maintains a Twitter account that tweets about the agency’s activities and engages 
with those who re-tweet its content.114 On occasion, followers have re-tweeted the updates 
along with critical comments. The BNP2TKI has found that this criticism provides a useful 
gauge of the public perceptions of their work. This complements perspectives that the 
BNP2TKI attempts to glean from the mass media through its daily compilation of reports 
that contain keywords that pertain to their mandate. In addition, Hidayat maintains his own 
Twitter account through which he communicates details about his schedule and interactions 
with ministers, sub-national government leaders, immigration officers and the police.115 He 
has also used Twitter to inform the public that the BNP2TKI is waiting for the ministry to 
act on their reports that detail illegal behaviour of labour recruitment companies. This 
micro-blogging activity gradually created the impression that the BNP2TKI was doing its 
job while ministry officials were sitting on their hands. 
 
The BNP2TKI also sought to establish links with the wider public through its relationships 
with civil society organizations. Through Hidayat, it maintained personal and mutually 
                                                          
112 A comprehensive search of English newspapers (Jakarta Post and Jakarta Globe) showed that 
these outlets published significantly fewer articles on migrant workers between 2007 and 2010 than 
Indonesian media (Kompas and Republika). 
113 See, for example, "Dualisme Kemenakertrans-BNP2TKI berakhir." Republika, 15 October 2010. 
114 The BNP2TKI public relations Twitter handle is @BNP2TKI. 
115 Hidayat’s personal and professional Twitter handle is @jumhurhidayat. 
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beneficial relationships with grass roots organizations that were traditionally natural 
enemies of the ministry, such as GASPERMINDO. In part, the president appointed Hidayat 
as head of the BNP2TKI in exchange for the support he garnered among these groups in 
the lead up to the 2004 Presidential Elections.116 Critics argue that Hidayat provided 
patronage to some of these organizations, for example, giving them access to government 
assets, such as motor vehicles. One of the core motivations for developing these 
relationships was to build a broader base of support for the BNP2TKI. For example, the 
BNP2TKI invited over 50 faith-based groups to attend an overnight event at a hotel in the 
hills outside Jakarta, where they were given a night’s accommodation in exchange for 
listening to the BNP2TKI’s version of the conflict with the ministry and their ideas for 
future policy direction. This kind of patronage was crucial for managing anti-BNP2TKI 
sentiment, which could potentially stack odds in favour of the ministry if the mass media 
switched sides, as it widened the BNP2TKI’s support base.  
Towards a new deal 
 
The BNP2TKI’s success in developing a popular public image and pro-BNP2TKI coverage 
of the dispute undermined the public’s view of the ministry. Ultimately, however, the 
ministry won the battle, if not the war. By February 2010, Hidayat conceded that control 
had effectively been prised away from the BNP2TKI, ending the period of duplication in 
services. The BNP2TKI’s doors were still open for provision of pre-departure training, 
finalization of administrative processes and issuance of overseas identity cards. But the 
ministry’s threat of administrative sanctions on labour recruitment companies using the 
BNP2TKI’s services was simply too great to ignore. The ministry’s threats, if carried out, 
would have directly affected the ability of labour recruitment companies to participate in 
the industry and to earn significant profits from it. Although the BNP2TKI offered free 
service provision and the ministry charged labour recruitment companies a combination of 
formal and informal fees, the savings the BNP2TKI promised paled in comparison to the 
losses recruiters would make if the ministry cancelled their licences.  
 
                                                          
116 Aditjondro, G, Membongkar gurita Cikeas: di balik skandal Bank Century (Jakarta: Galang 
Press, 2010). 
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By December 2009 it was clear to the BNP2TKI that the ministry had succeeded in 
reorienting the recruitment industry toward its own implementation unit in East Jakarta. In 
a last-ditch attempt to direct some of that business to its unit, the BNP2TKI announced a 
crackdown on labour recruitment companies that failed to arrange overseas identity cards 
for migrant workers, starting on 11 January 2010.117 In response, the ministry’s Director for 
Overseas Placement declared that the BNP2TKI was acting beyond its authority because, 
according to Ministerial Regulation No. 18/MEN/VIII/2009 on the Criteria and Procedure 
to Obtain an Overseas Workers Identity Card, it was the ministry’s right to issue – or 
delegate the issuance of – the card.118 Hidayat countered that the BNP2TKI was simply 
implementing the law, which stipulated that migrant workers must hold overseas identity 
cards. The ministry’s technical implementation unit in East Jakarta had been issuing 
exemption letters instead of cards, as the data management system that the ministry’s 
Agency for Research and Development was instructed to develop ten months earlier was 
still not in place.  
 
These conflicting instructions left other agencies very confused. On the day that 
BNP2TKI’s policy came into force, the police unit at Jakarta International Airport was 
hesitant to comply, explaining to the media that law enforcement agencies preferred to 
proceed with caution. Previous experiences with in-fighting executive agencies had caused 
them to look incompetent when they followed the executive’s instructions blindly.119 In this 
case, the officer pointed out that the ministry, as the state’s primary labour agency, would 
be asked for a legal opinion in prosecutorial proceedings and, given its relationship with 
the BNP2TKI, would predictably recommend dropping charges against anyone arrested for 
not carrying a migrant labour identity card. A legislator joined the conversation in response 
to the police’s expression of confusion, calling on the president to intervene.120 To 
outsiders, the solution seemed simple: call the government agency managers into the 
presidential office and make them resolve their differences. However, a resolution was 
                                                          
117 The consequences of this policy for administration of the overseas migration programme in the 
regions are explored in Chapter Four. 
118 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 18/MEN/VIII/2009. Bentuk, Persyaratan, dan Tata Cara 
Memperoleh Kartu Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, 6 August. 
119 "Polres bandara bingung soal KTKLN." Tangerang News, 11 January 2010. 
120 "Anggota DPR desak SBY atasi konflik BNP2TKI & Depnakertrans." MyZone, 12 January 2010. 
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going to require a much more complex set of interventions. First, the motivation to 
compromise and negotiate a new division of labour required some change in political 
context: amendments to the law and judgements concerning it had thitherto proved to be 
ineffective. Second, movement toward any such compromise was going to require the 
removal of officials with interests in maintaining the conflict. The discussion that follows 
offers an explanation for why the president may not have intervened when coordination 
had visibly broken down in 2007, and for most of 2009, when the agencies duplicated 
public services, seriously damaging the government’s public image. 
The president’s silence 
President Yudhoyono never intervened publicly in the conflict. Unlike direct interventions 
in other areas, such as creating ad hoc taskforces to deal with rogue officials (oknum) in 
law enforcement agencies, his response to this governance problem offered no such 
spectacle. The president’s silence on the matter indicates that he decided the conflict was 
simply not important enough to demand his attention. More pressing was the fallout from 
the Bank Century scandal, in which the president’s former and current vice presidents were 
key protagonists, the legislature’s threat to impeach him following media coverage of 
massive corruption cases that involved the Tax Office, and dealing with a skirmish between 
his Minister for Finance, Sri Mulyani, and another minister, Aburizal Bakrie, over the 
Bakrie family conglomerate’s tax obligations. Rather than intervene in the relatively 
inconsequential conflict between Suparno and Hidayat, the president opted to sit back and 
let the state’s internal systems handle it. 
 
The president’s muted support for Hidayat was also partly a strategy to avoid alienating 
potential political opponents.121 Yudhoyono has been criticized for his reluctance to make 
public his position concerning activity that enjoys the support of politically powerful 
groups. For example, the government has been criticized internally and internationally for 
its response to acts of intimidation by the Islamic Defender’s Front (Front Pembela Islam, 
FPI), and, as mentioned earlier, to the refusal by a Muslim mayor to allow the construction 
of a Christian church to proceed despite an instruction to permit it from the Supreme Court. 
                                                          
121 Interview data, Jakarta, 28 April 2010. 
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In the particular case of the conflict between the ministry and the BNP2TKI, the 
president’s first and foremost consideration was his rainbow cabinet that included five 
major political parties,122 one of them PKB – the party chaired by Iskandar Muhaimin, who 
had replaced Suparno as Minister for Manpower in 2009. The heavily factionalized party 
had two ministers in cabinet and 29 party cadres in the legislature. The president was 
predictably reluctant to force the minister to reverse changes that his predecessor had put in 
place for two reasons. First, Iskandar’s predecessor, Suparno, had hailed from the same 
party and, second, had most likely made ministry appointments in return for financial 
contributions to PKB. Instructing the minister to undo Suparno’s system risked damaging 
the party’s public image, which could result in retaliation against Yudhoyono’s 
government. 
 
Another criticism of the president concerning this conflict has been his decision – noted 
earlier – to appoint a non-bureaucrat to lead the BNP2TKI. According to Suparno, the 
appointment was partly repayment to Hidayat for the services he rendered in the lead-up to 
the 2004 Presidential Election.123 This may well have been the case. However, Hidayat’s 
appointment was also part of a much larger strategy, which sought to unsettle networks and 
ways of doing things that were deeply entrenched in the system; New Order legacies that 
persisted despite frequent changes in political leadership since 1998. Establishment of the 
BNP2TKI in 2007 dispersede power and drew the Ministry of Manpower into competition 
with it. In theory, intra-state competition should keep executive agencies in check, motivate 
them to seek popular support for their policy direction, and ultimately drive them to 
improve the quality of their work. In the contest that emerged between the ministry and the 
                                                          
122 The President’s coalition included give political parties, excluding only one after it chose to sit in 
opposition. These coalition parties are: the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), the Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, PAN), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,PPP) and the 
National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). The coalition did not include the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrat Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P). For an 
analysis of President Susilo Yudhoyono’s inclusive government cabinets, see Slater, D, "Indonesia's 
accountability trap: party cartels and presidential power after democratic transition," Indonesia 78, 
no. October (2004). 
123 "Penempatan TKI: PPTKIS berharap BNP2TKI terbuka terhadap masukan." Suara Karya, 16 
January 2007. 
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BNP2TKI, both sets of officials sought to expose flaws in their competitor’s systems 
leading to problems with mandatory health checks, insurance and training, thus putting 
them under pressure to make refinements. 
 
It is difficult, then, to imagine that the president expected Hidayat’s relationship with 
Suparno to be harmonious, especially given public knowledge about his background and 
character. Hidayat’s public identity was closely associated with his involvement in anti-
regime protest in 1989, when he and five other students led a demonstration against the 
Minister for Internal Affairs who was on an official visit at the Bandung Technology 
Institute.124 The incident landed Hidayat in prison for three years. In the post-Suharto years, 
Hidayat became involved in labour organizing, taking on a leadership role in his union. His 
curriculum vitae did not promise a candidate for the leadership of the BNP2TKI who 
would help maintain the status quo. In appointing Hidayat, the president presumably 
wanted the kind of ‘transformational leadership’125 that individuals like Islamic leader Din 
Syamsuddin as Director-General for the Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement had 
delivered following the resignation of Suharto. It is predictably for this reason that the 
existing official was not appointed to the role, as it was the implementation of the overseas 
labour migration programme that the BNP2TKI was established to help reform.  
 
In April 2010 the president did, however, act to create an opportunity for the ministry to 
solve its coordination problems with the BNP2TKI. In a Presidential Instruction No. 
3/2010 on a Fair Development Programme, the president called on his ministers and 
agency heads to tackle intra-state disagreements in the provision of almost fifty public 
programmes. Under the instruction, the ministry was required to refine systems for 
implementing the overseas labour migration programme by working out a more appropriate 
division of administrative labour. To complement this measure, the BNP2TKI was given 
the task of coordinating the development of a series of standard operating procedures. 
                                                          
124 "Sekilas Mohammad Jumhur Hidayat." Kompasiana, 1 November 2011. Also see the memoir 
that Hidayat’s mother wrote on his student days: Amiati, A, Memoir bunda seorang aktivis 
(Bandung: Mangle Panglipur, 2012).  
125 This leadership is expected to enhance performance in the bureaucracy by introducing an 
external, formerly excluded set of values. See Bass, B and R Riggio, Transformational leadership 
(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006). 
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Better coordination would arguably translate to better service provision to migrant workers, 
the supply of better quality migrant labour to international labour markets and a reduction 
in number of migrants with problems overseas. But whatever the objective may have been, 
the action to be taken, result that it ought to achieve and the deadline for achieving it, were 
clear. By the end of 2010, the Minister for Manpower was to have introduced a new 
division of administrative labour between the ministry, the BNP2TKI and provincial 
governments that would end the public conflict. 
A human resources legacy 
Following the presidential instruction, the minister reshuffled staff as part of his effort to 
solve coordination problems with the BNP2TKI. First, Iskandar split up Arka and Harahap, 
appointing Arka as caretaker of another division in the ministry’s portfolio.126 This move 
was relatively simple because Arka was already seen to have made sufficient money 
(kenyang, lit. to be sated), having held a top post in four different directorates-general over 
seven years. This gave him sufficient opportunities to recoup the significant financial 
investment that bureaucrats make to advance their career. Arka was reasonably accepting 
of the minister’s plan to transplant him from the troubled Directorate-General of Guidance 
of Labour Placement to a neighbouring division, where he remained until retirement one 
year later. Dealing with Harahap proved to be slightly more complicated. Like Arka, he 
was also set to retire. But he was still eager to attain a top level appointment before doing 
so. In the reshuffle, Iskandar appointed Harahap to fill the void that Arka left, making him 
caretaker Director-General for the Guidance of Labour Placement. According to a senior 
official in the BNP2TKI, Harahap entered the position seeking to become a fully fledged 
director-general, and was led to expect that the minister would support his candidacy. This 
posed a problem from the perspective of the minister: how to accommodate Harahap’s 
career ambitions when he was so invested in maintaining the status quo? 
 
The minister also dealt with older but more junior officials in the reshuffle. Iskandar 
reassigned the Director for Overseas Placement, Maula, who helped manage the ministry’s 
                                                          
126 Arka was appointed to manage the Directorate-General of Guidance of Labour Monitoring in 
2010. 
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transition back into direct administration of the programme, to a higher-level position in 
another directorate-general. His replacement, Roostiawati, who was one of the four 
bureaucrats who headed a section in his directorate, had a strong reputation for toeing the 
line. Colleagues expressed admiration for her uncompromising determination to impress 
her line manager. However, they also noted that she struggled to control her former peer, 
Bery Komarudzaman, who was entrusted by Arka and Harahap with the task of managing 
the ministry’s administrative activity in East Jakarta. Komarudzaman was left in place 
despite his strong connections with the ‘boys club’, 127 and Roostiawati was given the task 
of brokering a compromise with him. Komarudzaman was one of the sixty or so BNP2TKI 
officials who responded to the ministry’s call for former Manpower officials to return to 
the ministry and help administer the programme. In 2009 Komarudzaman was promised a 
junior executive position, which he received, and would, as a result of his work under Arka 
and Harahap, come to expect to achieve a director level appointment before retirement. 
 
These changes eased tension with the BNP2TKI, which enabled conversations between the 
minister and the agency while ministry officials adjusted to their new roles. With Harahap 
distracted by the challenge of managing the Directorate-General of Guidance of Labour 
Placement and Arka busy in an entirely different division, Iskandar held a series of closed 
meetings with Hidayat to talk about possible ways forward. Both parties agreed that the 
current focus on domestic workers posed a significant challenge to cooperation, given the 
recruitment industry’s strong clout with the ministry. However, they acknowledged that the 
development of an alternative – recruitment of migrant labour for formal sector jobs – 
would require time. Anything but a gradual scaling down of the outward flow of domestic 
workers would invite aggressive lobbying, which could potentially embroil agency 
managers in another inter-agency conflict. It is at this point that Iskandar gave the head of 
the ministry’s legal bureau, Sunarno, instructions to normalize the ministry’s relationship 
with the BNP2TKI. Iskandar reportedly admitted to a confidant that he was under no 
illusion that the ministry had to relinquish some control but argued that he had to carefully 
handle staff who were directly involved. 
 
                                                          
127 This term was used in English by my informant. 
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Iskandar had a reputation for using a cloak and dagger approach in his management of 
ministry staff. The minister kept details of conversations with various stakeholders secret, 
leading them to expect certain but sometimes conflicting outcomes, as was the case with 
Harahap and Sunarno. This proved to be an effective strategy for managing the politics of 
change. However, the fact that all top executive positions in the ministry were filled by 
caretakers indicates that Iskandar was reluctant to share control: caretakers have limited 
legal authority and so must run changes in policy direction by the minister.128 To the 
surprise of mid-career bureaucrats in the BNP2TKI and the ministry, Harahap was 
removed from the caretaker post and sent into retirement in October 2010. Sunarno was put 
in Harahap’s place while also maintaining his own role as head of the legal bureau. 
Roostiawati retained her post as Director of Overseas Placement as part of a deal in which 
she promised to follow the plan to normalize relations with the BNP2TKI proposed by the 
minister and Sunarno.129 Komarudzaman retained his position on the condition that he 
would have to follow Roostiawati’s lead in rolling back the ministry’s involvement in 
administration of the overseas labour migration programme if he wanted to achieve a 
director level appointment before retirement.130 This internal reshuffle replaced officials 
committed to maintaining the status quo with those who were more receptive to change. 
Compromise on the horizon 
Events from May 2010 indicated that some sort of compromise concerning the division of 
labour was in the offing. At that time, Iskandar amended the insurance law but stopped 
                                                          
128 As a consequence, the Ministry had limited capacity to respond to governance problems in an 
effective and timely way, as executive authority was concentrated in a single pair of hands. As part 
of this criticism, Iskandar was called on to differentiate between the strategies he used to manage a 
political party in his capacity as chairperson of PKB, and those he used to manage the Ministry. For 
reports of the latter, see "Muhaimin harus bedakan manajemen parpol dengan pemerintahan." Suara 
Pembaruan, 12 April 2011. 
129 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 14/MEN/X/2010. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri. was signed and announced on 13 October 
2010. 
130 A little over a year later, Roostiawati was temporarily appointed to head the Manpower and 
Development Centre to make space for Komarudzaman, who filled the role for one year until he 
retired. Having moved on, Roostiawati claimed that one of her major successes as Director for 
Overseas Placement was closing down the Ministry’s operations and pulling Komarudzaman back 
under the Directorate’s control.  
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short of re-incorporating the BNP2TKI, choosing instead to cut the central government out 
of the process altogether.131 The decision surprised Hidayat, coming just one month after 
the presidential instruction that ordered the minister to repair their relationship.132 After 
more than two years of public conflict, the BNP2TKI had gradually come around to the 
likelihood that the ministry would not hand the disputed administrative roles back to them. 
To compensate for the loss of control, the BNP2TKI turned its attention toward other 
policy areas in which it could build a strong pro-migrant reputation. For example, the 
Deputy for International Cooperation and Promotion sent delegations to destinations such 
as Azerbaijan, Namibia and the Seychelles to negotiate more bilateral agreements with the 
view to extending the existing scope of the government-to-government scheme beyond 
Japan and South Korea. This in turn created work for the placement and protection 
divisions. 
 
Even years later Hidayat believed that the ministry’s amendment to the insurance law was 
just another attempt to minimize the value of claims that insurers had to pay. However, 
four months after its promulgation, its implementation sparked a crisis that put the 
possibility of a favourable compromise within reach of the BNP2TKI. In September, 
Iskandar appointed a single consortium of insurance companies to replace the insurers that 
his predecessor had selected.133 This move was met by public outcry and accusations that 
the ministry had created an oligopoly of insurers, reducing the likelihood of competition 
and thus the likelihood of quality service provision to migrant workers. Harahap handled 
the selection process as caretaker of the Directorate-General of Guidance of Labour 
Placement. When he was unexpectedly removed from office, he revealed details of the 
process to the media. Harahap claimed that two consortia qualified but that the minister put 
pressure on him to recommend only one of them for appointment. Whether or not this was 
the case is a moot point. But, in retrospect, it shows that labour recruitment company 
threats to report the minister to the Corruption Eradication Commission for accepting 
                                                          
131 As noted earlier, his predecessor had transferred the responsibility to help process claims to local 
government in 2008. Compare the following regulations: Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 
23/MEN/X/II/2008. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia; Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 
7/MEN/X/V/2010. Asuransi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia. 
132 "Jumhur ngaku heran Menakertran cabut kewenangan BNP2TKI." Pos Kota, 18 October 2011. 
133 "Penetapan asuransi dinilai tak transparan." Bisinis Indonesia, 12 October 2010. 
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bribes in return for the appointment may have had some bearing on the ministry’s actions 
in the weeks that followed.134 
 
Anxious to find a distraction, the minister examined his options and renewed efforts to 
resolve the protracted conflict with the BNP2TKI. A few weeks later, the BNP2TKI and 
the ministry held a closed door meeting in which to resolve their differences.135 At the 
meeting, ministry delegates agreed to trade administrative roles for the BNP2TKI’s silence 
concerning the insurance controversy.136 On 14 October Ministerial Regulation No. 
14/MEN/X/2010 on the Implementation of Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Workers Overseas was promulgated, which re-incorporated the BNP2TKI into the 
programme’s administrative structures.137 Responsibility for pre-departure training, 
finalization of the administrative process and the issuing of overseas identity cards was 
handed back to the BNP2TKI.138 However, the regulation included provisions that allowed 
ministry officials online access to the BNP2TKI’s data management system.139 Mid-career 
bureaucrats in the ministry expressed relief that they would no longer have to defend what 
many of them believed had been an illegal strategy on the part of their institution. 
 
Where external mediation had failed, negotiation succeeded in resolving the conflict over 
the division of administrative labour. However, its resolution did require deep compromise. 
The most obvious sacrifice in the ministry camp was Harahap’s ambition to gain a director-
generalship. Colleagues estimate that Harahap spent in the range of Rp. 1 and 1.5 billion 
                                                          
134 The Supreme Court heard the employment companies’ case but accepted the Ministry’s argument 
that the consortium arrangement was not a mutual business for the one group of insurers it appointed 
to handle the activity although the Government had not produced a regulation to define it. See 
Supreme Court. No. 61 P/HUM/2010, decided on 18 January 2011. 
135 "Tugas BNP2TKI." Realita, 27 September 2010; "Dualisme pengelolaan TKI berakhir." Seputar 
Indonesia, 27 September 2010. 
136 The Minister for Manpower, Director-General for Guidance of Labour Placement, Director for 
Overseas Placement, head of the BNP2TKI, the BNP2TKI Secretary, Deputy for Placement and 
Deputy for Protection were present at this meeting. 
137 "Dualisme Kemenakertrans-BNP2TKI berakhir." Republika, 15 October 2010. 
138 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 14/MEN/X/2010. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, article 32. The BNP2TKI was given the 
option to delegate those responsibilities to provincial authorities if necessary.  
139 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 14/MEN/X/2010. Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan 
Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, article 39(3). 
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(USD 100-150,000) of personal funds on ministerial projects in exchange for Iskandar’s 
continued support. To the minister, however, Harahap’s commitment to maintaining the 
status quo made him a significant obstacle to re-incorporating the BNP2TKI into the 
administration of the programme. It was for this reason that Harahap was removed from his 
caretaker position. For the BNP2TKI’s part, it acceded to the demand for access to the 
agency’s database. It also agreed to Iskandar’s condition that the head of the BNP2TKI 
leave the disciplining of labour recruitment companies to the ministry, a condition which, 
once agreed to, sealed the deal for return to the 2008 division of administrative labour 
between the agencies. 
 
Once agreed, both sides undertook to improve coordination by instituting quarterly 
meetings. However, deeper structural problems that made coordination difficult were left to 
the legislature to solve. Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Workers Overseas had already been tabled for amendment, and the BNP2TKI and the 
ministry had divergent ideas about how it should be revised. Iskandar wanted the 
legislature to revise the article that made the head of the BNP2TKI responsible to the 
president and put the agency firmly under the ministry. The government-recognized 
association of labour recruitment companies, APJATI, shared this view. It wanted the 
BNP2TKI to be structured more like The Philippines Overseas Employment 
Administration, whose head administrator is vice chairperson of the agency’s governance 
board, chaired by the equivalent of Indonesia’s Minister for Manpower.140 Unsurprisingly, 
Hidayat wanted the legislature to maintain the BNP2TKI’s autonomy from the ministry. He 
also recommended lawmakers to go one step further by extricating the ministry from all 
operational aspects of the programme in order to avoid the kinds of conflict of interest that 
had led to the establishment of the BNP2TKI. As this suggests, the October 2010 
compromise was ultimately only a temporary fix to a much larger problem. 
Conclusion 
What emerges here is a narrative about competition for control. Under Suparno’s 
leadership, the Ministry of Manpower expected to retain control over policymaking 
                                                          
140 Interview data, Jakarta, 13 October 2009. 
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concerning implementation of the overseas labour migration programme. The president’s 
appointment of a non-career bureaucrat to lead the BNP2TKI, intentionally or not, threw a 
spanner in the works. Hidayat quickly let it be known that he had no intention of adhering 
to legal process when the ministry ignored the BNP2TKI’s calls for intervention. It was 
disagreement on this matter that drove a wedge between the two agencies, preventing any 
semblance of cooperation. The ministry’s subsequent attempt to relegate the BNP2TKI to 
the insignificant government-to-government programmes was met with fierce resistance on 
the part of senior BNP2TKI officials, who felt aggrieved by the attack on their authority 
and power. They responded by undermining the ministry through the duplication of 
services, challenging the legality of their regulations in the court and legislature, running 
counter lobbies in the regions and channelling their position on the matter to the mass 
media for wider dissemination. 
 
Mediation in the conflict by the judicial and legislative branches of government provides 
insight into the internal power dynamics in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian state. The fact 
that the ministry ignored the substance of the Supreme Court’s decision to return 
administrative roles to the BNP2TKI and then re-issued the regulation that the court had 
struck down were widely seen as an abuse of legal authority. The acts highlight the unequal 
relationship between branches of government, pointing to executive agencies’ use of legal 
procedure to avoid the consequences of judicial and legislative decisions pertaining to legal 
substance. As noted earlier, this particular use of the law is not unique to Indonesia, but it 
does reveal a great deal about how the law matters to those with authority to use it. 
Lawmakers in the legislature’s Commission IX, Tax Office officials and police officers 
were concerned that the ministry showed such contempt for the Supreme Court’s 
judgement. However, none of these institutions could act on their belief that the Minister of 
Manpower had misused the law. This reveals an important feature of the Indonesian 
system, namely that government agencies operate largely autonomously from one another. 
 
In many ways the fall-out from the conflict was felt most by street-level bureaucrats in both 
agencies who had little influence over the policy direction that their institutions took. As a 
consequence of the misalignment between policy objectives and directives, these 
bureaucrats had to juggle competing expectations, which put them in a very difficult 
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position. The next chapter offers cases about how the drama played out in six 
administrative sites across the archipelago. Whereas this chapter focused on events at the 
state’s centre, these case studies provide snapshots of the administrative landscape in 
disparate parts of the country, revealing the diverse ways in which central government 
agencies interact with sub-national levels of government. This focus on the peripheries 
draws out the influence that local institutional arrangements, local administrative cultures 
and other place-specific considerations have in shaping the context of reception for the 
transmission of policy direction from the centre.
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Chapter Four 
Accommodation and Conflict in the Periphery 
The state’s transit and embarkation sites for the overseas labour migration programme are 
mostly located in provincial capitals, where national and sub-national government agencies 
share the associated administrative work.1 The way in which they share that work differs, 
however, because of historical and place-specific factors. These factors have a strong 
bearing on the capacity of national and sub-national government agencies to cooperate in 
the administration of the overseas labour migration programme. They were a consideration 
for administrators during the New Order era, but much more so under decentralization. 
Under the New Order, government offices in the regions were at least formally an 
extension of a hierarchically superior organization in Jakarta. Moreover, these agencies in 
the country’s capital often appointed officials from within their ranks to manage their 
regional offices. Since decentralization, such top down structures have given way to a 
highly complex system in which the regional offices now fall under the jurisdiction of sub-
national governments. As a consequence, central government agencies are much more 
limited in their ability to steer the direction of public policy even when it concerns matters 
within Jakarta.2  
 
The conflict between the Ministry of Manpower and the BNP2TKI, described in the 
previous chapter, created a dilemma for national and sub-national officials involved in 
administering the overseas labour migration programme in different parts of the country: 
whose instructions were they to follow? Through a selection of cases, this chapter draws 
attention to the arrangements that emerged in six locations in Java, Sumatra and  
                                                           
1
 Provincial capital cities in Indonesia are dense administrative sites, which host national 
government units as well as provincial and municipal government agencies. See van Klinken, G, 
"Decolonization and the making of middle Indonesia," Urban Geography 30, no. 8 (2009). 
2
 See Chapter One for a discussion of how centre-periphery relations may be used to examine the 
relationship between different tiers of government and its impact on their agencies’ efforts to 
achieve their institutional objectives. 
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Kalimantan when the BNP2TKI instructed its technical implementation units to issue 
overseas identity cards – a task that the ministry had told provincial authorities offices was 
their responsibility. The first case explains why the ministry did not delegate the task to the 
provincial government in Jakarta where, as a result, the BNP2TKI competed directly with 
the ministry. The remaining cases show what happened in the regions where the BNP2TKI 
was set to compete against provincial government authorities. The first reveals that in 
Tanjung Pinang staff of the two agencies prioritized their relationships with each other in 
some locations, effectively putting more weight on horizontal networks over vertical ones. 
The next two portray situations in Medan and Semarang where scale trumped place and the 
BNP2TKI unit and provincial manpower offices duplicated services. The final pair, in 
Nunukan and Surabaya, demonstrate that administrators were spared having to face the 
dilemma altogether where a tier of government had no presence.3 
 
These cases reveal the complexity of administering the overseas labour migration 
programme. But they also demonstrate the necessity of paying serious attention to local 
conditions when attempting to understand governance structures in a country with over 
17,000 islands, 500 autonomous regions and an ethnically and religiously diverse 
population of 240 million people. The decentralization programme, which was pushed 
through the legislature in 1999, has been described by international observers as being 
nothing short of ‘radical’.4 The International Crisis Group notes that the combination of 
decentralized administrative and budgetary authority and direct elections at the sub-
national level has severely weakened the centre’s ability to govern, as provincial and 
district/city governments do not always feel compelled to comply with their instructions.5 
This Weberian perspective of the state interprets failure to follow directions from 
hierarchically superior officials – a characteristic of the ‘ideal-type state’6 – to be a sign of 
weakness in its institutional apparatus. As this chapter demonstrates, however, this 
normative understanding of power relationships risks dismissing contextual factors as 
                                                          
3 Refer to Appendix B to see these sites on a map of Indonesia and surrounding territories. 
4 See, for example, Hadiz, V, Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: a Southeast Asia 
perspective (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 22. 
5 ICG (International Crisis Group). "Indonesia: defying the state." (2012). 
6 Migdal, J, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14. 
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idiosyncratic and lacking in broader relevance, when they are often in fact salient to 
understanding the way in which a particular state is constituted and becomes manifest. 
National or sub-national? 
In February 2009 the ministry had reclaimed authority from the BNP2TKI to issue 
recruitment certificates, provide pre-departure training and furnish labour migrants it 
processed with overseas identity cards. However, the ministry only had an institutional 
arrangement in place to do so in Jakarta. In all other regions, the ministry sought to 
delegate the responsibilities to the provincial manpower office. This attempt to cut the 
BNP2TKI out of administrative roles that brought them into contact with labour 
recruitment companies and insurers was not so easily implemented. First, the ministry was 
forced to delegate responsibility for these tasks to provincial manpower offices because it 
had come to lack the structures to undertake them itself following the implementation of 
decentralization in 2001 and establishment of the BNP2TKI in 2007. Second, the ministry 
and the provincial manpower offices did not have systems in place to issue overseas 
identity cards in line with the law, so instead furnished labour migrants with letters 
exempting them from the payment of fiskal. In December 2009, the BNP2TKI announced a 
country-wide crackdown on migrants who held these letters instead of overseas identity 
cards, calling in immigration and the police to help with enforcement.  
Jakarta 
Jakarta is an unusual region because its provincial government is co-located with 
Indonesia’s central administration. Years of centralized, authoritarian rule in Indonesia 
blurred the boundary of authority between what are now national and sub-national units of 
the state.7 Post-New Order governments have attempted to introduce a clearer division of 
labour by sorting out responsibilities for administrative activity along decentralized lines.8 
                                                          
7 For an analysis of how this has complicated subsequent attempts to decentralize state activity, see 
Bünte, M, "Indonesia's protracted decentralization: contested reforms and their unintended 
consequences," in Democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. M Bünte and A Ufen (Oxon and 
New York: Routledge, 2009). 
8 For examples of the new challenges that this policy choice presents, see Firman, T, "In search of a 
governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia's 
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However, the Jakarta region will never resemble other provinces because its structure is 
unique. Unlike the district and city governments in other regions, Jakarta’s local 
administrative tier is not autonomous. Although local government agencies in Jakarta 
perform many of the same functions as those in other regions, they are directly subordinate 
to the provincial governor, who appoints civil servants to manage them much in the same 
way that central authorities did across the nation during the New Order era (1967-1998). 
For this reason, the division of labour that exists between provincial and local government 
in the regions is not replicated in Jakarta, where provincial apparatus in fact performs some 
of the work of the lower tier of administration. Moreover, the provincial government in 
Jakarta needs to accommodate the ministry in their administrative landscape, whereas the 
other provincial authorities do not. 
 
For most of the New Order, administration of the overseas labour migration programme 
was organized under a single government authority. The ministry finalized the pre-
departure process and the regional manpower office, which was subordinate to the 
ministry, registered intending labour migrants and issued the necessary documents, such as 
passport recommendations, to help them meet the programme’s requirements. On Jalan 
Gatot Subroto, the ministry furnished labour recruitment companies with licences and 
recruitment certificates, and on Jalan Raya Puncak the manpower office provided the 
documents that authorized migrant workers to leave the country, such as notes that 
exempted them from the fiskal, the departure tax for Indonesian citizens and expatriates. It 
is to this period of administration to which bureaucrats refer nostalgically as being neat and 
orderly (rapi) because there was a single authority, which directed the administrative 
activity from top to bottom. However, decentralization removed the manpower office out 
from under the ministry’s direct control and recast it as a subordinate agency to the Special 
Capital Region of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, DKI Jakarta). As a 
consequence, the ministry’s network of technical implementation units, which were 
frequently located within the building of the provincial manpower office, were put under 
the provincial government’s control.  
 
                                                          
decentralization policy: old problems, new challenges," Public Administration and Development 28 
(2008). 
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The introduction of separate tiers has been a source of frustration because the ensuing turf 
war between them effectively destroyed the state’s ability to provide a seamless service to 
Jakarta-based labour recruitment companies. Over time, those who profited from the 
business started to lobby for a reorganization of administrative roles associated with the 
programme. This request was partly prompted by the fact that the provincial government 
used ministerial regulations as guidelines because provincial ones had not yet been 
produced, even though decentralization had out-dated them. However, their main point of 
contention was that the change introduced another hurdle into the system. Labour 
recruitment companies had formerly interacted with one authority, whereas the new 
arrangement forced them to deal with two. As a result, recruiters not only had to meet the 
formal criteria of an extra layer of government but also respond to further demands for 
informal payments. The ministry recentralized the units in 2002, but the decree that did so 
did not specify that administrative tasks had to be performed by a central authority. This 
opened up space for the provincial government to establish their own unit bearing the same 
name as that of the ministry’s. In this way, the Jakarta manpower office held on to 
responsibility for those tasks, the income from which, along with other informal fees 
collected, supplemented its budget allocation from the centre. 
 
Another development that alarmed stakeholders in the business was that the ministry could 
no longer rely on the manpower office to produce the 30,000 or so passport 
recommendations that were needed to get travel documents for the labour recruited for 
Saudi Arabia each month. Saudi Arabia has always been a very important destination for 
Indonesians departing under the overseas labour migration programme, and, for historical 
reasons, the majority of labour migrants transit in Jakarta. Most come from adjacent 
regions, such as Banten and West Java, and other areas with strong religious affiliations to 
the Middle East like East Java and Muslim-majority parts of the Lesser Sunda Islands.9 
Then recruits frequently arrived without the full set of documents required to register for 
the migration process. The provincial government has historically been more than willing 
                                                          
9 For detailed accounts of recruitment in Lombok, see Lindquist, J, "The elementary school teacher, 
the thug and his grandmother: informal brokers and transnational migration from Indonesia," Pacific 
Affairs 85, no. 1 (2012); "Labour recruitment, circuits of capital and gendered mobility: 
reconceptualizing the Indonesian migration industry," Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010). 
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to generate real but fake (asli tapi palsi, aspal) documents, such as identity and family 
cards to facilitate their migration, despite the fact that legally they only have the right to do 
so for individuals who have residency status in their jurisdiction.10  
 
In exchange for the provincial government’s willingness to continue these practices, the 
ministry brokered an informal arrangement under which the ministry handled 
administration of labour migrants travelling to the Gulf region and Taiwan while the 
Jakarta provincial authorities handled those heading to other countries in the Asia Pacific 
region.11 The ministry conceded administrative control over finalization of the pre-
departure process, which in 2002 entailed collecting USD 15 tax from labour recruitment 
companies for each labour migrant, to whom the ministry would provide a note exempting 
them from fiskal. A National Audit Agency report on the informal arrangement pointed to 
some serious accounting issues that this practice caused. The accounting team noted that 
the ministry had only held incomplete records of the amount of tax and number of 
exemption letters that the manpower office had issued. The official reason given for this 
was that the manpower office did not have a formal reporting relationship with the ministry 
and so was under no legal obligation to do so.12 
 
                                                          
10 Despite the fact that intending migrants come from somewhere else, however, the administration 
is legal by this stage because the migrants are formal residents as far as the manpower office is 
concerned because they hold Jakarta issued documents. For a detailed study of aspal documents and 
their role in the Riau Islands, see Ford, M and L Lyons, "Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' labour 
migration through an Indonesian border town," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E 
Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). 
11 BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). "Hasil pemeriksaan atas pengelolaan dana pembinaan dan 
penyelenggaraan penempatan tenaga kerja Indonesia dan pelaksanaan penempatan tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia ke luar negeri tahun anggaran 2004 dan 2005 pada Ditjen Pembinaan dan Penempatan 
Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, Dinas Tenaga Kerja, Balai Pelayanan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia serta instansi terkait lainnya di Surabaya, Pekanbaru dan Batam." Jakarta. 85/S/III-
XI.3/07/2006, (5 July 2006), 8. 
12 "Hasil pemeriksaan atas pengelolaan dana pembinaan dan penyelenggaraan penempatan tenaga 
kerja Indonesia dan pelaksanaan penempatan tenaga Kerja Indonesia ke luar negeri tahun anggaran 
2004 dan 2005 pada Ditjen Pembinaan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, Dinas Tenaga 
Kerja, Balai Pelayanan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia serta instansi terkait lainnya di 
Surabaya, Pekanbaru dan Batam." Jakarta. 85/S/III-XI.3/07/2006, (5 July 2006), 8. 
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This arrangement became problematic when the overseas migration law was passed. Law 
No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas, which 
replaced earlier ministerial regulations, effectively rendered the ministry’s agreement with 
the manpower office illegal. It required the ministry to take responsibility for 
administrative tasks at the beginning and end of the overseas labour migration programme. 
All intermediary roles, such as registering recruits and recommending that they be 
furnished with passports, were transferred to local authorities, which in Jakarta meant the 
provincial government. However, established arrangements proved difficult to change 
because of stakeholders, including personnel in the ministry, who preferred the status quo. 
Despite the passing of the law, the informal division of labour persisted, in part because 
ministry authorities were unwilling to relinquish the benefits that they gained through it in 
the form of access to the provincial government’s special services, which enabled recruits 
to be processed in Jakarta. As a result, labour recruitment companies that specialized in 
sending labour to Saudi Arabia were able to continue their long-standing connections with 
ministry bureaucrats who were often indirectly involved in the industry.  
 
This did not mean that these arrangements were allowed to continue unchecked. In 2006, 
the National Audit Agency asked the ministry to deal with the illegal division of labour. By 
this stage, the ministry’s deal with provincial authorities had already entered its fourth year. 
The relevant director-general explained privately that the situation was not straightforward. 
The ministry had in fact held conversations with the provincial government about 
normalizing the arrangement but no agreement had been reached. When the National Audit 
Agency subsequently pointed to the fact that it was responsible for financial losses, the 
ministry pursued resolution more aggressively to avoid prosecution under the anti-
corruption law. While it cannot be proved that the National Audit Agency’s intervention 
forced its hand, the ministry then revealed long-delayed plans to make corrections to the 
system by firming up control over roles to finalize the process for migrants to all countries. 
The first implementation regulation for Law No. 39/2004, passed that year, outlined the 
division of labour between the ministry, its units and manpower offices across Indonesia.  
 
Even after this – and even at the height of the conflict between the ministry and the 
BNP2TKI – ministry officials continued to identify the manpower office as the most 
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powerful of the three government agencies in Jakarta. This office had assumed 
responsibility for services to labour recruitment companies, such as issuing permits to set 
up the necessary infrastructure, including boarding houses. They registered recruits, 
archived placement agreements (perjanjian penempatan) that outlined nominal rights and 
responsibilities of recruits and labour recruitment companies to one another, and provided 
other intermediary services, such as the issuing of passport recommendations. These 
services constitute the lion’s share of administration under the programme. By contrast, the 
ministry’s unit, which would later be transferred to the BNP2TKI, only provided pre-
departure training, witnessed the signing of employment contracts and issued notes to 
exempt labour migrants from fiskal. The fact that more than half of the programme’s labour 
migrants passed through Jakarta meant that the manpower office effectively controlled the 
bulk of the programme’s administration. Ministry officials who had experienced the 
transition from shared control to this division of labour were acutely aware of the power of 
the Jakarta manpower office, which they were sometimes unable to persuade to follow the 
ministry’s preferred procedures.  
 
It was in this political context that the ministry converted dormant offices at the rear of 
BNP2TKI’s technical implementation unit in East Jakarta into a set of counters to reassume 
control over authority to issue recruitment certificates in October 2008. Two months later, 
Ministerial Regulation No. 22/MEN/XII/2008 on the Implementation of Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas reclaimed authority over the finalization of the 
pre-departure process. The ministry’s Directorate of Overseas Placement was responsible 
for overseeing the provision of the tasks involved in the East Jakarta unit. But recognizing 
that the BNP2TKI still provided these services from its unit, which was located on an 
adjacent plot of land, the Director-General for Guidance of Labour Placement, Gusti Made 
Arka, gave labour recruitment companies until February to cease working with the 
BNP2TKI.13 It is this series of events that led to the BNP2TKI requesting a judicial review, 
which declared the authorizing regulation invalid.14 A period of service duplication ensued 
                                                          
13 "Dirjen Binapenta I Made Arka: selama G to G masih ada, dualisme proses pelayanan 
pemberangkatan TKI." Madina, n.d. 
14 See Chapter Three. 
 
156 
 
 
because the ministry refused to cancel the regulation, and the BNP2TKI announced its 
intention to resume service provision regardless.  
Tanjung Pinang  
Tanjung Pinang, the capital of Riau Islands province (Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, Kepri), is 
located on the island of Bintan, which is adjacent to Indonesia’s international sea border 
with Malaysia and Singapore. As a consequence, it constitutes a major gateway for labour 
migrants exiting Indonesia. The number of labour migrants officially leaving through the 
town has fluctuated over time, partly in response to government policy.15 In 2002, for 
example, the immigration checkpoint on Batam Island was made the only exit point for 
domestic workers seeking to enter Singapore.16 This restriction was lifted in 2007, but not 
before a sophisticated alternative system had developed in Tanjung Pinang, where largely 
unlicensed recruiters worked through contacts in the Immigration Offices to secure 
passports for labour migrants to help them circumvent the requirements of the official 
programme.17  
 
The ministry had never established an office in Tanjung Pinang because Kepri was only 
created in 2002, one year after the ministry’s manpower offices were transferred to 
provincial governments. The ministry’s offices were in Pekanbaru, the capital city of Riau 
province, where the manpower office became part of the Riau provincial government. The 
ministry had maintained control over the programme’s implementation unit, which was 
transferred to the BNP2TKI, along with the other 14 regional units under the ministry’s 
control, in 2007. Until 2009, these central government agencies had administered labour 
migration exiting the Riau Islands through an extension of the implementation unit. In that 
year, the BNP2TKI converted the post into a fully fledged unit with exclusive jurisdiction 
                                                          
15 Interview data, 3 June 2010. 
16 For an overview of this system within the broader context of the overseas migration programme, 
see Wijayanti, A, "Kendali alokasi sebagai bentuk perlindungan hukum bagi tenaga kerja 
Indonesia," Jurnal Yustika 7, no. 1 (2004). 
17 Ford, M and L Lyons, "Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' labour migration through an Indonesian 
border town," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: 
KILTV, 2011). The major reason for this policy shift was to prevent the BNP2TKI from assuming 
authority to enforce it. 
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to finalize the pre-departure process for the labour migrants departing through the Riau 
Islands. The decision to do so was largely motivated by the need to establish a foothold 
closer to the new provincial capital, Tanjung Pinang, as part of an attempt to forge the kind 
of collegial relationships with provincial authorities there that in Pekanbaru had been useful 
in implementing the programme when the Riau Islands were part of Riau province. As a 
result, the BNP2TKI’s implementation unit in Tanjung Pinang related with the provincial 
government on its own terms from the outset, unlike its counterparts in other regions. 
 
The provincial government and the BNP2TKI implementation unit performed 
complementary tasks in the administration of the overseas labour migration programme in 
Tanjung Pinang. The provincial manpower office serviced labour recruitment companies 
licensed by the ministry, providing them, for example, with the necessary authorizations to 
approach local governments about setting up offices and boarding house facilities. During 
my fieldwork, the manpower office official responsible for administering the system 
produced relatively straightforward templates and criteria for the permission-seeking 
process – unlike in other regions, where labour recruitment companies claimed that the 
entire process is subject to rent seeking. The threat of sanction and rent seeking associated 
with maintaining the many illegal boarding houses found in the Riau Islands made this 
authorization extremely valuable. 
 
To complement these activities, the BNP2TKI’s unit finalized the pre-departure process for 
recruited labour: for example, verifying their documents to make sure that they meet the 
administrative requirements. They must hold a valid passport, a work permit and insurance. 
The unit processes around 40,000 workers each year. The most significant group by far 
consists of women from rural areas in East Java transiting on the way to Singapore, where 
they are mainly employed as domestic workers. By contrast, the unit only processes around 
5,000 labour migrants who have formal sector jobs in Malaysia.18 Of this group, only 
slightly more than half are men. Many of these workers come from within Kepri itself 
rather than deeper within Indonesian territory. It is important to note that these records 
                                                          
18 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Data 
penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan 
Informasi. (2009), 25. 
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represent only a portion of labour migration, given the large numbers of migrants who 
circumvent the formal system.19 As a consequence, Kepri is host to a large informal 
industry in which a wide range of government officials are involved,20 including the 
BNP2TKI’s own unit.  
 
Another local factor that shapes the way things are done in Kepri is the fact that Tanjung 
Pinang is a major point of return for Indonesian labour migrants who have been deported 
from neighbouring countries. In 2002, Malaysian authorities deported 356,256 people to 
Indonesian border towns in Sumatra and Kalimantan.21 This figure was exceptionally large 
because they were cracking down on migrant labourers lacking valid work permits. At first, 
sub-national government authorities at designated return points set up local taskforces to 
anticipate the deportations. However, after the deaths of around 70 deportees in Nunukan 
were reported in the national media, these efforts were quickly expanded to include central 
government agencies. In 2004, the Tanjung Pinang taskforce was subsumed into an 
institution to coordinate a national response to the problems associated with deportations 
created by President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Since then, the Tanjung Pinang branch, 
which handles in the vicinity of 35,000 deportees year, has had to establish local 
mechanisms for financing this operation.22 
 
The majority of deportees from West Malaysia disembark at the Port of Kijang on the 
southeast side of Bintan Island. This prevents the Tanjung Pinang international ferry 
                                                          
19 Ford, M, "After Nunukan: the regulation of Indonesian migration to Malaysia," in Divided we 
move: mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia, ed. A Kaur and I Metcalfe (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
20 Ford, M and L Lyons, "Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' labour migration through an Indonesian 
border town," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: 
KILTV, 2011). 
21 Coordinating Ministry of People's Prosperity. "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja 
Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2008." Jakarta. (December 
2008), 62; Ford, M, "After Nunukan: the regulation of Indonesian migration to Malaysia," in 
Divided we move: mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia, ed. A Kaur and I 
Metcalfe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
22 Coordinating Ministry of People's Prosperity. "Petunjuk pelaksanaan penanganan dan pemulangan 
tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarganya (TKI-B) dari Malaysia." Jakarta. (January 
2009), 10. 
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terminal from being dominated by deportation traffic, serving to keep deportees out of the 
public eye. Malaysian authorities pay for all expenses up until disembarkation.23 
Indonesian authorities are then responsible for organizing transportation to Tanjung 
Pinang, their temporary board there and eventual repatriation to their province of origin. In 
2007, significant debts were incurred for these services with the state-owned enterprises PT 
Pelni (shipping) and PT Damri (buses).24 The cost of transportation from the point of 
arrival to deportees’ home cities and districts in other parts of the country was the 
responsibility of counterpart taskforces in those areas. This undertaking also required 
resources from sub-national authorities in the transit zones, such as the Kepri government 
based in Tanjung Pinang. The governor of Kepri even issued a regulation that established a 
coordinating team to ensure the provision of services, such as medical check-ups, which 
enables authorities, such as the manpower office, to charge related expenses to the 
province’s budget when necessary. 
 
The provincial legislature, however, has publicly opposed the province’s involvement in 
repatriation. As a consequence, the governor is not always able to secure a formal budget 
allocation for these expenses and so provincial authorities involved in the effort to handle 
the high volume of deportation from Malaysia have come to rely heavily on the 
supplementary funds it receives from the centre.25 A strict reading of the decentralization 
law requires provincial governments to manage the administrative work associated with 
deportation. But Kepri successfully lobbied central authorities and secured their 
                                                          
23 "Petunjuk pelaksanaan penanganan dan pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan 
keluarganya (TKI-B) dari Malaysia." Jakarta. (January 2009), 21. 
24 "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari 
Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2007." Jakarta. (December 2007), 19. 
25 The Governor of Riau Islands province has also publicly refused to cooperate with central 
government agencies, as was the case in his handling of the Oceanic Viking issue in 2009, 
presumably as part of an attempt to win greater support in the provincial legislature and the Riau 
Islands electorate. The Oceanic Viking was an Australian custom’s ship that rescued asylum seekers 
from a sinking vessel within Indonesia’s search and rescue area. The Australian Prime Minister 
struck a deal with the Indonesian President that would see the asylum seekers alight in Indonesia. 
However, local government authorities in Indonesia resisted the instruction to implement the deal. 
For more details of this case, see Ford, M, L Lyons, and W Palmer, "Stopping the hordes: a critical 
account of the Labor government's regional approach to the management of asylum seekers," Local-
Global 8 (2010). 
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involvement, arguing that the deportations are a national problem.26 The central 
government accepted Kepri’s argument that the provincial budget should not be used to 
cover shortfalls. Financial support from central authorities is, nevertheless, insufficient. In 
2007, for example, Rp. 8 billion (USD 800,000) was allocated to cover the task force’s 
activities – sufficient only for the first six months.27 As part of their attempt to deal with 
these budgetary constraints, the Kepri taskforce has brokered deals with ‘colleagues’, 
including but not limited to other government authorities to provide services.28  
 
The shortfall was in part remedied in negotiations for the 2008 budget, in which the 
president specifically earmarked Rp. 350,000,000 (USD 35,000) for ‘strengthening’ the 
taskforce’s institutional presence in Kepri.29 The Kepri group used their entire allocation, 
but only 35 per cent of the budget for accommodating and transporting deportees was 
spent.30 The annual accountability report for the taskforce cites the fact that the Ministry of 
Finance did not make the budget allocation available until almost the end of the year. As a 
result, the task force in Kepri – as elsewhere along Indonesia’s international borders – were 
forced to buy food and transport for deportees on credit. The situation was so bad in fact 
that the Ministry of People’s Prosperity made enquiries with the Ministry of Finance to 
obtain a budget top-up so as to prevent unpaid expenses from being debited to the 
following year’s budget.31 Largely for these reasons, the Kepri taskforce had still not 
purchased or formally leased facilities to accommodate deported citizens even years later.  
 
                                                          
26 The Riau Islands government also attempted to use its connections with governors of sending 
provinces, but was only successful in convincing West Java to make a budget allocation to help 
subsidize repatriation.  
27 Coordinating Ministry of People's Prosperity. "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja 
Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2007." Jakarta. (December 
2007), 19. 
28 "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari 
Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2007." Jakarta. (December 2007), 19. 
29 "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari 
Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2008." Jakarta. (December 2008), 12. 
30 "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari 
Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2008." Jakarta. (December 2008), 13. 
31 "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari 
Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2008." Jakarta. (December 2008), 14. 
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Instead, the Riau Islands taskforce, which included the head of the provincial manpower 
office as its chair and the head of BNP2TKI’s implementation unit, had brokered a deal 
with a local businessman who agreed to provide the use of a privately owned facility 
formerly used to house transiting workers. The taskforce had awarded Aseng, owner of a 
local business called PT Siam, an exclusive contract to organize the mass repatriation of 
deportees to their province of residence, mostly in Java or the Lesser Sunda Islands. The 
boarding facilities were an informal condition of the deal, as were the kickbacks that he 
channelled to the taskforce’s selection committee. The funds contributed to off-budget 
accounts, which officials on the committee used not only to line their own pockets, but also 
to protect the taskforce’s activities from the vagaries of the budgeting process. In his office, 
Aseng presented a folder of receipts for the previous week’s departures, which showed that 
PT Siam paid Rp. 250,000 (USD 25) for the passage of each deportee, an expense that he 
included in his bid to win the contract. With an average of 700 repatriations each week, the 
activity consumed around Rp. 700,000,000 (USD 70,000) a month. This figure was grossly 
inflated because Aseng and taskforce officials brokered an alternative arrangement, in 
which the state-owned enterprises returned a portion of the sum through kickbacks.  
 
This arrangement made it difficult for the ministry to reassign the BNP2TKI’s 
administrative roles to the provincial manpower office. The head of this office resisted the 
ministry’s encouragement to assume responsibility for administration of formal labour 
migration out of Kepri partly because of the fact that no funding was made available to do 
so, and partly because the recommendation that the provincial government simply produce 
letters in lieu of the overseas identity cards as a transitional measure seemed 
unsatisfactory.32 Even more troubling for him was the politics of doing so, as it entailed 
taking control of administrative roles that had until then been performed satisfactorily by 
the BNP2TKI’s implementation unit in Tanjung Pinang. More importantly still, the head of 
the BNP2TKI unit was involved in the taskforce’s selection committee, which brokered the 
deal with Aseng. In addition to personally benefiting from this relationship, he was also 
therefore privy to details about how it worked.33 The head of the provincial manpower 
office was thus content to leave the administrative work in the hands of the BNP2TKI unit, 
                                                          
32 Interview data, Tanjung Pinang, 4 January, 2010. 
33 Interview data, Tanjung Pinang, 4 January, 2010. 
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both to avert the risk of these details reaching the public domain and to continue with the 
effective arrangement that allowed the provincial government to minimize the cost of 
handling deportees. 
Medan 
Like Tanjung Pinang, Medan, the capital city of North Sumatra, is an embarkation point for 
West Malaysia bound labour migration. Some 11,000 labour migrants are processed in the 
city each year for employment on the Malaysian Peninsula,34 although it only handles one 
thousand or so deportees each year.35 Government statistics maintained by the Ministry of 
Manpower and the BNP2TKI show the number of women leaving from Medan is seven 
times higher than the number of men. More than half those women take jobs in the 
informal sector as domestic workers. As in Kepri, most of this latter group of labour 
migrants originate from other islands, such as Java. By contrast, formal sector migrants 
mostly originate from Sumatra. The men are mostly employed on construction sites and 
plantations, and the women in this group are typically employed in factories or the 
hospitality industry. In all cases, labour migrants historically transited in Medan as part of 
their itinerary, which involved crossing the Strait of Malacca by boat for access to West 
Malaysia’s largest cities and plantations. 
 
Migrants participating in the overseas labour migration programme formerly only passed 
through the immigration checkpoint at Port Belawan, which is 25 kilometres north of the 
city.36 The port closed its direct route connecting North Sumatra to the northwest of 
Malaysia in 2010. An indirect route via Tanjungbalai Asahan, 150 kilometres to the south 
of Medan, also connected Medan to Port Klang on the central coast of the Malaysian 
Peninsula, which is only a 30 minute car ride to Kuala Lumpur. The Tanjungbalai Asahan-
                                                          
34 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Data 
penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan 
Informasi. (2009), 25. 
35 Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. "Peran pemerintah daerah di wilayah perbatasan dalam 
melindungi warga negara Indonesia yang dideportasi (studi di propinsi Kalimantan Barat, 
Kepulauan Riau, Sumatera Utara, dan Kalimantan Timur)." Jakarta: Human Rights Research and 
Development Agency. (2011), 22. 
36 Interview data, Medan, 19 April 2010. 
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Port Klang segment of the journey takes between six and eight hours. With the introduction 
of multiple low cost international air routes though, Medan’s airport gradually became the 
main administrative site for international migration.37 In 2010, Medan International Airport 
offered direct flights to Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru in Malaysia and to 
Singapore – all popular destinations under the overseas labour migration programme. 
Cheap air travel has revolutionized international migration. AirAsia, for example regularly 
offers Rp. 99,000 (USD 10) flights from Medan to Kuala Lumpur, a trip that only takes one 
hour. Predictably, these considerations soon encouraged labour recruitment companies to 
move their business away from sea routes, shifting the demand for programme services 
closer to the airport, which at the time was located in the city centre. 
 
The administrative culture in Medan did not produce the same kind of collegial response to 
changes in central regulations pertaining to the overseas labour migration programme as in 
Tanjung Pinang. In fact, quite the opposite happened. Following promulgation of the 2008 
regulation that delegated the BNP2TKI’s administrative roles under the programme to the 
provincial government, the relationship between the provincial manpower office and the 
BNP2TKI unit in Medan deteriorated. Conflict became a feature of the relationship as the 
manpower office showed greater interest in the administrative activity over time. When the 
regulation was introduced in December 2008, the head of the manpower office ignored the 
ministry’s calls largely because of the absence of an adequate budget allocation for the 
roles. His position changed after August 2009, when the two central government agencies 
entered a period of service duplication in Jakarta. The head of the manpower office was 
largely convinced to change track by those in Medan with commercial interests in 
programme who saw distinct advantages in a division of administrative labour that gave the 
provincial authority effective control of the programme. 
 
The historical and spatial particularities of the city also partly explain why conflict 
developed in Medan. Conflict between the ministry and the BNP2TKI centred around a 
particular segment of the international labour migrants, namely women with jobs as 
domestic workers. One of BNP2TKI’s objectives in Medan had been to encourage those 
                                                          
37 Interview data, Medan, 19 April 2010. 
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who migrate informally to participate in the official overseas labour migration programme. 
But as relatively few labour migrants with employment in Malaysia came from the Medan 
BNP2TKI unit’s jurisdiction, which only covered North Sumatra,38 it meant that the office 
mainly dealt with recruits who had been transported in from other provinces by locally 
registered labour recruitment companies. The head of the Medan BNP2TKI unit was at first 
confused by the behaviour of the recruitment industry. During conversations with labour 
recruitment company owners in the area, he learned that it made economic sense to the 
recruitment industry to concentrate on female migrants from further afield. Supplying 
domestic workers was a profitable business, but the major source areas for migrant labour 
of this kind were on islands further east, namely Java, Lombok and Sumbawa. The 
migration infrastructure in Medan had enabled them to channel these workers cheaply and 
quickly (by plane) and legally (through the BNP2TKI’s unit) to Malaysia. 
 
But the nature of services had changed since the manpower office was involved, as the 
overseas migration law introduced pre-departure training and replaced the departure tax 
exemption letter with an overseas identity card. The combination of more administrative 
responsibilities on a larger scale raised the stakes around control. The ministry’s technical 
implementation unit in East Jakarta charged Rp. 50,000 (USD 5) per migrant, generating a 
significant source of non-tax income, which could be used to fund related administrative 
activity.39 In this case, the funds were used to produce overseas identity cards. The ministry 
encouraged the head of the Medan manpower office to introduce a similar charge using the 
provincial government’s authority to seek compensation from those who used their 
services. This opportunity was even more attractive in the context of budget transfers from 
the centre to sub-national governments, which gave the provincial government only ten per 
cent of the amount earmarked for North Sumatra.40 In this particular location, where more 
                                                          
38 The jurisdiction of BNP2TKI units sometimes includes multiple provinces, such as the office in 
Pekanbaru, which covers Jambi, Riau and West Sumatra. Until 2009, when the Tanjung Pinang 
office was established, the Pekanbaru office also had jurisdiction over the Riau Islands. 
39 Goverment Regulation No. 73/1999. Tata Cara Penggunaan Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak 
yang Bersumber dari Kegiatan Tertentu, article 4. 
40 For 2010 the North Sumatra government received Rp. 813,233,489,000, while Deli Serdang 
District received Rp. 793,141,685,000 and Medan Municipality received Rp. 784,139,518,000. 
There are 27 other local governments within North Sumatra. For further details see Presidential 
Regulation No. 43/2009. Dana Alokasi Umum Daerah Provinsi, Kabupaten, dan Kota Tahun 2010. 
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than 10,000 labour migrants require the service each year, this fee promised to generate Rp. 
500,000,000 (USD 50,000) for discretionary purposes. 
 
In December 2009, the head of the BNP2TKI issued a circular memorandum to the heads 
of its units in the regions and to the heads of provincial manpower offices requiring the 
government agency with the necessary infrastructure to furnish labour migrants with 
overseas identity cards. As was the case in Jakarta, the only government unit in Medan that 
had the systems and machinery in place to do so was the BNP2TKI unit. The BNP2TKI 
unit had billboards erected around the airport reminding migrants that they need to hold 
overseas identity cards. However, as was also the case in Jakarta, the police unit and 
immigration officers at the Medan International Airport were reluctant to intervene against 
labour migrants who held exemption letters, which in this location had been issued by the 
Medan manpower office. As a result, the BNP2TKI unit and the manpower office were 
enabled to effectively duplicate finalization of the pre-departure process, hindering the 
collection of statistics on the number of migrant workers departing through the programme. 
 
The manpower office and the BNP2TKI unit were located on the same plot of land and, 
from the perspective of labour recruitment companies, both government units were 
strategically placed to perform the necessary administrative roles. Jalan Asrama is only 20 
kilometres distance from the international airport and an exit on the Trans-Sumatra 
highway, which runs from the northernmost tip of the island (Banda Aceh) to the 
southernmost (Bandar Lampung). Also, the fact that it is a residential area enabled labour 
recruitment companies to not only transport labour migrants in from other parts of the 
country without having to pass through the city centre, but also to temporarily 
accommodate them there. It was this fact that the manpower office exploited to leverage 
greater control over the contested services under the overseas labour migration programme. 
The head of the BNP2TKI unit had close friends in the manpower office next door, who 
informed him that the official with authority to authorize the establishment of boarding 
houses was coercing the recruitment industry into using exemption letters in place of 
overseas identity cards. This gradually eroded some – but not all – of the demand for 
services at the BNP2TKI office. 
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This brief description explains how the manpower office wrested control from the 
BNP2TKI. But, as indicated above, the motivation to become involved in the first place 
came from the recruitment industry itself. In order to process labour migrants from outside 
the province, labour recruitment companies frequently sought to have them registered as 
residents in North Sumatra. This enabled them to obtain the necessary passport 
recommendation letters that, according to the overseas migration law, only local 
government could issue. The head of the BNP2TKI unit, claimed that he had made it clear 
to labour recruitment companies that his staff were under instruction not to finalize the 
departure process without this letter. This was a BNP2TKI policy to prevent the 
recruitment industry from circumventing the local government. This policy was 
undermined by the provincial manpower office, which began processing labour recruitment 
companies’ requests for services without prior consent from local authorities, and at times 
even forging their authorization. Records from this period confirm that the number of 
applications processed by local administrations was dwarfed by those recorded by the 
manpower office and the BNP2TKI.41 
 
In part, the manpower office was open to becoming involved in the administration of the 
programme because of pressure from local legislators. Some legislators profited directly 
and indirectly from the migration business, making them sensitive to the commercial 
interests of the recruitment industry. In this case, labour recruitment companies wanted the 
manpower office to help circumvent local authorities who complicated matters, for 
example, by demanding bribes in return for services such as registering migrants and 
recommending that the Immigration Office furnish them with passports. These legislators 
then approached the Governor of North Sumatra, Syamsul Arifin, explaining that the 
Minister for Manpower’s regulations gave the provincial government control over 
finalization of the pre-departure process.42 The Governor then instructed the head of the 
                                                          
41 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Sistem 
online BNP2TKI atasi disparitas data TKI di Disnaker Sumut." http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-
mainmenu-231/5926-sistem-online-bnp2tki-atasi-disparitas-data-tki-di-disnaker-sumut.html. 
Accessed on 20 August 2011. 
42 Syamsul Arifin was formerly regent of Langkat District. The largest discrepancy between the 
number of labour migrants registered with a local government and who whose pre-departure process 
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manpower office to determine what needed to be done in order to take on that role. The 
provincial parliament eventually intervened formally, calling on the provincial manpower 
office and the BNP2TKI unit to defend the legality of their activity in a mediation session 
that replicated the one that had taken place in Jakarta a few months earlier. The head of the 
BNP2TKI unit fully expected legislators to side with the provincial government because 
their priorities lay with interests in North Sumatra, unlike his, which also had a national 
dimension. 
 
This competition eroded the veneer of cohesion that government agencies seek to promote, 
revealing how different parts of the state respond differently to stimulus in their 
environment. The relationships between the provincial manpower office and the BNP2TKI 
unit were not as strong as those in Tanjung Pinang, where the different agencies already 
worked on more issues together. In Medan, their administrative involvement in the 
programme was more or less clearly differentiated at the time that the ministry’s regulation 
was introduced. At that point, the manpower office had responsibility for authorizing the 
establishment of recruitment industry infrastructure, and the BNP2TKI unit took charge of 
finalizing the pre-departure process for labour migrants. The provincial manpower office 
became involved in administration of the pre-departure process in response to lobbying by 
a network of labour recruitment companies and legislators who convinced the governor to 
have the manpower office take on the roles. This, therefore, is a case where considerations 
of scale trumped those of collegiality between different levels of government in a particular 
place.  
Semarang 
Another site where scalar considerations trumped the flatter, horizontal relationships in a 
particular place is the capital city of Central Java, Semarang. This city is a major transit site 
for migrant labour, mostly from within that province but also from adjacent regions, such 
as Yogyakarta and East Java. Migrants are mainly female domestic workers leaving for 
employment in the Asia Pacific region, but around one fifth are men heading to formal 
                                                          
was finalized concerned this district. Arifin was removed from public office in 2011 after the 
Supreme Court sentenced him to six years in prison for corruption. 
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sector jobs in Malaysia.43 Semarang is the third largest administrative site for the 
programme on Java after Jakarta and Surabaya. As a result, Semarang officials have had to 
deal with the kinds of demands that the recruitment industry places on the state apparatus 
to administer its business, such as those illustrated above in the case of Medan. In 
Semarang, administration of the overseas labour migration programme was formerly 
dominated by the provincial manpower office but, as in Medan, changes to the political 
system and in local conditions have challenged the status quo. In this case, the 
disaggregation of the BNP2TKI unit from what would later become a provincial 
government agency introduced a new authority into the administration of labour migrants, 
unsettling networks that made the programme work in Semarang much in the same way as 
in Jakarta, albeit on a much smaller scale.  
 
Semarang was formerly only a transit site for intending migrants leaving through Jakarta. 
But with the introduction of direct flights to popular destination countries, such as Malaysia 
and Singapore, it has also developed as a site of embarkation. In 1989, a Silk Air route was 
introduced between Surakarta, the second largest city in the province, and Singapore, 
creating an alternative for migrants seeking to circumvent the official system.44 But it was 
the introduction of low-cost flights from Surakarta to Kuala Lumpur by AirAsia in 2006 
that prompted change. The Ministry of Manpower’s implementation unit in Semarang, 
which was to be transferred to the BNP2TKI in 2007, was called on to open a counter at 
Surakarta International Airport. As suggested by this move, the programme’s scope was 
adjusted in response to the success of private air carriers in securing the opening of 
regional airports for international routes. Eight of the 21 BNP2TKI staff eventually 
stationed at the Surakarta airport were reassigned to Semarang International Airport to help 
                                                          
43 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Data 
penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan 
Informasi. (2009). 
44 Labour migrants heading to Singapore ought to have passed through Jakarta. An exception 
occurred between 2004 and 2007 when all Singapore-bound labour migration was required to transit 
in Batam. 
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with administration following the introduction of another AirAsia route connecting that 
city to Kuala Lumpur a few years later.45 
 
The history of control over the implementation unit influenced the way in which the 
conflict between the ministry and the BNP2TKI played out in Semarang. Until 1999, the 
unit was subordinate to the provincial manpower office. However, this arrangement 
changed when the Minister for Manpower at the time, Fahmi Idris, made units directly 
responsible to the ministry. In 2001, the central government began to recognize the 
manpower office’s jurisdiction over decentralized aspects of the programme, such as 
authorizing the establishment of recruitment industry infrastructure in the province, as 
required by the two year deadline stipulated in Article 132 (2) of Law No. 22/1999 on 
Regional Governance. In this transition period, ministry staff were on the ministry’s payroll 
but remained in the provincial manpower office’s building. As this arrangement suggests, 
unit staff effectively operated under a dual management system: they were structurally 
accountable to the centre but were expected to toe the line in the provincial manpower 
office.  
 
The fact that the unit was situated in the manpower office also meant that provincial 
government colleagues could sometimes exert influence over the BNP2TKI’s work with 
labour recruitment companies. This was particularly the case, for example, when labour 
recruitment companies sought to have the pre-departure process finalized for labour 
migrants who were recruited in the Special Region of Yogyakarta or East Java. Around 15 
of the 40 or so recruitment companies in the province maintained an office in Semarang, 
where they had developed mutually beneficial relationships with the relevant officials. 
However, the ministry encouraged its unit to scrutinize migrants’ documents more 
carefully in order to ensure greater accuracy in records of labour migrants’ origin for 
planning purposes and so that the next of kin could be contacted in an emergency. Tensions 
also grew as labour recruitment companies that had previously received preferential 
                                                          
45 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "BP3TKI 
Semarang siap layani TKI di Bandara Ahmad Yani." BNP2TKI, 15 June, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/6814-bp3tki-semarang-siap-layani-tki-di-bandara-
ahmad-yani.html. Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
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treatment were overlooked in favour of others. This was particularly the case when a labour 
recruitment company that was closely associated to a manpower office staffer was refused 
special treatment. The tension was settled in 2002 when the ministry replaced the unit 
manager with an outsider from Jakarta, partly severing informal ties to manpower office 
staff.46 
 
As a next step, the ministry moved the unit into another building 20 minutes south of the 
provincial manpower office in 2003. Located on the highway that runs into the Semarang 
City centre, where the manpower office remained, the new location was also strategically 
south of the ring road. This enabled access by those travelling from west, south and east of 
the province to the unit and the airport without having to enter Semarang. Moving into their 
own office space disrupted the relationship of dependence that had grown between the 
implementation unit and the provincial manpower office. It extricated the provincial 
government from all processes to do with migrant workers, and firmed control over 
finalization of the pre-departure process in the hands of the central government. This 
reconfiguration of power relations enabled the central government authorities to have more 
say in how the programme was administered. In 2005, following introduction of the 
overseas migration law, the unit ran mandatory pre-departure training and started setting up 
systems to replace the exemption letter with an overseas identity card. On average, the unit 
produced around 200 such cards daily, which grew over time to 400 per day after it 
expanded capacity by opening up an administrative post in Cilacap on the other side of the 
province.47  
 
The longstanding practice of re-documenting residents so that they could use the Semarang 
services continued, but the provincial manpower office was no longer involved.48 
                                                          
46 Interview data, Yogyakarta, 10 October 2010. 
47 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "BP3TKI 
Semarang terbitkan 400 KTKLN per hari." BNP2TKI, 18 September, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/5346-bp3tki-semarang-terbitkan-400-ktkln-per-
hari.html. Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
48 The number of cards that the unit claimed to produce exceeded the number of migrant workers 
that it recorded as leaving the country. Moreover, unit staff developed a reputation for prioritizing 
service provision to some employment companies over others. See Hariani, D and H Lestari, 
"Analisis kualitas pelayanan di Balai Pelayanan Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja 
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Recruiters acquired the necessary migration documents from local government 
administrations that were amenable to their demands. Part of the reason for doing so was 
that labour recruitment companies source migrants from a wide catchment area, and those 
recruits do not always arrive with all of the necessary documents, such as birth certificates 
and identity cards. Moreover, some migrants even fall short of age restrictions and 
education standards, and so labour recruitment companies want state documents that hide 
those facts. Some local administrations further afield also complicated matters. For 
example, the head of Sragen District and even the Governor of Yogyakarta had at different 
times imposed bans on migration for informal sector work overseas in order to discourage 
the population from taking up certain kinds of employment overseas, such as domestic 
work, despite high demand for it. To circumvent restrictions, recruiters organized to have 
other local administrations provide the documents, a practice that BNP2TKI units in most 
places were prepared to overlook. 
 
It was in this context that in 2008 the Minister for Manpower sought to delegate the task of 
finalizing the pre-departure process to provincial manpower offices. In Semarang, the head 
of provincial manpower office eagerly took up the responsibility, tasking staff to provide 
pre-departure training, verify documents and issue overseas identity cards. However, the 
office issued exemption letters to migrants instead of identity cards, pointing to the 
ministry’s assurance that this arrangement was temporary. At the same time, the 
implementation unit – which had been transferred to the BNP2TKI the previous year – 
continued to issue identity cards. This duplication continued uneasily until the end of 
December 2009, when the BNP2TKI instructed law enforcement agencies, including the 
regional head of police in Semarang, to crack down on migrant workers without the card. 
The head of police at the Semarang International Airport was also called on to do all in his 
power to make life difficult for migrant labour that presented exemption letters instead of 
identity cards. This situation panicked Semarang-based labour recruitment companies that 
                                                          
Indonesia (BP3TKI) Semarang Provinsi Jawa Tengah," Journal of Public Policy and Management 
Review 2, no. 2 (2013). 
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had used the manpower office’s services, and they turned to the Governor of Central Java, 
Mardiyanto, to help sort out the confusing situation.49  
 
Mardiyanto wrote to the Minister for Manpower three days after the crackdown started, 
exhorting him to resolve the conflict with the BNP2TKI. In the correspondence, he claimed 
that competition between the provincial manpower office and the BNP2TKI’s unit in 
Semarang had made it difficult to apply a single standard, and that public attention to this 
problem was damaging public perceptions of the state as a cohesive entity. The governor 
sent a carbon copy of the correspondence to a range of institutions in Jakarta, including the 
BNP2TKI. All of Indonesia’s governors also received a copy, alerting them to an issue that 
may also have been occurring in their jurisdiction. During fieldwork, a provincial 
government official in Banda Aceh brandished the letter in an interview as evidence that 
the conflict in Jakarta was playing out in unpredictable ways in each province. Semarang 
was arguably one of the worst-affected sites because the BNP2TKI unit and the provincial 
manpower office had more business over which to compete. In places such as Banda Aceh 
and Banjarbaru, there was no conflict, largely because there was no real business of which 
to speak.50 The correspondence itself was not acted on immediately, but it added 
momentum to demands from the regions to have top managers in the central government 
end the conflict. 
Nunukan 
Located on the northeast international border with Malaysia on the island of Borneo, 
Nunukan is another site through which labour migrants leave Indonesia and are deported. 
2,000 kilometres north of Semarang, it is the major gateway between Indonesia and the 
East Malaysian state of Sabah. In 2007 when the BNP2TKI assumed control of the 
Nunukan unit, 70,000 departures were recorded, which staff revealed mostly originated 
                                                          
49 Mardiyanto was re-elected Governor of Central Java in 2003. He held this position until 2007 
when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed him Minister for Internal Affairs. 
50 To illustrate, in 2007 Banjarbaru in South Kalimatan processed 42 migrants and Banda Aceh 
recorded 99. See BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia). "Data penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian 
Pengembangan dan Informasi. (2009), 25.  
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from Sulawesi and Flores, to the east.51 The unit was the only one that the ministry 
established in a site that was not also the capital city of the province. It was established in 
1984 by Sudomo in an attempt to harness some of the 3,000 labour migrants who arrived 
by boat each month and entered Malaysia without valid migration documents.52 The 
significance of Nunukan does not stop there. In 2002 the district became a household name 
following the death of deported migrants due to gross negligence on the part of Indonesian 
authorities – an event commonly referred to as the Nunukan Tragedy. As many as 25,000 
Indonesians waited in temporary camps while recruiters looked for employers and sorted 
out the necessary paperwork with Indonesian and Malaysian officials so that the deportees 
could return to Sabah. But after evidence emerged that around 70 people had died there due 
to unsanitary conditions, the central government intervened by offering the local 
administration money to help build accommodation facilities for deportees in anticipation 
of more large-scale deportations.53 
 
Nunukan is an exceptional site because it hosts a range of central government offices but is 
not a provincial capital city. Until 2013, Nunukan fell under the jurisdiction of the 
provincial authorities of East Kalimantan, in Samarinda, which was only accessible by 
multiple plane trips or a combination of boat and car travel.54 But Samarinda was primarily 
concerned with the administration of the oil and gas rich areas of Balikpapan and Bontang, 
rather than the immigration hotspot of Nunukan. Moreover, unlike Tanjung Pinang, where 
the transit point coincided with the provincial capital, provincial authorities in East 
Kalimantan could afford to ignore isolated Nunukan. The provincial manpower office also 
stood to gain very little from becoming involved in the situation in Nunukan, as labour 
                                                          
51 For more on this, see Hugo, G, "Population movement in Indonesia since 1971," Tijdschrift voor 
Economische en Sociale Geografie 79, no. 4 (1988); Idrus, N, "Makkunrai passimokolo': Bugis 
migrant women workers in Malaysia," in Women and work in Indonesia, ed. M Ford and L Parker 
(New York: Routledge, 2008). 
52 Departemen Tenaga Kerja. "Perluasan kesempatan kerja melalui antar kerja antar negara ke 
Malaysia Timur." Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Bina Hubungan Ketenaga Kerjaan dan Pengawasan 
Norma Kerja. (February 1987). 
53 For an extended discussion of the Nunukan Crisis, see Ford, M, "After Nunukan: the regulation of 
Indonesian migration to Malaysia," in Divided we move: mobility, labour migration and border 
controls in Asia, ed. A Kaur and I Metcalfe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
54 In 2013 it was transferred into the province North Kalimantan. 
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recruitment companies generally maintained only a coordinating office on the island, 
opting to keep their main operations closer to sources of migrant labour. As a consequence, 
the provincial government’s main function – authorizing labour recruitment companies to 
set up infrastructure, such as offices and boarding houses – was irrelevant. A final 
additional factor that influenced the provincial government’s decision to forestall setting up 
presence in the area was the large proportion of migrants leaving via Nunukan outside the 
formal overseas labour migration programme altogether.55 
 
By contrast, there are several central government offices in Nunukan, including 
immigration, customs, the police and a BNP2TKI unit, reflecting its importance as a transit 
point for migrants and thus as a flashpoint in Indonesia’s bilateral relationship with 
Malaysia. Their presence also meant that central authorities were more important players 
than the provincial government in the district. The BNP2TKI unit, for example, is routinely 
involved in Nunukan government-organized coordination meetings in response to frequent 
announcements in Malaysia about plans to deport labour migrants from Indonesia who lack 
valid migration documents. These central government units have also developed an 
informal system that helps labour migrants to circumvent the system, much like the case as 
described in Tanjung Pinang.56 In Nunukan, migration intermediaries known as ‘fixers’ 
(pengurus) make the necessary deals with immigration officials to secure the exit of 
migrants without passports.57 Local entrepreneurs also double as migration 
intermediaries.58 This local phenomenon clearly subverts all sorts of laws, but it is none the 
                                                          
55 Ford, M, "After Nunukan: the regulation of Indonesian migration to Malaysia," in Divided we 
move: mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia, ed. A Kaur and I Metcalfe (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
56 For more details on this, see Ford, M and L Lyons, "Travelling the aspal route: 'grey' labour 
migration through an Indonesian border town," in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E 
Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). 
57 For more details on this system, see Idrus, N, "Makkunrai passimokolo': Bugis migrant women 
workers in Malaysia," in Women and work in Indonesia, ed. M Ford and L Parker (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 156-57. 
58 Locals in Nunukan have married this business with small time international trade in items, such as 
sugar and plastic housewares from Malaysia, which are often considered higher quality and cheaper 
than equivalent products in Indonesia. They exploit the fact that international ferries compete for the 
business of migrant workers. In exchange for putting the migrants on their boats, the transporters 
offer intermediaries free passage to and from Tawau for travel on the same day. 
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less a feature of social and administrative landscape in which the BNP2TKI unit is required 
to engage. 
 
This reality of labour migration through Nunukan poses a challenge to the BNP2TKI unit, 
which is tasked with job of convincing other government agencies to discipline staff who 
facilitate irregular international labour migration. Central authorities based in Jakarta, 
Kuala Lumpur, Kota Kinabalu and Tawau want Indonesian immigration officials in 
Nunukan to screen border crossers to ensure that they hold a valid work permit for 
employment in Malaysia. However, it is not always easy to convince institutions at the 
peripheries to implement central rules. This is certainly the case in Nunukan, where 
immigration officials have been amenable to turning a blind eye in exchange for a bribe. 
This situation is further complicated by the fact that Malaysian authorities on the other side 
of the border are also complicit. In Tawau, Malaysian officials were prepared to relax 
immigration policy. For example, intermediaries may travel with a bundle of passports for 
Indonesian citizens still at work in places further inland.59 Malaysian officials provide the 
necessary visa stamp when the passport leaves and when it returns.  
 
The BNP2TKI unit is not involved in this arrangement. Instead, it focuses on labour 
migrants passing through the official system, and especially the administration of re-entry 
for deported migrant workers. The ministry showed little interest in the border area after 
the implementation unit was established in 1984, preferring to focus its attention on labour 
migration leaving international airports on Java.60 However, the central government scaled 
up its presence on the island in 2005 following the introduction of a national taskforce to 
coordinate regional responses to the deportation of Indonesian citizens the previous year.61 
                                                          
59 Personal observation, Tawau, 2 June 2010. 
60 Ford, M, "After Nunukan: the regulation of Indonesian migration to Malaysia," in Divided we 
move: mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia, ed. A Kaur and I Metcalfe (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
61 For details of the taskforce, see Presidential Decree No. 106/2004. Tim Koordinasi Pemulangan 
Tenaga Kerja Indonesia Bermasalah dan Keluarganya dari Malaysia. For reports on its 
implementation, see Coordinating Ministry of People's Prosperity. "Kinerja tim koordinasi 
pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan keluarga dari Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 
2007." Jakarta. (December 2007); "Kinerja tim koordinasi pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia 
bermasalah dan keluarga dari Malaysia (TK-PTKB) tahun 2008." Jakarta. (December 2008); 
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Between 2006 and 2010, the BNP2TKI unit’s budget allocation was increased to purchase 
equipment including computers, machinery for printing identity cards and a car for the use 
of unit staff.62 The additional expenditure was justified through the claim that the state 
could best protect migrants by ensuring that they left the country with a complete set of 
migration documents. However, in fact, the decision was largely motivated by a desire to 
profit from the opportunities that emerged from what became routine deportations of 
citizens who wished to re-enter Malaysia as soon as possible.63 
 
The Nunukan district government provided an integrated solution to the problem of 
missing state documents. The Population and Civil Registration Office, an agency of the 
district government, provided intending migrants from other areas of the country (including 
those seeking to re-migrate after deportation) with aspal documents that made the migrants 
appear as though they resided in Nunukan. The term ‘bleaching’ (pemutihan), or 
regularization, was already commonly used for migrants whose migration status, was 
legalized by Malaysian authorities in Malaysian territory.64 But in Nunukan, the term 
assumed an additional meaning as authorities furnished intending migrant workers with 
new birth certificates, identity cards and passports that hid the fact that they were from 
another jurisdiction, in some cases also changing their personal details. As in Tanjung 
Pinang, these documents helped migrants avoid the official programme altogether. But 
aspal documents also facilitated access to the programme in Nunukan, as they did in 
Jakarta and Semarang, where labour migrants were required to hold local identity 
documents to register. 
 
                                                          
"Petunjuk pelaksanaan penanganan dan pemulangan tenaga kerja Indonesia bermasalah dan 
keluarganya (TKI-B) dari Malaysia." Jakarta. (January 2009). 
62 While this budget allocation increased, discretionary funds decreased each year. The year after the 
BNP2TKI assumed control of the unit, expenditure on officials’ salaries was halved. Most retired 
but some were reassigned to other BNP2TKI units, including Makassar. 
63 For some Indonesians, the prospect of returning to their province of origin was unattractive 
because it offered little in the way of gainful employment. Others were born or had otherwise spent 
most of their life in Malaysia and so saw that country as their home, but lacked the documents they 
required to be able to remain. 
64 For more on regularization programmes in Sabah, see Kassim, A, "Filipino refugees in Sabah: 
state responses, public stereotypes and the dilemma over their future," Southeast Asian Studies 47, 
no. 1 (2009). 
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In 2010, however, the number of migrants processed in Nunukan decreased dramatically. 
There were three main reasons for this decline. First, the Sabah government did not require 
unlawful migrants to return to Indonesia for the purpose of organizing a full set of valid 
migration documents that year. Rather, migrants were permitted to remain in Malaysia 
while they sorted out the paperwork with the Indonesian consulate in Tawau and then 
organized a work permit with the Sabah immigration authority. Second, the BNP2TKI unit 
in Makassar, South Sulawesi, had started processing labour migrants there since 2008.65 
This enabled workers to leave Nunukan on the first outward-bound international ferry 
immediately after their arrival. Third, after 2006, the passport application process was 
simplified, allowing citizens to apply for travel documents at any Immigration Office in the 
country, whereas before they could only do so at a designated office, determined by the 
address recorded in their national identity card. The same policy was introduced for the full 
suite of services associated with the finalization of permission to depart, including for 
services at BNP2TKI units across the country. This enabled labour recruitment companies 
to organize these administrative requirements en route to Nunukan in cities such as 
Makassar, Mataram and Surabaya.66  
 
It was at this time that the ministry’s decision requiring provincial manpower offices to 
take over responsibility for the finalization services that the BNP2TKI units had previously 
provided was promulgated. However, unlike all other sites described here, there was 
simply no provincial authority present in Nunukan to do so. The provincial government in 
Samarinda could have intervened, but it was clear to all by this stage that the province was 
going to be partitioned, and that Nunukan was to fall within the jurisdiction of another 
province. The fact that there was effectively no provincial authority in Nunukan made the 
contest with the BNP2TKI in Jakarta, over 3,000 kilometres away, feel not only distant but 
also lacking in relevance in ways that was not the case in Medan and Tanjung Pinang. 
Moreover, the drastic decline in the number of migrant workers who required those 
administrative services in Nunukan as a result of a combination of Indonesian and 
                                                          
65 Interview data, Nunukan, 3 June 2010. 
66 Evidence of the rise and fall of the migration business is visible in the main town, where each 
street is decorated with ageing signs that show where employment companies’ representatives 
formerly operated. 
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Malaysian policies meant that there was very little to do. It is these factors that spared 
administrators working in Nunukan from the political headache of working out how to best 
accommodate the centre’s conflicting policies concerning the administration of the 
overseas labour migration programme. 
Surabaya 
Surabaya, the capital city of East Java, is the largest administrative centre for the overseas 
labour migration programme outside Jakarta. Located 300 kilometres to the east of 
Semarang, Surabaya has an international airport that boasts daily flights to popular labour 
migration destinations not just in Southeast Asia but also to Hong Kong, Seoul and Taipei. 
Some 45 per cent of those processed in Surabaya migrate for overseas domestic 
employment, while the rest leave Indonesia for jobs in construction, plantation agriculture, 
as well as manufacturing and hospitality sectors. As many as 65 per cent are women.67 
Official statistics suggest that the main source areas for these migrants are Malang, 
Ponorogo, Blitar, Banyuwangi and Tulungagung in that order.68 East Java also has the 
highest concentration of labour recruitment companies (over 70) outside Jakarta. As in 
Nunukan, however, the state’s institutional arrangement for handling the administration of 
the recruitment industry and their business in Surabaya is unlike any other province in the 
country.  
 
In Surabaya, like Nunukan, one of the tiers of government is effectively absent – in this 
case, the BNP2TKI unit. This unusual situation is explained by a series of events during the 
New Order and in the early stages of decentralization.69 In Surabaya, the services 
associated with the overseas labour migration programme were provided from a small 
counter in the provincial manpower office from the year of its establishment in 1984 until 
                                                          
67 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Data 
penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan 
Informasi. (2009), 25-26.  
68 "Penempatan berdasar daerah asal (kota/kabupaten) 2011-2012." BNP2TKI, 12 June, 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/statistik-penempatan/6779-penempatan-berdasar-daerah-asal-
kotakabupaten-2011-2012.html. Accessed on 21 June 2013. 
69 For background on the relative autonomy of East Java during the New Order, see Dick, H, J Fox, 
and J Mackie, eds., Balanced development: East Java in the New Order (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
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1992. In this year, Abdul Latief as Minister for Manpower authorized its relocation to a 
standalone building to accommodate the increasingly large volume of work it was required 
to perform as the programme expanded. The new office was located south of the city centre 
near the exit of the major toll road that provided those coming from the east, south and 
west of the province with a faster connection to the airport. In 1999 the office was removed 
from the control of the provincial manpower office by Latief’s successor, Fahmi Idris. But 
in 2001, the governor of East Java seized control of the unit, transforming into the 
country’s first and only special unit that implemented central government laws but was 
structurally subordinate to officials in Surabaya.70  
 
The governor used the fact that unit staff had not received their salary from the ministry for 
three months as a justification for his actions. Over time, however, it became clear that the 
governor’s motivations were much more complex. Administrators in the provincial 
government were concerned that decentralization laws had reduced the province’s role to 
that of coordinator in the region. In addition, there was a formal expectation that the 
governor served as an extension of central government authority. According to their 
interpretation, which turned out to be more or less accurate, the decentralization agenda 
effectively hollowed out the provincial level of government, making it financially 
dependent on central government handouts to pay for infrastructure, personnel and 
programmes. Moreover, it was clear that central government authorities intended to 
maintain a foothold in the province by embedding various specialist units into the 
administrative landscape. East Java, along with a number of other regions, pre-empted the 
development by claiming control first. In other cases the ministry successfully negotiated 
with provincial authorities to recentralize the units within a few years. But it failed to do so 
in East Java, making Surabaya the exception. 
 
As a result of this arrangement, the provincial manpower office was able to filter the 
directives emanating from the centre, and apply them according to its own logic. It 
announced that it would accept recruitment certificates that were issued by both the 
ministry and the BNP2TKI in Jakarta. The province already had responsibility for pre-
                                                          
70 Gubernatorial Regulation (East Java) No. 35/2000. Dinas Tenaga Kerja. 
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departure training, verifying migration documents and producing overseas identity cards, 
which it had come to control by default. Through control of these administrative functions, 
the provincial manpower office effectively shielded the East Java recruitment industry 
from the conflict and uncertainty that first emerged in Jakarta but, as described above, also 
came to feature in Medan and Semarang. While the ministry was pleased with this 
outcome, since it was the intention of the 2008 regulation to delegate authority over these 
roles to provincial authorities outside Jakarta, the BNP2TKI was less so.71 In Surabaya, 
then, the unit, which in other locations was accountable to the BNP2TKI, was effectively 
subordinated to the provincial manpower office, obviating the possibility of horizontal 
conflict between national and provincial authorities concerning administration of the 
overseas labour migration programme. 
 
The spoils brought by the provincial government’s victory were significant. In 2001, the 
governor instructed the unit to deposit the migrant worker levy of USD 15 per person in the 
provincial government’s bank account. This directive diverted revenue that would have 
otherwise passed through ministry’s hands. Handling of tax collection in the ministry and 
other state agencies usually involves holding funds temporarily in an off-budget account to 
generate interest for institutional and private use. Ministry statistics show that a total of 
380,690 migrants ought to have paid USD 5,710,350 in levies in 2004. A conservative 
estimate suggests that ministry officials may have collected around USD 50,000 in interest 
on this amount that year alone.72 As a result of the East Java governor’s directive, the 
provincial government collected the tax for 97,777 migrants between 2005 and 2006.73 
This amounted to nearly USD 1,500,000 in revenue for the provincial government. 
Significantly, it translated into a comparable loss for the Ministry of Finance, which was 
                                                          
71 The BNP2TKI allocated the budget that it would have otherwise given to its unit in Surabaya to 
perform those roles, and senior officials included negotiations to gain control of the unit in an order 
of business in 2011. As of August 2013, the BNP2TKI’s negotiations with the Governor of East 
Java had still not concluded so the unit remained under the control of the provincial manpower 
office. 
72 This figure was calculated using compound interest at 10%, compounded weekly, assumption that 
sum is transferred to the Ministry of Finance each week. 
73 BNP2TKI (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia). "Data 
penempatan TKI ke luar negeri: tahun 1994-2007." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan 
Informasi. (2009). 
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deprived of the revenue, and the ministry, which was deprived of the opportunity to harvest 
the interest on those taxes before they were remitted. 
 
As this example suggests, the governor’s wresting of control over the processing of labour 
migrants was aimed at increasing access to resources. At the same time, authority to collect 
the levy also augmented the provincial manpower office’s power over labour recruitment 
companies. The provincial government gave the East Java chapter of APJATI, the major 
association of recruiters in the area, an office to collect the levy in the building alongside a 
counter for the East Java government-owned Bank Jatim. In 2005 the East Java regional 
secretary, Soekarwo, who would himself become governor in 2008, was appointed grand 
commissioner on the Bank Jatim’s advisory board. This institutional arrangement 
effectively enabled provincial authorities to grant (and cover up) exemptions concerning 
payment of the levy. The fact that the provincial government controlled collection of the 
levy gave the officials associated with it access to funds that were handled by BNP2TKI 
units in other sites. In 2007, when the BNP2TKI became operational, its officials collected 
almost USD 9.5 million. The East Java provincial government handled almost USD 
900,000, out of sight from central government authorities, in the same year.  
 
These activities did not go unnoticed. Like all other agencies and units, the provincial 
government is subject to account inspection by the National Audit Agency. When its 
accounts for 2004 and 2005 were inspected in 2006, the auditing agency found a 
discrepancy between the revenue that ought to have been deposited with Bank Jatim based 
on the number of migrants in the provincial manpower office’s records and the amount that 
was actually collected. The agency put the discrepancy down to negligence (lalai) and 
recommended that the governor fix the problem.74 In reality, money may have been 
siphoned off for private purposes, but it is also likely that at least some of it had been used 
to pay for institutional activity, as is the practice in other parts of the bureaucracy.75  
                                                          
74 An interview with a public auditor revealed that in her experience negligence is generally a 
euphemism for many kinds of maladministration, of which some are deliberate.  
75 Mietzner, M, "Party financing in post-Soeharto Indonesia: between state subsidies and political 
corruption," Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 29, no. 
2 (2007); "Funding pilkada: illegal campaign financing In Indonesia’s local elections," in The state 
and illegality in Indonesia, ed. E Aspinall and G van Klinken (Leiden: KILTV, 2011). 
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Control of tasks associated with labour recruitment companies offered an alternative source 
of revenue to fiscal transfers from Jakarta, which kept the province dependent on the 
central government. The Ministry of Finance carefully monitors the production of local 
regulations for such attempts to generate revenue, which the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
then cancels, citing the justification that the rules stifle investment by raising transaction 
costs.76 While this may be the case, it is also a possibility that this form of gatekeeping 
aims to prevent leakage from central funds. To illustrate, the National Audit Agency 
recommended that the Ministry of Finance reverse the loss that the central government 
incurred as a result of the East Java government’s regulation annexing the levy charged to 
labour migrants. In the following year’s fiscal transfer, the agency suggested that the 
Ministry of Finance reduce the East Java government’s share by the same amount earned 
by the province through collection of the levy.77 This highlights an important dynamic of 
centre-periphery power relations whereby the sub-national tier seeks ways to reduce 
dependence on the centre and the centre looks for ways to maintain the upper hand.  
 
However unaccounted funds were used, the provincial government eventually agreed to 
transfer 30 per cent of the levy to the Ministry of Manpower.78 At first glance, it appears as 
though the ministry and East Java authorities agreed to redistribute the revenue according 
to the law on fiscal decentralization, which requires the centre to transfer 70 per cent of 
total revenue to the regions. But an auditing report reveals that a shadow system was used 
to make the transaction. The East Java governor authorized a series of payments to the 
                                                          
76 Butt, S, "Regional autonomy and legal disorder: the proliferation of local laws in Indonesia," 
Sydney Law Review 32, no. 2 (2010). 
77 BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). "Hasil pemeriksaan atas pengelolaan dana pembinaan dan 
penyelenggaraan penempatan tenaga kerja Indonesia dan pelaksanaan penempatan tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia ke luar negeri tahun anggaran 2004 dan 2005 pada Ditjen Pembinaan dan Penempatan 
Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, Dinas Tenaga Kerja, Balai Pelayanan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia serta instansi terkait lainnya di Surabaya, Pekanbaru dan Batam." Jakarta. 85/S/III-
XI.3/07/2006, (5 July 2006). 
78 "Hasil pemeriksaan atas pengelolaan dana pembinaan dan penyelenggaraan penempatan tenaga 
kerja Indonesia dan pelaksanaan penempatan tenaga Kerja Indonesia ke luar negeri tahun anggaran 
2004 dan 2005 pada Ditjen Pembinaan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, Dinas Tenaga 
Kerja, Balai Pelayanan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia serta instansi terkait lainnya di 
Surabaya, Pekanbaru dan Batam." Jakarta. 85/S/III-XI.3/07/2006, (5 July 2006). 
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private bank account of Gusti Made Arka, who was then the Director-General for 
Placement of Guidance of Overseas Labour in the ministry.79 A legal transfer would have 
entailed depositing the funds with the Ministry of Finance, which would then make part of 
it available to the Ministry of Manpower. But the fact that the governor agreed to transfer 
state funds into the director-general’s private bank account indicates that this practice 
constitutes part of an informal settlement between central and provincial authorities 
concerning access to financial resources associated with the overseas labour migration 
programme, such as the levy. It may have been this informal transaction that secured the 
ministry’s acceptance of the status quo in which the provincial manpower office controlled 
the technical implementation unit. 
 
In return, the Ministry of Manpower appears to have scaled back attempts to pursue control 
over assets and migration business connections in Surabaya. Central authorities started 
making formal budget allocations to the provincial manpower office for the purpose of 
subsidizing the unit’s activity, especially after much of the service provision became 
nominally free of charge with the introduction of BNP2TKI in 2007. BNP2TKI 
administrators in Jakarta argued that officials in the Surabaya manpower office were in a 
good position to carry out these tasks because they had access to budget allocations from 
both the central and provincial governments. However, absence of a separate unit of the 
BNP2TKI meant that its policies were less likely to be implemented. Immigration officials 
at Surabaya International Airport claimed that the provincial manpower office did not issue 
overseas identity cards to all migrant workers. Rather, it provided the cards to formal sector 
migrant workers but furnished domestic workers, especially those with jobs in Malaysia, 
with letters that exempted them from having to pay the mandatory departure tax.  
 
In Surabaya, unlike in any other administrative site of the overseas labour migration 
programme, the BNP2TKI was unable to instruct officials to compete with provincial 
government authorities by issuing overseas identity cards in January 2010. The 
                                                          
79 "Hasil pemeriksaan atas pengelolaan dana pembinaan dan penyelenggaraan penempatan tenaga 
kerja Indonesia dan pelaksanaan penempatan tenaga Kerja Indonesia ke luar negeri tahun anggaran 
2004 dan 2005 pada Ditjen Pembinaan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, Dinas Tenaga 
Kerja, Balai Pelayanan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia serta instansi terkait lainnya di 
Surabaya, Pekanbaru dan Batam." Jakarta. 85/S/III-XI.3/07/2006, (5 July 2006). 
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concentration of control over administration of the overseas labour migration programme 
in the hands of one tier of government increased the risk of arbitrary decision-making, as 
there were fewer checks and balances. In Surabaya, however, the provincial manpower 
office shielded the recruitment industry in East Java from having to make a choice between 
central authorities (the BNP2TKI unit) and the provincial manpower office, as was the case 
in Medan and Semarang. This institutional arrangement did not prevent labour recruitment 
companies from having to make a choice between the ministry and the BNP2TKI in 
Jakarta, where they apply for recruitment certificates. While some labour recruitment 
companies avoided making the choice by patronizing the services of both central 
government organizations, others sought recruitment certificates from their preferred 
authority. But in Surabaya, it was business as usual because at that administrative site there 
was simply no central government agency to consider. 
Conclusion 
Each of these case studies offers a narrative about the diverse and varied administrative 
landscapes in Indonesia. As the cases of Nunukan and Surabaya show, institutional 
exceptionalism, in which a tier of government is missing, prevented the transmission of 
what was essentially a Jakarta-based conflict. In cases where both the ministry and the 
BNP2TKI were present, local staff sometimes prioritized place-related considerations over 
scale, as was the case in Jakarta and Tanjung Pinang. Officials in these kinds of places are 
less amenable to policy directions that threaten to complicate collegial relationships, 
especially when they could have consequences for getting other work done. By contrast, 
the sites where central and provincial government agencies engaged in a struggle for power 
were also places where contextual factors – historical and spatial – produced a clear 
division of labour, and relationships characterized by low-level cooperation and mutual 
suspicion. The administrative culture in Medan and Semarang demonstrates all too clearly 
that under such conditions, administrators are more likely to prioritize their vertical 
allegiances over local, collegial relationships. 
 
In all locations, the confusing situation caused by conflicting policies from central 
government agencies meant that discretion was the main resource for finding a solution. In 
the case of Surabaya, this can be seen clearly in the decision by the head of the provincial 
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manpower office to accept recruitment certificates from either the ministry or the 
BNP2TKI to ensure that the conflict did not bring the recruitment industry’s business in 
East Java to a grinding halt. In Medan and Semarang, governors played a key role.The 
governor of North Sumatra intervened against the BNP2TKI by instructing the provincial 
manpower office to take on the administrative roles that the ministry sought to delegate, the 
governor of Central Java spoke out, putting pressure on the Minister for Manpower to end 
the conflict. Ministry officials in Jakarta, meanwhile, decided to share administrative 
authority over aspects of the overseas labour migration programme although the law 
forbade it. It is this use of discretion that undermined the state’s formal structures, whereas 
the kind exercised by the other officials described above helped to achieve institutional 
objectives when institutional relationships broke down.  
 
The following chapter continues this discussion of discretion, examining the role it played 
in shaping administrative systems and in the handling of particular kinds of cases in 
embassies and consulates in Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. As the chapter 
reveals, not only did implementation regulations not yet exist to instruct the development 
of consular systems for handling migrants, but the labour attachés, who handled much of 
the case load, were the only Ministry of Manpower official within their consular office. 
The environment for handling migrants was also further complicated by the fact that these 
officials carried out their responsibilities in an extraterritorial setting, where their authority 
was circumscribed by the administrative, legal and political limitations imposed by the host 
state.
 
186 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Limitation in Extraterritorial Settings 
In the peripheral locations examined in the previous chapter, it was evident that context 
varies dramatically even within Indonesia’s national boundaries as a consequence of local 
conditions and relationships that mitigate against the direct transference of centrally 
defined institutions. This observation is equally – if not more – true in the case of the 
systems established to handle Indonesian migrant workers within its consular offices 
overseas. Administration of the overseas labour migration programme was performed in 
each particular institutional and legal context, but also in the decisions made by individual 
labour attachés who had contact with, but were working largely in isolation from, their 
home institution – the Ministry of Manpower. As a consequence, no Indonesian consulate 
or embassy’s arrangements are the same.  
 
This chapter examines the role of discretion in the establishment of the systems used to 
handle matters pertaining to the overseas labour migration programme in three Indonesian 
consular offices. The first section explains how and why systems in Hong Kong, Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore differ, pointing to variations in those countries’ regulatory 
frameworks and the impact of decisions taken by individual officials on the form and 
operation of those systems. The next section focuses closely on the way in which labour 
attachés handle particular problems, revealing the level of discretion exercised and the 
rationale behind their response. The chapter reveals that Indonesia’s consular offices were 
largely removed from direct impact from the ongoing conflict in Indonesia between the 
ministry and the BNP2TKI. However, the uncertainty at home translated into something of 
a vacuum abroad, which expanded the discretionary space available to labour attachés. At 
the same time, their relationships with representatives of other ministries were far more 
important than they were at home as a consequence of their location the Ministry of 
Foreign Affair’s extraterritorial infrastructure.  
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Systemic variation 
Since the end of the New Order, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has increasingly pressured 
consular offices to provide better service to Indonesian citizens overseas. Indonesian 
expatriates, students and those on vacation have traditionally had much better access to 
consular services than those employed as domestic workers or earning a living on 
construction sites or plantations. In some countries, however, steps have been taken to 
better deal with Indonesia’s migrant workers. The Indonesian embassies in Jeddah and 
Kuala Lumpur have had labour attachés since the 1980s.1 Elsewhere, the Indonesian 
government began embedding an official from the Ministry of Manpower to assist with the 
challenging task of handling migrant workers and dealing with labour recruitment 
companies in 2005, following the introduction of Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas. The Minister for Manpower, Fahmi Idris, 
reported to the legislature in February 2005 that he wanted to position a manpower official 
in Hong Kong, Kuwait, Singapore, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan.2 
The Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform and the Minister for Finance 
approved three of those posts, agreeing to send labour attachés to Hong Kong, Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates. 
 
In these locations, the systems that developed as a consequence of this push have done so 
organically. As of 2010, no governmental regulations had been issued that provided 
instructions on how systems for handling migrant workers in destination countries ought to 
be set up. Furthermore, the Minister for Manpower was yet to promulgate ministerial 
regulations that specified the role of labour attachés. Under Law No. 39/2004, authority 
was delegated to the president, his cabinet and the Minister for Manpower to flesh out the 
content of 31 articles, which could not be done immediately.3 In the absence of such 
regulations, officials in Indonesian consular offices were left to design systems for 
administering the overseas labour migration programme themselves. The task of doing so 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise stated, the information this chapter was provided by labour attachés or other 
embassy and consulate staff. 
2 "Pemerintah akan buka atase tenaga kerja di enam negara." Kapanlagi, 23 February 2005. 
3 Krisnawaty, T. "Reformasi dibelenggu birokrasi." Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan, (2006). 
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was in the hands of various layers of managers, with the ambassador or consul-general at 
the top, foreign affairs in the middle and the labour attaché close to the bottom. As this 
suggests, the absence of regulations also meant that these officials were left to negotiate 
their own roles and scope of authority, as demonstrated by the cases of Hong Kong, Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore described here. 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong’s regulatory framework is designed to delegate as much responsibility for 
migrant workers as possible from the state to local labour recruitment companies. It also 
outsources the responsibility to vet visa applications for labour migrants to their home 
governments’ representatives, mostly consulates, in Hong Kong. This policy was 
introduced following bilateral negotiations between the British colonial administration in 
Hong Kong and the Government of The Philippines in the mid-1970s. For The Philippines, 
the key motivation in this negotiation probably centred on securing more overseas 
employment opportunities for Filipinos; however, it also wanted to exercise greater control 
over the conditions under which they took up employment in Hong Kong.4 
 
As a result of these dealings in the 1970s, the Hong Kong Immigration Department 
requires all consular offices to sign off on their citizens’ employment as domestic workers 
by endorsing their employment contracts before visa applications may be submitted.5 In the 
Indonesian case, the consul-general delegates the function to the foreign affairs official 
who heads consular services, based on the rationale that endorsing contracts is first and 
foremost a form of service provision to citizens. This system enables the consulate to 
                                                          
4 Indonesia pursued an identical objective in its diplomatic relationships with governments in the 
Middle East only a few years later. Confidential correspondence between Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Manpower and consular offices overseas indicates that Indonesia has encouraged its consuls to 
approach host governments in an attempt to design these kinds of mechanisms since the early 1980s. 
See Ditjen Binaguna. "Garis-garis besar antar kerja antar negara." Jakarta: Departemen Tenaga 
Kerja dan Transmigrasi. (16 May 1982), 4. 
5 It is through this administrative role that senior officials have been able to impose criteria on 
employment companies that want to supply Indonesian migrant labour to Hong Kong employers, 
such as serving as the first port of call for questions about the terms of their employment. See 
Palmer, W, "Public-private partnerships in the administration and control of Indonesian migrant 
labour in Hong Kong," Political Geography 34 (2013). 
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exercise power over Hong Kong labour recruitment companies more effectively than 
would otherwise be possible. As the consulate was almost entirely staffed with foreign 
affairs officials until 2005, the endorsement of employment contracts was largely managed 
through systems designed for long-established consular roles, such as renewing passports, 
with little regard for how it could be harnessed to support the Ministry of Manpower’s 
policies and regulations concerning the extraterritorial dimension of the overseas labour 
migration programme. This legacy provided fertile ground for conflict upon the insertion of 
a labour attaché. 
 
The Ministry of Manpower has required that Indonesian consular offices endorse the 
recruitment industry’s plans to source migrant labour in Indonesia for overseas 
employment since the 1970s. The task of organizing this endorsement is given to labour 
recruitment companies registered in Indonesia. It requires them to provide details about the 
type of employment, conditions and employers in what is referred to as a demand letter or 
job order (surat permintaan). In Hong Kong, the consul-general delegates responsibility to 
endorse this document to the next most senior foreign affairs official, the first secretary. 
Every day, hundreds of requests for migrant labour are signed, which mostly contain 
details of employment for domestic work that promises to meet Hong Kong minimum 
conditions concerning wages and rest days. But blank forms with his signature also 
circulate in migrant source areas, such as East Java, which both indicates that the process is 
little more than a formality and reveals that the consular staff (or the consulate as an 
institution) may perform the function in return for informal fees. This is perhaps not 
surprising since endorsement is a requirement to obtain recruitment permission from the 
Ministry of Manpower in Indonesia but offers little to the consulate as a means for 
managing the supply of Indonesian migrant labour to Hong Kong.  
 
What this requirement has allowed the consulate to do, however, is gain a degree of control 
over Hong Kong labour recruitment companies. In 1995, the Hong Kong Association of 
Indonesian Labor Recruitment Companies (Asosiasi Perusahaan Pengerah Tenaga Kerja 
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Indonesia Hong Kong, APPIH) was established with the consul-general as its head.6 Since 
that time, only members of the association have been entitled to submit applications for 
endorsements on behalf of Indonesian migrant workers.7 The arrangement mirrors the 
approach to service provision in Indonesia, where labour recruitment companies must first 
obtain a recommendation letter from the government-recognized professional association 
to confirm that their documents are in order.8 In Hong Kong, the association’s records of 
members’ contact details enables consular officials to effectively convey information about 
changes in policy without having to maintain their own database. Reflecting the 
institutional arrangement that positions the consul-general, always a career bureaucrat from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at its helm, foreign affairs officials dominated the 
Indonesian government’s relationship with the association for at least the first ten years of 
its establishment.  
 
This arrangement changed in 2005 with the arrival of the consulate’s first labour attaché. 
The consul-general retained his position as head of APPIH but the labour attaché was 
appointed to represent the consulate on the association’s advisory board. She served two 
consecutive terms until 2010, when her posting ended and she was replaced by a colleague 
from the Ministry of Manpower. Formally, her inclusion on the advisory board was 
intended to provide a channel through which Hong Kong labour recruitment companies 
could raise issues with the Indonesian consulate. In practice, however, her involvement was 
merely for show, as senior foreign affairs officers continued to dominate the consulate’s 
relationship with Hong Kong labour recruitment companies through their control of the two 
abovementioned endorsement roles. To illustrate, the association’s ‘protection division’ 
was encouraged and indeed preferred to handle cases involving migrant workers and the 
                                                          
6 For the association’s written constitution, see APPIH (Asosiasi Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia). "Anggaran Dasar: Asosiasi Perusahaan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong 
Kong." Hong Kong, (1995). 
7 As was observed in a Hong Kong High Court judgement, the fact that the Consulate generally only 
notarises domestic helper employment contracts obtained through the association, is entirely 
acceptable to the Hong Kong authorities. See Court of First Instance. Asosiasi PPTKI Hong Kong 
Limited vs. Mei Foo Employment Agency Limited, Ho Wing Shan Kathy and Allwin Employment 
Centre Limited, decided on 3 February 2010. 
8 See, for example, AJASPAC. "Pengantar rekrut SIP agensi Al Ahliya (EST) Labour Suplay." 
Addressed to Direktor-Jenderal Binapenta. 004/R-SIP/AJASPAC/XI/2008, 5 November 2008. 
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labour recruitment companies without involving the labour attaché. In addition to the 
requirement that the APPIH prevent problems from ending at the consulate, the labour 
attaché could not guarantee that her advice for handling those cases would not threaten the 
association’s members’ chances of endorsement of future recruits’ employment contracts.  
 
The consulate imposes additional conditions on Hong Kong labour recruitment companies 
to expand their role in dealing with migrant labour cases. Before 2009, local labour 
recruitment companies only had to meet the basic requirements of having a permanent 
office, a boarding house, and Indonesian-speaking staff to be eligible for accreditation. 
However, in 2009 the consulate introduced a Business Accreditation Certificate (BAC) that 
permits Hong Kong businesses to ‘operate an Indonesian agency’.9 Staff decided against 
calling the document a licence because of uncertainty about how the Hong Kong 
administration would respond to the representative of another state licensing labour 
recruitment companies it has already authorized. Nevertheless, the document is in effect a 
licence that gives Hong Kong recruiters permission to broker employment for Indonesian 
citizens in the territory.10 The consul-general and first secretary exercise greater power 
within the committee, serving to relegate the labour attaché to a supporting administrative 
role. This reflected the scope of her authority more generally. In the labour section. She 
managed the locally hired staff, who accepted applications for licences, and then 
channelled them to the first secretary’s office to be checked for compliance. 
 
Under the consulate’s system, Hong Kong recruiters are evaluated each year. Labour 
recruitment companies that fail the assessment risk losing their accreditation. The labour 
attaché role in the evaluation committee is an administrative one, in which she sends out 
formal invitations for labour recruitment companies to attend an interview at the 
consulate.11 In the course of the interview, committee members ask labour recruitment 
companies for information on the number of migrant workers they have sourced from 
                                                          
9 KJRI (Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia). "Renewal: Business Accreditation Certificate 
(BAC) to operate an Indonesian employment agency." Hong Kong. 44-B-XI/09-X, (23 October 
2009). 
10 This section draws heavily on Palmer, W, "Public-private partnerships in the administration and 
control of Indonesian migrant labour in Hong Kong," Political Geography 34 (2013). 
11 Their facilities are sometimes reassessed as part of the evaluation process. 
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Indonesia. These companies are also interrogated about how they have complied with 
consulate policy, such as the contemporary position on the rights and responsibilities of the 
consulate and labour migrants in relation to the recruitment industry. The encounter also 
gives the consulate an opportunity to gather information about the recruiters’ experience 
operating as partners of Indonesian companies. The first secretary might bring this 
information up in the course of assessing Indonesian recruiters’ requests for endorsement 
of their job orders if necessary. But Hong Kong labour recruitment companies that fail the 
licensing committee’s assessment may have their authorization cancelled. A negative result 
includes notification that future applications for endorsements should be rejected by the 
head of consular services. Their success or failure is communicated through the first 
secretary. 
 
The consulate also uses the threat of blacklisting to ‘guide’ (membina) the behaviour of 
labour recruitment companies in Hong Kong. Known as skorsing in Indonesian, this 
process involves the temporary or complete cessation of recruiters’ business activities.12 
This alternative to fines puts licensed companies on a watch list that ought to prevent them 
from applying for consular services, such as endorsement of job orders.13 In Hong Kong, 
labour recruitment companies are given three warnings in response to illegal or otherwise 
unacceptable conduct before being blacklisted. Once skorsing is applied, the consulate 
refuses requests for endorsement of employment contracts, which means not only that 
companies are unable to recruit workers from Indonesia but also that they cannot secure 
work permits for Indonesians already in Hong Kong. This two-pronged approach has the 
effect of cutting off access to Indonesian labour migrants, who have historically been very 
profitable for agents. As a consequence, Hong Kong recruiters are eager to cooperate with 
the Indonesian consulate. The consul-general is aware of the power that the consulate gains 
through this system and claims to exercise it carefully so as to avoid accusations that they 
abuse it.  
 
                                                          
12 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 5/MEN/III/2005. Ketentuan Sanksi Administratif dan 
Tata Cara Penjatuhan Sanksi dalam Pelaksanaan Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia di Luar Negeri, article 3b. 
13 Ministerial Regulation (Manpower) No. 38/MEN/XII/2006. Tata Cara Pemberian, Perpanjangan 
dan Pencabutan Surat Izin Pelaksana Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, article 8(2). 
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The consulate uses this power to coerce Hong Kong labour recruitment companies into 
complying with requirements that effectively contract out its responsibility to assist and 
support Indonesian citizens to the private sector.14 The consulate requires labour 
recruitment companies to mediate conflicts that arise between Indonesian workers and their 
employers. The consulate facilitates settlement of some disputes through its labour section, 
but the vast majority of cases are resolved by Hong Kong recruiters without involving the 
consulate. In addition, labour recruitment companies are expected to help migrant workers 
report employers for alleged criminal behaviour. Non-government organizations and other 
migrant support groups perform that function when workers have left their employers’ 
household.15 But while migrant workers are still there, Hong Kong labour recruitment 
companies continue to serve as Indonesians’ first port of call. It is for this reason that the 
consulate also requires them to employ Indonesian-speaking staff. By forcing Hong Kong 
labour recruitment companies to act as a front office for such matters, the consulate has 
freed itself up to focus on providing conventional consular services (i.e. services not related 
to employment). This system also simplifies the labour attaché’s job, as the bulk of 
employment-related problems never reach her desk.  
 
Ultimately, labour recruitment companies comply because cooperation with the consulate 
has made them fabulously wealthy. The system may require companies to service workers, 
but it also helps those involved in the migration business extract recruitment fees well in 
excess of the amount set by the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower. The wealth of Hong 
Kong labour recruitment companies is legendary in both industry and government circles. 
In part, involvement of consular and Ministry of Manpower officials is responsible for the 
profitability of labour recruitment companies, as it has enabled them to collect a 
‘management fee’ in contravention of Hong Kong law.16 Although the ministry has 
                                                          
14 In response to campaigns against the way in which the commercial interests of employment 
companies have come to dominate service provision to migrant workers, the consulate has instituted 
alternative mechanisms to enable more direct access, such as an online portal to apply for passport 
renewal and Sunday opening hours. Nevertheless, employment companies continue to provide the 
majority of services. 
15 Sim, A, "Organising discontent: NGOs for Southeast Asian migrant workers in Hong Kong," 
Asian Journal of Social Science 31, no. 3 (2003). 
16 Palmer, W, "Public-private partnerships in the administration and control of Indonesian migrant 
labour in Hong Kong," Political Geography 34 (2013): 6. 
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unsuccessfully attempted to eliminate the fee for the best part of a decade, Hong Kong 
labour recruitment companies continue to collect it in return for the access they provide to 
the Hong Kong labour market and the role they play in coordinating financing and the post-
deployment payment of recruitment fees. The division of the overall fee is referred to as ‘7-
11’ within the consulate, a reference to the chain of 24 hour convenience stores used here 
to describe an arrangement whereby Hong Kong labour recruitment companies collect 
HKD 7,000 (USD 900) and their Indonesian partner, HKD 11,000 (USD 1400) from each 
migrant worker.17 This level of profitability and the ability of consular officials to rent-seek 
in support of it predictably complicate the consulate’s relationship with migrant workers, as 
the commercial interests of those in the consulate are often closely aligned with the labour 
recruitment companies. 
Kuala Lumpur 
In Malaysia, the system for handling migrants is set up to help the embassy respond to the 
high number of labour migrants who enter the country illegally or who have left their 
employment and lost legal migration status. There are roughly 1,200,000 Indonesian 
migrant workers lawfully employed in Malaysia,18 but estimates suggest that the 
Indonesian migrant population is closer to two million, including those who do not hold 
valid migration documents.19 Both groups require assistance with employment and 
immigration matters. The Malaysian government regularly cracks down on undocumented 
migrant workers, forcing them to return to Indonesia, while the Indonesian government 
periodically imposes moratoria on the placement of foreign domestic workers in Malaysia 
in response to public outcry about high profile cases involving Malaysian employers who 
physically abuse Indonesian domestic workers.20 The embassy receives requests for tens 
                                                          
17 A conservative estimate suggests that Hong Kong employment companies have collected HKD 
980 million (USD 13.25 million) from the 140,000 Indonesians working there as of 2013. The value 
is of course much higher, as it does not include migrant workers who have come and gone. 
18 For an estimate of the number of lawfully employed Indonesian migrant workers in 2014, see 
Shymala, E and C W Meng, "Policies and laws regulating migrant workers in Malaysia: a critical 
appraisal," Journal of Contemporary Asia 44, no. 1 (2014): 19. 
19 Interview data, Kuala Lumpur, 21 June 2010. 
20 See Ford, M, "Constructing legality: the management of irregular migration in Thailand and 
Malaysia," in Labour history beyond borders: concepts and explorations, ed. M van der Linden 
(Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2010). 
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and sometimes hundreds of thousands of international travel documents each year for 
Indonesian citizens who have somehow invalidated their conditions of stay. On an 
everyday basis, the embassy is also forced to deal with migrant workers who report not 
having received wages or who want to return to Indonesia but are unable to do so because 
their passports remain in the hands of their employers. 
 
Before 2006 the embassy provided few services to the large population of Indonesian 
migrant workers in the country. There was no information desk to direct migrant workers 
to the relevant attaché for their problems. The service in highest demand – passport 
renewal – was performed in an area that was full of rubbish and, even where migrant 
workers used the services of ‘informal intermediaries’ (calo) to lodge their applications, 
they often had to wait weeks before the document was ready for collection. Service 
provision in the labour section was equally appalling. The labour attaché, in place from the 
1980s in this case, focussed on services for Indonesian labour recruitment companies rather 
than on assisting migrant workers with their problems. Local staff were hired for the 
purpose of accepting requests for endorsement of mandatory job orders and cooperation 
agreements between Indonesian recruiters and their business partners in Malaysia. 
Requirements for the latter document were not enforced by the consulate in Hong Kong, 
where consular officers had restricted the ability to participate in the industry to only those 
companies it approved. This was not the case in Malaysia, as the host government provided 
no such mechanism to enable Indonesian officials to license local agents. As a result, the 
embassy was particularly interested in adding layers of administration that would at least 
bring Malaysian recruiters involved in the business to its attention. 
 
This system began to change following the intense politicization in the Indonesian mass 
media of a particularly gruesome case of abuse involving a young Indonesian domestic 
worker.21 The embassy established an emergency women’s shelter to accommodate 70 
                                                          
21 See Chapter Two for details about how this event also expedited the process to produce the 
country’s first overseas migration law. Nirmala Bonat was hospitalized in 2004 after being severely 
beaten by her employer who broke her nose with a metal jug and burnt the girl’s chest with a hot 
iron. The abuse occurred in May as President Megawati and her competition were already vying 
against each to win public support for their candidacy in the first round of Indonesia’s first direct 
presidential election, which was scheduled for June. 
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migrants in response to Megawati’s decision to make better service to migrant workers part 
of her campaign to be re-elected as president in 2004. By the end of that year, the shelter 
regularly exceeded its capacity by almost 300 per cent each month. The system changed 
further in 2006, when a ‘pro-migrant’22 orientation was announced by the ambassador 
following a visit by the new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, during which he 
promised migrant workers that the government would improve service provision. Consular 
resources were reorganized to ensure, for example, that migrant workers left the embassy 
with their renewed passport on the same day, cutting out the need for intermediaries. The 
embassy also organized a roster system for consuls to monitor locations where Indonesian 
migrant workers were employed without a valid visa to anticipate cases where Malaysian 
businesses called in immigration officials to avoid paying their wages. In addition, an 
information desk was set up to direct migrants to the attaché with expertise concerning 
their problem in line with the division of labour as outlined in the ambassador’s 
establishment of a task force to improve service to citizens in 2007. 
 
The labour section also became more involved in employment related matters. On the 
labour attaché’s initiative, the embassy introduced a mandatory employment contract for 
Indonesian domestic workers, which included a minimum wage, regular rest day and other 
conditions of employment. Use of this contract was made a mandatory requirement of the 
passport renewal process. The labour attaché was prompted to impose this condition by 
cases in which migrant workers claimed that their employer had verbally agreed to certain 
conditions but were unable to substantiate their claims.23 The labour attaché first 
approached the immigration attaché about the possibility of requiring migrant workers to 
include a signed employment contract in the passport renewal process. When that officer 
resisted, arguing that immigration and labour policy should be kept separate, the labour 
                                                          
22 Migrant worker support groups use ‘pro-migrant’ to describe government policies that are 
sensitive to the needs of migrant workers. 
23 Malaysia introduced a standard employment contract for Indonesian domestic workers in 2006, 
following the signing of a bilateral agreement with Indonesia. The contract did not include 
entitlement to a minimum wage or regular rest day. See Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Government of Malaysia. "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia on the recruitment and placement of 
Indonesian migrant workers." Denpasar. (13 May 2006). 
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attaché escalated the matter to the ambassador, who saw the potential of the requirement to 
make it easier for the embassy to intervene on behalf of migrant workers. 
 
This ‘pro-migrant’ shift in orientation, then, was driven by the embassy’s desire to simplify 
the resolution of migrant labour problems through strengthening of workers’ position vis-a-
vis employers. A central problem for the embassy was that responsibility for the 
accommodation and repatriation of migrant workers often fell on their shoulders, as the 
migrant worker population generally lacks the economic resources to pay for such services 
themselves. The routine expenses of dealing with situations in which the labour migration 
experience has gone wrong, leaving migrant workers without stable income or a permanent 
address in a foreign country, prompted the labour attaché to turn his sights towards the 
recruitment industry as an alternative source of financing. Through the embassy’s 
administrative functions, including the endorsement of cooperation agreements and 
frequent requests to source migrant labour from Indonesia, the labour attaché can extract 
support from Indonesian labour recruitment companies. In return for business, companies 
are amenable to the labour attaché’s frequent demands that they cover the expenses 
involved in handling migrant workers whom they recruited for employment in Malaysia. 
 
In contrast to its counterpart in Hong Kong, the Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur has 
no means of imposing similar demands on Malaysian labour recruitment companies. The 
labour section does not operate a formal accreditation system for Malaysian labour 
recruitment companies, partly because the labour attaché understood that his function was 
to evaluate rather than accredit but also because he anticipated resistance from a wealthy 
and politically well-connected Malaysian Association of Foreign Maid Agencies 
(Persatuan Agensi Pembantu Rumah Asing, PAPA). As in Indonesia, labour recruitment 
companies in Malaysia play a role in the development of public policy. They also have the 
power to create bilateral conflict around Indonesian interventions by encouraging 
Malaysian authorities to take the issue up with the embassy. In the absence of the ability to 
licence them, the embassy exerts pressure on PAPA and its members through its ability to 
determine which Indonesian labour recruitment companies can channel workers to 
Malaysia. Through providing the endorsement Indonesian companies require them to seek 
authorization from the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower to recruit migrant labour, the 
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embassy effectively compels labour recruitment companies to put pressure on their 
Malaysian partners to cooperate. 
 
The form and function of these kinds of systems depend heavily on who occupies the 
labour attaché position, as they are not fully recorded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
Director for Protocol in Indonesia. The labour attaché posted to Kuala Lumpur between 
2005 and 2010 was frustrated that the Indonesian labour recruitment companies did not 
always report the particulars of labour migrants and employers at the end of each month as 
required by the Ministry of Manpower. Further, he found that Indonesian recruiters do not 
always hold accurate data concerning employers or places of employment in Malaysia. As 
a work-around, he kept a tally of job orders that they submitted for endorsement and 
maintained a list of Malaysian recruiters through which Indonesian labour recruitment 
companies placed labour migrants in the country. The labour attaché then required that 
Indonesian labour recruitment companies only cooperate with Malaysian recruiters that 
sent him a list of migrant workers’ particulars within a week of arrival. The recruitment 
industry can circumvent the system by exploiting the loophole in which Malaysian law 
issues work permits regardless of how labour migrants arrive, but licensed recruiters in 
Indonesia conduct the largest part of their business under the formal system. Recognizing 
this, evidence of non-compliance by Malaysian recruiters was used as grounds for refusing 
to endorse future requests by Indonesian labour recruitment companies to supply them with 
labour migrants.  
Singapore 
The primary driver of the system in Singapore is the desire to handle migrants according to 
the conditions set by the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower. Foreign labour makes up about 
35 per cent of Singapore’s workforce. Some 190,000 of this total are domestic workers 
from just a few approved countries, including Indonesia.24 Singapore is located on 
Indonesia’s sea border, close to the Riau Islands. Indonesians living close to the border can 
get access to employment in-country more easily without assistance from labour 
                                                          
24 For the Government of Singapore’s statistics, see Ministry of Manpower (Singapore). "Foreign 
workforce in numbers." http://www.mom.gov.sg/statistics-
publications/others/statistics/Pages/ForeignWorkforceNumbers.aspx. Accessed on 19 June 2013. 
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recruitment companies. The majority of domestic workers come from elsewhere in 
Indonesia. This group can also circumvent the Indonesian system courtesy of the fact that 
the Singaporean immigration authority enables foreign citizens to enter the island state on a 
tourist visa and then convert it to a work permit. As a consequence, it is more difficult to 
impose Indonesia’s administrative requirements regarding ceilings on fees payable to 
recruiters and the use of contracts that impose minimum conditions of employment, such as 
a minimum wage. 
 
Indonesian labour recruitment companies register the departure of around 40,000 labour 
migrants to Singapore through the overseas labour migration programme each year.25 
Having grown weary of instances where Ministry of Manpower officials refused to accept 
recruitment paperwork because of errors that foreign affairs officials in Singapore had 
missed, APJATI lobbied the Minister for Manpower to prioritize the appointment of a 
labour attaché to the embassy for the purpose of aligning its systems with the ministry’s 
regulations. When the first labour attaché was appointed to the embassy in 2008, she was 
given two major tasks. First, she was expected to address problems arising from the fact 
that the foreign affairs officials who handled administration of the overseas labour 
migration programme were ignorant of the Ministry of Manpower’s regulations. She was 
also asked to make it more difficult for officials to collect rents in exchange for 
endorsement, a practice brought to the ministry’s attention by Indonesian labour 
recruitment companies. Second, the Director-General for the Guidance of Labour 
Placement and the Director for Overseas Placement encouraged her to find a way to get 
Indonesian migrant workers who remain in Singapore to negotiate new employment 
contracts, something that host country laws did not require. 
 
In attempting to deal with these issues, the labour attaché found herself in a hostile 
institutional context. Upon arrival, she was told that her assistance was not necessary, and 
that her expertise would be of greater benefit to Indonesia at home. Following telephone 
calls to the Ministry of Manpower’s Human Resources Bureau, the ambassador instructed 
                                                          
25 Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BNP2TKI). "Realisasi 
Penempatan TKI - LN TA 2008." Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pengembangan dan Informasi Sekretariat 
Utama. (2008). 
 
200 
 
 
the foreign affairs official in the citizen service section to involve the labour attaché in the 
system he had set up to handle migrant workers’ problems. At the time, the consular 
division focussed on general services such as providing birth certificates and accepting 
applications to relinquish Indonesian citizenship.26 However, Indonesian migrant workers 
were also using this service to report labour issues, such as employers reneging on 
promises to raise the workers’ wage and give them rest days. Another common problem 
was that employers would also unilaterally change the terms of employment, for example, 
by requiring labour migrants to work in more than one household. The foreign affairs 
officer ultimately agreed to delegate responsibility for handling these kinds of cases to the 
labour attaché.  
 
Having inserted herself into the system, the labour attaché then lobbied the ambassador to 
authorize inclusion of an employment contract as a condition for migrant workers to renew 
their passports. The fact that the labour attaché in Kuala Lumpur succeeded in doing so at 
the same time suggests that this was more of a ministry initiative than her own. 
Nevertheless, she took responsibility for drafting the contract, and re-trained four local staff 
to help check that it was attached to migrant workers’ passport renewal applications. In 
addition, she required that employers accompany applicants to an interview with her staff 
so that they could explain the contract and consequences for not complying with it. The 
labour attaché showed significant initiative in ensuring that this process was followed. She 
asked that the security staff who guarded the embassy’s entrance check that migrant 
workers were in fact accompanied by their employers and not a labour recruitment 
company. Her staff would then require the employer to produce their Singaporean 
identification card to verify that they were the individual recorded in the migrants’ work 
permit to ensure that only employers could attend. This had the effect of shifting the bulk 
of this section of the embassy’s workload toward migrant workers, who came to outnumber 
other groups of Indonesians who sought consular services. 
 
Turning her attention to the demand side, the labour attaché convinced the foreign affairs 
official responsible for relationships with labour recruitment companies to let her help him 
                                                          
26 Indonesian law requires those who acquiring citizenship in another country to relinquish their 
Indonesian citizenship. 
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refine his system for administering the recruitment industry. First, she overhauled the 
accreditation system for labour recruitment companies in Singapore. In addition to 
simplifying the registration process, this allowed her to impose a new set of criteria on 
companies seeking accreditation. In recognition of the fact that Singaporean companies 
were not legally obliged to apply for Indonesian accreditation, she made it easier for them 
to do so by allowing them to register at any time of the year (the embassy formerly only 
held registration between certain dates). In order to qualify for accreditation under the new 
system, labour recruitment companies had to produce a business licence from Singapore’s 
Ministry of Manpower. As the ministry required labour recruitment companies that supply 
foreign domestic workers to hold active membership in one of the two government-
recognized professional associations, applicants had to submit those details to the labour 
attaché as well. She would then check that recruiters had no demerit points recorded 
against them by the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower. Finally, the labour attaché 
required that labour recruitment companies had no outstanding issues with the embassy, 
such as a client staying in the embassy’s emergency shelter or instances where they did not 
respond to her calls, which she recorded on post-it notes on her desk. 
 
The labour attaché claimed that her new system has raised awareness among Singaporean 
labour recruitment companies about the standards that are acceptable to the embassy. 
However, investigation of 60 accredited companies revealed that only half promoted 
Indonesian labour migrants in line with the embassy’s standards concerning wage level and 
rest days. It was explained that the higher wages and provision of rest days were only 
applicable after the workers’ passports were renewed. One accredited recruiter even 
promoted the fact that his workers always held the standard five year passport instead of 
the two year passport that labour migrants should hold. Promotion strategies aside, this 
investigation uncovered that some accredited recruiters did not even hold a business licence 
from the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower. When questioned about how this could be 
the case, the labour attaché lamented that she was the only official with responsibility to 
make the assessment and did not have time to carry out physical inspections for each 
application to verify that submitted documents were all valid. It was normally sufficient to 
check the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower’s website and contact the relevant 
professional association to resolve inconsistencies.  
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A more serious issue identified by the labour attaché was the fact that the embassy had 
never imposed a cap on the level of recruitment fees that accredited companies could 
charge Indonesian migrant workers. Indonesia’s Ministry of Manpower requires that labour 
recruitment companies submit a cooperation agreement (perjanjian kerjasama) as part of 
their application for a recruitment certificate, as it details arrangements with overseas 
recruiters concerning such matters. In practice, before the labour attaché arrived, 
Indonesian labour recruitment companies rarely signed them with their business partners in 
Singapore. Attempting to make the agreements compulsory, she informed her line 
manager, a foreign affairs official, about the relevant ministerial regulation. She then 
convinced him not only that the agreement was necessary for administrative purposes in 
Indonesia, but also that the embassy could use it to steer the recruitment industry away 
from excessively exploitative arrangements which frequently resulted in migrant workers 
seeking the embassy’s assistance. For this reason, she was authorized to inform labour 
recruitment companies in Indonesia that as part of the application for endorsement, a copy 
of their cooperation agreement was necessary. The foreign affairs official also agreed that 
she would oversee the implementation.27  
 
The labour attaché then lobbied the foreign affairs official to let her help him with the 
administration associated with endorsing requests for migrant workers, offering to ensure 
that they complied with relevant regulations and policies once they arrived on his desk. The 
foreign affairs official resisted at first but conceded after the labour attaché agreed to the 
condition that her signature would only be a pre-endorsement, and that the official would 
retain the right to grant or deny the embassy endorsement required by the Ministry of 
Manpower. Every day, she checked requests for migrant labour from Indonesia to ensure 
that they included details of the type of job proposed, conditions of employment as well as 
the name and address of the future employer. She returned applications that included 
details that did not comply with her system. She would have liked to have also vetted the 
                                                          
27 Following this incident, Indonesian companies became increasingly aggrieved, as the labour 
attaché required that she witness them sign the agreement with their accredited partner in her office 
at the embassy. The labour attaché reasoned that employment company owners frequently travel to 
Singapore so could do it on one of their trips, but they deemed it to be a burdensome requirement, to 
which their business partners in Singapore would not be easily amenable. 
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applications based on a blacklist of employers who were reported for abusing migrant 
workers or not paying their wages. Nevertheless, the measures she did put in place helped 
her insist that the recruitment industry settle outstanding matters, such as repatriating 
migrant workers in the embassy’s shelter, by turning down Indonesian recruiters’ requests 
to supply labour migrants to labour recruitment companies in Singapore who fell foul of 
her system. 
 
The labour attaché was aware that the foreign affairs official endorsed requests she had 
turned down, or which had never crossed her desk. In response, she set up an informal 
system for ensuring that such applications were flagged. She made a deal with staff at the 
reception desk, which resulted in their reporting the number of applications for 
endorsement they received each day. They also agreed to inform her if the foreign affairs 
official requested a deviation from the standard operating procedure, according to which 
requests were first passed to her. However, after confronting the official with evidence that 
he had broken their agreement, the labour attaché was told to mind her own business. 
Taking a different tack, the labour attaché contacted the Ministry of Manpower’s Director 
for Overseas Placement and explained that all endorsements that complied with procedure 
had both her signature and her line manager’s endorsement. She recommended that the 
ministry not only re-inspect documents that had only her manager’s signature, but also ask 
recruiters why the document had not been pre-endorsed by the labour attaché. The ministry 
also passed on names of labour recruitment companies that circumvented the labour 
attaché’s system, allowing her to raise the issue with them in future interactions. 
Predictably, rumours of this arrangement reached the foreign affairs official, who – angered 
by the way in which the labour attaché subverted his authority – cut her out of the process 
altogether.  
The handling of particular cases 
Attention to the way in which particular cases are handled by consular officials also brings 
into stark relief the extent to which discretion shapes administrative roles. This is more 
evident in consular offices than at home. Staff in consulates and embassies often have sole 
responsibility for particular administrative tasks. They also lack access to the full suite of 
mechanisms and resources that would otherwise be available to them in Indonesia. To 
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further complicate matters, they perform their roles in an extraterritorial setting, where they 
must be mindful of how their administrative work is supported or undermined by host laws. 
These factors coalesce to engender extended opportunities for the exercise of discretion, 
which accounts for the development of particularistic approaches to case management 
within Indonesia’s system of consular offices. In part, this differentiation is due to the 
particular set of opportunities and limitations that the host context presents. However, the 
fact that a single person may often be charged with the responsibility to carry out a 
particular function also means that the performance of administrative roles has an 
individualized dimension, which is the product of choices that they make about how and 
why to take a particular course of action. 
 
The ways in which discretion is operationalized in the handling of problems related to 
international labour migration are revealed by close scrutiny of labour attachés’ decision-
making. The Hong Kong case study presented below examines the conditions under which 
the labour attaché assists migrants wanting to reclaim their passports from a local labour 
recruitment company. In Kuala Lumpur, the labour attaché is under pressure to ensure that 
the recruitment industry shares responsibility for costs incurred when migrants seek the 
embassy’s assistance to return home. In Singapore, the labour attaché’s approach to 
instances where migrant workers hold authentic passports with fake names and dates of 
birth is related not only to her experience of dealing with other Indonesian authorities but 
also to personal knowledge of what she sees as systemic problems. These cases are not 
directly comparable. When combined, however, they demonstrate the impact of contextual 
factors, such as the labour attachés’ relationships with the recruitment industry, the degree 
of influence those officials have in their home institution, the depth of their connections 
with other authorities in Indonesia and the quality of their personal relationships with 
others working in their embassy or consulate on the level of discretion available to them 
and how they choose to exercise it. 
Hong Kong 
The Indonesian consulate in Hong Kong contributes to the recruitment industry’s strategy 
for financing Indonesian labour migration to the special administrative region, which 
entails migrant workers handing over their passport as security for a loan to pay for 
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recruiters’ fees. Before leaving Indonesia, migrant workers enter a formal financing 
arrangement with their labour recruitment company, responsibility for which is then 
transferred to Hong Kong-based financiers. Migrant workers bring copies of the loan 
documents with them to Hong Kong and then hand them, along with their passport, over to 
the local labour recruitment company that picks them up at the airport. Although the 
Indonesian Director-General for Immigration forbids the use of travel documents as 
security for debt, it is accepted practice in most, if not all, countries that receive Indonesian 
domestic workers through the overseas labour migration programme. In Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore, employers retain migrants’ passports. In Hong Kong, consulate-accredited 
labour recruitment companies do so. This practice is tolerated by Indonesian officials. 
However, it is also a source of irritation, as migrant support groups and non-government 
organizations, wage campaigns against them and lobby the Hong Kong police to act against 
those involved. 
 
The labour attaché’s position on passport confiscation was evident in the Welcoming 
Program, where the consulate inducts newly arrived migrant workers into life and work in 
Hong Kong. Her main role in the program was to explain the content of the employment 
ordinance, especially procedural requirements, such as that workers give employers one 
month’s notice of resignation. However, neither she nor any other consular officer 
mentioned that it is illegal for labour recruitment companies to confiscate migrants’ 
passports. Her position became clear following an excursion to evaluate the services that 
the consulate offered to Indonesian migrant labour in Macau, on which the labour attaché 
was temporarily replaced by one of her subordinates. Addressing migrant workers’ 
concerns about their passports, this junior official told them that labour recruitment 
companies had not ‘confiscated’ their passports, but were holding the documents as 
security for the loan covering their recruitment fees. In a meeting the following week, the 
labour attaché explained that such a public announcement was not necessary, as everyone – 
including migrant workers – knew the drill. Privately, she admitted that it was consulate 
policy to tolerate the practice.  
 
Despite the ubiquity of passport confiscation and the consulate’s tolerance of it, the labour 
attaché frequently received requests for help from Indonesian migrant workers seeking to 
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reclaim their travel documents from Hong Kong labour recruitment companies, in the form 
of personally addressed letters. These letters are typically authored by a member of a non-
government organization, another migrant worker support group or non-Indonesian friends 
who understand that the labour attaché is more likely to act in response to formal requests. 
In most cases, on receipt of such a letter the labour attaché called the labour recruitment 
company office or even the personal mobile of company staff to inquire about the situation 
and determine if the recruiter would be amenable to returning the migrant’s passport. This 
was never a problem in cases where migrant workers had already settled their debts with 
Hong Kong financiers, as labour recruitment companies no longer needed a passport as 
security. In cases where debts were still outstanding, the labour attaché was reluctant to 
push labour recruitment companies to return migrants’ passports, instead reporting that the 
labour recruitment company claimed not to be in possession of the document. The labour 
attaché knew from her contacts in those companies that migrant workers would escalate 
their request to the Hong Kong police.  
 
In all cases where the company refused to return migrants’ passports, the labour attaché 
would direct the correspondence and a report on their initial response to the committee that 
evaluates the consulate’s accreditation of labour recruitment companies. Although the 
labour attaché has some input into the evaluation process, her role is largely to inform 
accredited companies of a date and time for an annual interview with the committee. The 
decision-making process is dominated by senior foreign affairs officials, as described 
above. Early in her posting, the labour attaché learned that those officials expected her to 
leave managing the recruitment industry up to them and to focus instead on providing 
employment-related services to migrant workers. To her mind, these areas of responsibility 
could not be so neatly divided. Arrangements for recruitment and financing strategies in the 
international migration industry, including the use of state travel documents as a security 
for loans, had clear implications for the experiences of migrant workers. Forced to accept 
the division of labour, the labour attaché left the difficult task to broker new arrangements 
to her superiors, who she acknowledged have much better connections with other potential 
industry players, such as bank owners in Indonesia. 
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The labour attaché’s response to less formal requests by migrant workers for assistance was 
slightly different. She often received short message service (SMS) texts from migrant 
workers about how to reclaim their passports from labour recruitment companies. 
Generally, the labour attaché responded that they could do so if there were no monies 
outstanding on loans. Less frequently, migrant workers seeking to break their contracts 
early to change employers or return to Indonesia would approach her in person about 
getting their passports back. In these cases, she would explain that the consulate would 
only intervene if migrant workers could demonstrate that they had settled their debt. 
However, senior foreign affairs officials were sometimes forced to act, as demonstrated in 
a 2009 case where the consulate instructed a labour recruitment company to return 
passports regardless of whether debts were settled following media coverage of 
demonstrations outside the recruiter’s office in which migrant workers demanded their 
passports back. The negative publicity put the consulate in a very difficult situation: while 
it tolerated the use of passports as a form of security for loans, it was legally bound to 
suppress the practice. The consul-general, who recalls that that situation was difficult, 
decided that the best option for the consulate’s image was to order that the company to 
return the passports regardless of any prior arrangement. 
 
The labour attaché felt partly responsible for the situation, as the migrant workers 
concerned had asked her informally for assistance to obtain their passports before mounting 
the demonstration. At the same time, she took some pleasure in the fact that her foreign 
affairs colleagues were compelled to intervene against a practice that the consulate 
sanctioned. This response reflects her frustration with her subordinate position in the 
consulate and tensions in her personal relations with other consular officials. It also hints at 
the complexity of the passport issue. On the one hand, the Ministry of Manpower’s position 
on the retention of passports was clear. On the other, labour attaché believed that migrant 
workers understood the financing arrangement before leaving Indonesia. In her experience, 
the large majority of Indonesian labour migrants in Hong Kong accepted the arrangement 
in place of paying recruitment fees upfront in Indonesia. Moreover, she had learned from 
labour recruitment company staff in Hong Kong that migrant workers in possession of their 
passports often disappeared, leaving labour recruitment companies in Hong Kong and 
 
208 
 
 
Indonesia as well as Hong Kong financiers with the cumbersome task of working out who 
owes what.28  
 
For the labour attaché, these considerations posed a perplexing problem: did the fact that 
the loan arrangement gave poor Indonesians access to overseas employment without 
requiring them to pay upfront compensate for its excesses? She acknowledged that the 
recruitment industry reaped excessive commercial benefits because poverty at home, and 
that uncertainty about how their employment would work out, motivated migrants to accept 
the arrangement. As a solution, the labour attaché believed the Indonesian government 
should provide a greater mix of subsidies and credit to intending labour migrants. From her 
perspective, however, this would only work if the Hong Kong administration lowered the 
fee labour migrants pay by forcing labour recruitment companies to charge employers 
more, in line with the Employment Companies Ordinance, which stipulates that migrant 
workers should pay no more than ten per cent of their first monthly wage in exchange for 
recruitment services. At the same time, the labour attaché recognized that a 90/10 split was 
highly unlikely given the fact that the supply of labour migrants is much greater than 
demand by employers, and that the process entails organizing the necessary migration 
documents from two states, such as passports and work permits. On balance, however, she 
believed that moving closer to this division of fees would significantly reduce the problem 
of indebtedness in the system, and perhaps remove the need to use passports as collateral in 
the host country. 
Kuala Lumpur 
The Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur runs a women’s shelter for migrant workers 
who are waiting for their problems to be addressed. Construction of the shelter, which was 
funded by Indonesia’s Coordinating Ministry of People’s Prosperity and a Malaysian bank, 
was finalized in March 2004. The shelter had the capacity to appropriately accommodate 
70 people. However, by November, it was accommodating numbers of migrant workers 
                                                          
28 For obvious reasons, most migrant workers do not admit that they want to cut their contracts short 
when asking for help in recovering their passports. In a small number of cases, they would explain 
that they were unhappy with their current employer and needed their passport to register change of 
employment with the Hong Kong Immigration Department. 
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that rarely fell below 260. While victims of trafficking constituted a small proportion of the 
occupants, most were Indonesian domestic workers who entered the country with valid 
migration documents but then ran away from their employers. Consular officers, including 
the immigration, labour and police attachés, were expected to deal with occupants’ cases as 
quickly as possible to help manage the problem of over-capacity occupation of the shelter. 
As the majority had employment-related issues, this task fell primarily to the labour 
attaché, who lamented that almost as soon as he finalized one case another migrant worker 
in need of emergency accommodation would arrive at the embassy.  
 
The labour attaché’s handling of these particular cases revealed the extent to which his 
thinking determines the embassy’s orientation toward Indonesian migrant labour. He was 
frequently surprised at the speed with which news travels when a bed became vacant in the 
embassy shelter. He initially suspected that a network of consular officers and external 
actors, such as non-government organizations, collaborated to ensure that some migrant 
workers had better access to updates concerning the shelter than others. In interviews with 
occupants, he quickly learned, however, that information about vacancies was disseminated 
by occupants themselves to relatives and friends. Some of those who arrived with the 
expectation of being admitted to the shelter had already run away from their employer and 
were working illegally to support themselves in the meantime. Others had been more 
cautious, waiting until they received news about a vacancy in the shelter before leaving 
their employers. The labour attaché would immediately admit those whose migration status 
had become unlawful but carefully interviewed those who had just left their employers to 
find out whether their case could be handled without them staying in the shelter. 
 
Those admitted to the shelter were presented with two options: remain there until their 
problems were resolved or leave as soon as it was administratively and logistically possible 
to do so. Those who stayed were screened by locally hired staff in the labour section to 
determine a course of action with regard to their complaint. Immigration matters, such as a 
missing passport, were directed to the immigration attaché, while cases involving criminal 
acts, such as physical abuse, were passed to the police section. The labour attaché’s 
mandate was to assist migrant workers address employment-related problems, such as the 
non-payment of wages. His local staff ascertained whether the worker entered Malaysia 
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under the overseas labour migration programme, in which case the labour migrant ought to 
have an enforceable employment contract. Migrant workers who arrived through the 
official programme were also required to hold mandatory insurance policies that offer 
compensation for such situations – although the labour attaché found that this is frequently 
not the case in practice. In the case of migrant workers who travelled to Malaysia through 
informal channels, the labour attaché would seek details of migration intermediaries to 
identify an alternative source of funds to cover the costs of repatriation or remaining in the 
shelter. 
 
Reliance on the limited budget allocated by the embassy for repatriation meant that it was 
not always able to send migrant workers home immediately. In order to get around this 
problem, the labour attaché would work with his counterparts in the embassy to find a 
‘creative’ solution. In one example, he and his colleagues in the police section worked out 
an agreement under which certain categories of migrant workers, such as those who held 
passports that overstated their true age, were classified as victims of trafficking in order to 
gain access to the repatriation component of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM)’s anti-trafficking programme. In most cases, however, the labour attaché succeeded 
in identifying the labour recruitment company or private individual who helped place the 
migrant worker in question in overseas employment. This actor could then be convinced to 
fund costs such as hospitalization and repatriation. However, in order to do so, the labour 
attaché would present the intermediary with evidence that the law had been broken. 
Through demonstrating failure to organize insurance policies and pointing to the mix of 
legal sanctions, which includes fines and prison sentences, for example, the labour attaché 
could coerce them into footing the bill. 
 
The labour attaché used similar tactics when evaluating labour recruitment companies. 
Those that complied with his demands benefited from faster endorsement of cooperation 
agreements and more efficient processing of recruitment requests. Those who resisted or 
refused were added to an informal blacklist, to which the labour attaché referred before 
providing endorsement. The labour section would then scrutinize their applications for 
endorsement much more closely with the view to complicating the process. Labour 
recruitment companies typically expected endorsements on the same day, but labour 
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section staff would take the maximum time allowable to inspect documents, and if they 
turned up deficiencies or inconsistencies, would then return them to the applicant and ask 
that the application be re-submitted once it was in order. Where applications were 
complete, staff would justify a delay in processing on the basis that they wanted to check 
the veracity of items, such as details of cooperation and proposed employers. Non-
compliance with the labour attaché’s demands thus threatened to complicate labour 
recruitment companies’ administrative relationships with government agencies in 
Indonesia, as the endorsement was necessary to legally recruit migrant labour there. For 
this reason, Indonesian labour recruitment companies most frequently agreed to these 
special requests.  
 
The labour attaché also extracted informal fees from Indonesian labour recruitment 
companies. In August 2008 the ambassador decreed that the labour section could charge 
labour recruitment companies MYR 70 (USD 22) for inspecting applications for 
endorsements. According to a labour recruitment company in Indonesia and its business 
partner in Kuala Lumpur, labour recruitment companies were expected to pay an additional 
fee, which in 2010 was calculated at MYR 2 for each migrant worker to be recruited. The 
labour attaché explained that this fee served to ensure that labour recruitment companies 
only requested the number of workers for which they could find work, as grossly inflated 
requests also translated to high informal fees. Further investigation revealed that the 
purpose of the charge was first and foremost to generate a steady flow of income for the 
labour section’s off-budget account, which was used to subsidize migrant worker expenses, 
but also to cover items that could not easily be debited to the embassy’s account, such as 
accommodation and entertainment expenses for visiting Ministry of Manpower officials, 
including the Director for Overseas Placement, Director-General for Guidance of Labour 
Placement and the minister himself.  
 
In addition, the labour attaché had a reputation for dealing harshly with instances where 
Indonesian migrant workers were found stranded at the Kuala Lumpur international 
airports. The conflict between the ministry and the BNP2TKI had exacerbated the situation, 
as it meant that labour recruitment companies could easily circumvent the requirement that 
full travel itineraries for migrant workers be submitted as part of the finalization process. In 
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response to notification from airport authorities that Indonesian labour migrants en route to 
another country lacked onward tickets, for example, he would contact the sending labour 
recruitment company in Indonesia and order them to fix the situation by either repatriating 
migrant workers or organizing the necessary onward travel immediately. As a consequence 
of the labour attaché’s punitive approach, the recruitment industry started to redirect 
candidates that did not conform fully to the programme’s requirements through Singapore. 
He became aware of this practice following conversations with his counterpart there, in 
which she complained that the embassy had started to encounter greater numbers of 
stranded migrant workers at Singapore International Airport. The labour attaché in Kuala 
Lumpur explained his zero-tolerance policy in Kuala Lumpur would not be possible in 
Singapore where the labour attaché lacked control over the necessary administrative 
functions, such as endorsement of job orders. 
Singapore 
As noted in the first section of this chapter, Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore 
must report to the embassy’s labour section as part of the process of renewing or replacing 
their passports. In an interview with one of four locally hired staff, the applicant and her 
employer are required to sign a standard employment contract provided by the embassy. 
This step must occur before they can collect new passports from the immigration section. 
Technical staff are required to ensure that the interview is attended by employers so that 
both parties agree to the Indonesian government’s minimum wage in the presence of an 
embassy official. Domestic workers are also asked to confirm their name and date of birth 
during the interview. During the period examined in this study, routine cases were handled 
by these technical staff, who passed the signed contract to the labour attaché for counter-
signing. When irregularities arose, the migrant worker was referred to the labour attaché, 
who then decided on the best way to deal with his or her case. 
 
The labour attaché claims that the interview process turned up at least two clear cases of 
trafficking each month. The cases mostly involved girls aged between 14 and 16 who had 
been placed in domestic employment using passports that overstated their ages. 
Identification of such cases is not always straightforward because underage migrants, who 
may look older than they really are, work hard to conceal their true age. During an 
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interview, the labour attaché presented me with a binder full of such cases, pointing to the 
most recent one, which involved an individual holding a passport stating she was 23 but 
who was later found to be only 14 years and 9 months old. The discrepancy was uncovered 
when the labour attaché probed into the girl’s education history, asking when she started 
and finished primary school. Employers typically claim that they had no idea that their 
workers were children, arguing that in any case they are not responsible for recruitment and 
documentation processes in Indonesia. Meanwhile, many migrants acknowledge that they 
consented to falsification of their documents because they wanted the work to help support 
their families. The labour attaché generally reported such cases to authorities in Indonesia, 
recognizing that it is usually parents and not the children themselves who give consent.  
 
The labour attaché corresponded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Criminal 
Investigation Section of the National Police, the BNP2TKI, the Ministry of Women’s 
Empowerment and the Ministry of Manpower in Jakarta about such cases. In that 
correspondence, she provided information about the worker’s identity, a brief description 
of the case background, the name of the labour recruitment company in Indonesia that 
organized the documents, and details of the articles of the national migrant worker law that 
may have been contravened. She claimed that the Ministry of Manpower was the only 
agency that responded with any regularity. Unlike many of the other institutions, the 
ministry had the power to discipline labour recruitment companies; moreover, it was party 
to arrangements whereby the National Police defer authority to the Ministry’s civil servant 
investigators in the first instance. These bureaucrats were tasked with establishing whether 
there is sufficient evidence to pursue criminal punishment or if administrative sanctions 
should be applied instead. The immediate effect of these sanctions on the ability of labour 
recruitment companies to operate legally motivated companies to comply with the ministry 
in Indonesia and its labour attachés overseas. For this reason, the labour attaché chose to 
address all correspondence on illegality involving labour recruitment companies to the 
Ministry of Manpower, notifying other state institutions with a carbon copy. 
 
But the labour attaché did not always report labour recruitment companies through official 
channels. In some cases, she instructed company owners to report directly to the Ministry 
of Manpower. In such instances, the labour attaché corresponded privately with colleagues 
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in Indonesia to brief them on the case thereby ensuring that it was handled within the 
ministry, and without notifying the police. This strategy reflected her understanding that 
police officers in the Criminal Investigation Section often accepted bribes from company 
owners in exchange for dropping charges. Labour recruitment companies also complained 
to her that police officers targeted them for extortion by threatening to push for formal 
investigations into evidence of illegal behaviour on their part. Such investigations could 
lead to more extortion and possibly even fines and imprisonment. So mistrusting the 
country’s prime law enforcement agency, she personally conducted preliminary 
investigations, taking note of the labour recruitment companies’ version of events, and then 
deciding how best to report the case.  
 
On some occasions, the labour attaché chose not to respond to the inclusion of false data in 
migrant workers’ travel documents at all. In instances where migrant workers were found 
using counterfeit or misappropriated passports, she mostly chose not to file reports with 
law enforcement. Rather, she coordinated with the immigration attaché, who issued the 
migrant worker in question with a limited validity travel document so that they could 
legally return to Indonesia. Her reasoning for this course of action was twofold. After 
President Yudhoyono’s visit to the embassy in Kuala Lumpur, where he announced that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs would improve service provision to labour migrants, consular 
offices had progressively sensitized their policies to minimize negative consequences for 
migrants. In this case, reporting misappropriated passports would not only cause 
complications with Indonesian authorities, but could also land migrants in a Singaporean 
prison for ten years or result in a fine of up to SGD 10,000 (USD 7,900). On a practical 
level, it was also motivated by the fact that there was no police officer in the embassy at the 
time so there was very limited capacity to appropriately investigate. 
 
Similarly, while she was reasonably consistent in reporting labour recruitment companies 
that transgressed the minimum age requirement for recruitment when first posted, she later 
started to make exceptions. Labour recruitment companies frequently complained that it 
was difficult to find suitable recruits who met the Singaporean requirement that candidates 
be at least 23 years of age. Some migrants even admitted to having approached labour 
recruitment companies with full sets of modified papers, arguing that use of false 
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documents were necessary because barriers to overseas employment were too high. For the 
labour attaché, stories about the lack of employment opportunities at home eventually 
tipped the scale in favour of ignoring some such transgressions. On the basis of these 
encounters, she began to turn a blind eye to the overstating of migrants’ ages when the 
passport bearer was over the age of 18 and appeared to have the level of maturity required 
to deal with the challenges of working in Singapore. She also instituted a ‘two-strikes-and-
you're-out’ system for cases that involved women below the age of 18, giving labour 
recruitment companies a verbal warning for the first transgression and reporting them 
through formal channels for any subsequent violation. 
 
The labour attaché also chose to ignore evidence that passports did not contain true names. 
Migrant workers who have formerly worked in Saudi Arabia frequently hold such 
documents because labour recruitment companies change the names of recruits in order to 
comply with that country’s immigration law, which requires visa applicants to have more 
than one name. Those with only one name tend to add their father’s given name using the 
Arabic patronymic system with bin (son of) or binti (daughter of). But labour recruitment 
companies also change recruits’ identities to avoid detection by authorities. In pursuing this 
issue, she learned about the difficulties of guaranteeing the integrity of migrant workers’ 
passports in informal discussions with colleagues affiliated with the Directorate-General of 
Immigration. The police attaché in another consular office told her that the Indonesian 
National Police’s criminal investigation section prioritized investigations into other more 
serious evidence of illegal practice. Having reported a few cases, she decided that efforts to 
identify and report false names in passports were an unwise use of her time. 
 
Another consideration for the labour attaché was the reality that a formalistic response to 
doctored identities – which she believed were a symptom of systemic failure rather than 
individual deviance – disproportionately penalized Indonesian migrant workers themselves. 
Once in a destination country, migrant workers hold work permits and identity cards based 
on the data recorded in their travel documents. If the embassy were to issue passports 
containing new data, migrants would have to undergo a number of complicated processes 
to change their identity or might even lose the right to work. For the labour attaché, 
confiscating passports and forcing migrants to return home posed an ethical dilemma 
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because of the costly nature of the migration process and the fact that such acts deprive 
poor Indonesians of much-needed work. She also observed with a sense of irony that 
destination countries set high minimum age requirements but turn a blind eye themselves, 
as she had discovered in her dealings with the Singaporean Immigration Checkpoint 
Authority. In her view, it was clear to all that higher age limits simply resulted in greater 
demand for ‘real but fake’ documents in Indonesia because the policy did not address 
supply and demand issues in the labour market.  
 
The labour attaché took a very different stance on cases where migrant workers claimed to 
have experienced coercion in the course of migrating. Occasionally a migrant would 
confide to the labour attaché that she was pressured into registering for international labour 
migration by her father or husband. More frequently, women would explain that labour 
recruitment company personnel had kept them under lock and key in a training centre 
dormitory, ignoring their requests to leave even temporarily. This practice was well known 
to officials in the Ministry of Manpower, and the labour attaché believed that it was only a 
matter of time until labour recruitment companies would be forced to overhaul their 
recruitment strategies. As another example, she pointed to the practice whereby labour 
recruitment companies and the commission seeking fieldworkers gave women financial 
inducements, referred to as ‘pocket money’ (uang saku), in order to convince them to sign 
up. The labour attaché would frequently ask migrant workers how much they received, 
motivated by the belief that financial inducement was a much more serious issue than the 
use of false identities because it induced rather than facilitated international labour 
migration. The payment of pocket money is in itself not illegal. But forcing people to 
migrate is. In handling these cases, the labour attaché gave those migrants the option to 
either report the matter for law enforcement to handle in Indonesia or just return home. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows how discretion on the part of individual officials not only shapes the 
development of administrative systems but individualizes the handling of particular 
problems. A central theme in the Hong Kong case studies is the idea of institutional 
hierarchy. As a junior official in the consulate, the labour attaché had much less say in the  
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development of administrative systems to handle administration of labour recruitment 
companies and labour migrants than her more senior colleagues from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. As a result of their affiliation, foreign affairs officials cared very little for 
the enforcement of regulations from the Ministry of Manpower, which they saw as further 
complicating their relationships with the local recruitment industry. This also holds true for 
the insistence of the Ministry of Justice and Human Right’s Directorate-General of 
Immigration that passports must not be used as collateral for debt, as they are in Hong 
Kong. Yet, despite the labour attaché’s much circumscribed role, formal and informal 
requests to assist with reclaiming passports still land on her desk. Moreover, it is in her 
handling of these cases that the limits of her authority are clearly visible, and through the 
logic of the actions she takes that the individualized dimension of administration becomes 
much more apparent. 
 
The Kuala Lumpur and Singapore examples reveal other influential factors related to the 
exercise of authority. The labour attaché in Kuala Lumpur could play a determining role in 
refining administrative systems in the embassy largely because of his exclusive authority to 
handle matters to do with administration of Indonesian and Malaysian labour recruitment 
companies. This, in turn, enabled him to harness the recruitment industry as an alternative 
resource to subsidize the embassy’s growing responsibilities with regard to the provision of 
emergency accommodation and repatriation of migrants who lacked the funds to return. 
Both this labour attaché and the labour attaché in Singapore were able to secure the 
introduction of a mandatory employment contract for Indonesian domestic workers seeking 
to renew their passports. They did so by going over the immigration attaché’s head and 
working directly through the ambassador, risking a turf war in doing so. This aspect of life 
and work in these Indonesian consular offices hints at a central problem in all settings: 
what happens when control of administrative roles becomes the object of competition? 
Institutions can break down or become erratic, thus prompting even more personalized 
strategies than would otherwise be the case. 
 
This observation brings the case studies in this and the preceding two chapters to full circle 
by showing how the individuals and agencies that comprise the state’s institutional 
architecture operationalize discretion in performance of their public functions. In Hong 
 
218 
 
 
Kong, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the conflict between the Ministry of Manpower and 
the BNP2TKI was largely irrelevant, not least because the relevant administrative roles that 
were performed there either preceded a contested role (such as the issuing of recruitment 
certificates) or because they entailed handling situations that arise once labour migrants are 
overseas. The following chapter, which concludes this study, situates a discussion of this 
phenomenon within the broader context of what is currently known about the realities of 
the Indonesian state.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a sustained analysis of interactions between the principal 
government agencies, units and individuals that comprised Indonesia’s migration 
bureaucracy between 2007 and 2010. The objective was not to assess how these 
interactions affected the state’s capacity to achieve particular objectives, affected the 
profitability of the migration business or changed the experience of labour migrants. 
Rather, it examined the discretion exercised by those individuals who constitute the state in 
the development and implementation of the overseas labour migration programme, paying 
particular attention to historical and geographical context. The thesis systematically 
examined the role that discretionary acts played in administration at the centre, six sites in 
the periphery and three extraterritorial locations. This geographical approach enabled the 
identification of three themes that characterized the context in which discretion was used at 
the time. Focus on contestation at the centre revealed the role that discretion plays in 
producing, sustaining and resolving inter-agency conflict. Attention to accommodation in 
the periphery demonstrated that discretion is a resource that allows the state to function 
when institutional relationships have broken down. Extraterritorial locations exposed the 
extent to which discretion shapes administrative systems and determines implementation 
when institutional capacity and bureaucratic authority are limited.  
 
Regime change and government programmes  
 
This thesis has shown that the fall of Suharto did not result in immediate changes to service 
provision within the overseas labour migration programme. The lion’s share of interaction 
with those who migrate for work involves privately-owned labour recruitment companies 
rather than government officials, meaning that agents of the state had to influence practice 
within the recruitment industry if improved service provision was a priority. It was not 
until 2004 that the state criminalized the worst behaviour of labour recruitment companies 
towards migrant workers, including treating those who stayed in company boarding houses 
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‘inhumanely’ (tidak manusiawi)29 in recognition of systemic failure of the Ministry of 
Manpower to address this problem. As a further measure of redress, the legislature 
transferred administration of labour migrants to a purpose-established government agency 
– the BNP2TKI. Not surprisingly, this sparked conflict between the Ministry of Manpower 
and the BNP2TKI over control of the programme. This study examined the ways that these 
government agencies operate to achieve their institutional objectives following these 
changes to legal and institutional frameworks.  
 
This thesis has shown that the democratizing effects of the 1998 regime change are largely 
responsible for the timing of the overseas migration law. It was the career aspirations of 
presidential candidates, including Megawati Soekarnoputri, the incumbent in the 2004 
election, which brought the state to enact Indonesia’s first statute regulating the 
programme. Although Megawati ultimately lost the election, her efforts to seek re-election 
provided the necessary impetus for the law to be tabled and passed. It is outside the scope 
of this study to evaluate if, how and when the law improved the lot of Indonesian migrant 
workers. However, the thesis has shown that the dispersed control of administration under 
the law precipitated a breakdown in coordination around the state’s dealings with migrant 
labour recruiters and appointed insurers. In addition, the intra-agency competition between 
the newly-formed BNP2TKI and the Ministry attracted a great deal of negative media 
about the administration of the overseas labour migration programme, prompting senior 
government officials to openly criticize and defend policy choices, something not seen at 
any other time in the programme’s 40 year history. 
 
Democratization was not the only form of regime change at play in the years between the 
New Order’s end and passage of the law. After the implementation of decentralization in 
2001, government officials experienced a rise in what they describe as ‘vertical 
institutional egotism’ (ego vertikal instansi), in which government agencies operate much 
like silos with bureaucrats pursuing their institutional objectives at the expense of the 
objectives of others. This added to the existing problem of ‘sectoral institutional egotism’ 
(ego sektoral instansi), in which agencies prioritize their own area of policy interest. 
                                                          
29 Law No. 39/2004. Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, 
103(1h). 
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Successive New Order governments sought to contain this tendency by hand-picking 
managers. The transfer of bureaucratic loyalty from the president to political parties 
disrupted this locus of control, as senior party cadres now act as the primary sponsor of 
top-level bureaucrats at all levels of government. Together with the fact that the state’s 
institutions had been restructured into three distinct tiers with varying degrees of 
interdependence and autonomy, policy-making and implementation have become much 
more complicated processes. In the context of the overseas labour migration programme, 
this meant that the Ministry of Manpower and later the BNP2TKI could not as easily count 
on other government agencies or units to help achieve their policy objectives. 
 
This thesis has shown that decentralization of control forced the central government to 
negotiate closely with lower levels of government around programme implementation. 
These negotiations most frequently involve the lowest tier of government, to which the 
bulk of direct service provision was transferred under the decentralization policy. In the 
main, central government agencies believe that the local tier of government lacks the 
administrative and technical capacity to perform this task. However, it is negotiations with 
the provincial tier – which has the difficult task of acting as an administrative extension of 
the central government while coordinating the administrative activity of autonomous local 
governments within its jurisdiction under the leadership of a directly elected governor – 
that have most influenced the institutional arrangements for the administration of the 
overseas labour migration programme. Provincial governments promised to be a much 
better alternative in most locations because provincial capitals tend to double as 
embarkation points, where labour migrants from towns and villages could have their 
documents processed in a single place. This, however, proved to be little more than an 
exercise in justification of the ministry’s decision to cut the BNP2TKI out of the 
programme, especially as in Jakarta, where the largest number of labour migrants is 
processed, the ministry did not involve the provincial government at all, choosing instead 
to perform those administrative tasks itself. 
 
This thesis has shown that decentralization has also diluted the ministry’s reach in the 
regions. In the past, the ministry circulated personnel from within its own ranks to manage 
its offices outside the national capital. Office managers are now mostly drawn from the 
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provinces themselves. Loss of control over appointments to these positions has removed an 
opportunity for the ministry to forge the informal relationships often essential for 
coordinating policy implementation. Abdul Malik Harahap and his ‘boys’ club’ 
experienced this first hand when they attempted to enlist the provincial governments in 
their plan to isolate the BNP2TKI. By contrast, the BNP2TKI was given a string of units in 
the regions, which embedded it in those places’ administrative landscape. Through 
negotiation with provincial governments, the BNP2TKI was also able to expand its 
institutional presence in other locations, such as Bali and North Sulawesi. In each of these 
places, the BNP2TKI sought to foster collaborative relationships with government officials 
working in different tiers and sectors of the state to enhance its capacity to achieve 
institutional objectives such as bringing more recruitment of labour migrants under the 
programme. The ministry – and most other national government agencies – lacked the legal 
mandate to do the same. 
 
Discretion, place and scale  
 
The transfer of administrative authority and budget allocation to sub-national governments 
since decentralization has sparked great interest in the study of political relations between 
different tiers of government. Historically, the centre-periphery model most accurately 
reflected the arrangement of state institutions in Indonesia. It continues to provide a 
primary frame of reference for discussing decentralization, where the national tier of 
government is described as the centre (pusat) and intermediate and local tiers as regions 
(daerah). This thesis has operationalized the centre-periphery model to describe relations 
between tiers of government in particular sites within the periphery, drawing out the 
different ways that relationships between national, intermediate and local tiers of 
government have evolved across the archipelago. In Jakarta, unresolved tension between 
national and sub-national authorities meant that the ministry ultimately chose not to 
collaborate as part of their effort to isolate the BNP2TKI. But in other provinces it 
attempted to do just that, putting pressure on authorities to lend support to their cause with 
their unique administrative landscapes. As this thesis has shown, these administrative 
landscapes – each the product of history and place – influenced the outcome of this attempt 
in different ways. 
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This thesis has revealed the enormous impact of place-based considerations within 
particular government agencies by examining administrative landscapes as they actually 
are rather than how they are meant to be. Greater distance from an agency’s head office in 
many cases enables local social and economic structures to influence how bureaucratic 
units function. The case studies presented here demonstrate the ease with which regional 
units of national agencies came to prioritize the aims of sub-national government over the 
institutional objectives of their own agency. Indeed, a key finding of this thesis is the extent 
to which institutional breakdown results in the abandonment of vertical hierarchy as an 
ordering principle in a range of administrative sites. This illustrates just how tenuous the 
internal relationships within a particular tier of government can be. The finding confirms 
that the concept of discretion is a key concept in Indonesia’s culture of administration. This 
study points to the myriad ways in which discretion is operationalized within different sets 
of geographic, legal-administrative and political constraints. 
 
This thesis has also confirmed that scale is a social construct, which is open to negotiation, 
and thus dynamic. This is not to say that scale does not matter. It certainly does, as 
demonstrated in each of the case studies. However, it is not always the primary concept 
that defines the complex system of affiliations and purposes of government officials in a 
given context. As distance in centre-periphery relations should also be measured in 
economic, political and other terms, so too must it be when examining scalar relations. This 
study sought to problematize the concept of scale by focusing on the interaction of 
government officials in a range of places around the administration of this particular 
programme. In the performance of their roles, officials negotiated the importance of scale 
with one another in their respective locations. Given this fact, it is appropriate to use actor-
network theory to make assumptions about relations between individuals, units, agencies 
and tiers within government in a way that positions scale as one of many other factors that 
influence the way in which government officials perform their administrative roles. In 
other words, scale does not always determine implementation and may change over time. 
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The discretion-illegality nexus 
 
This thesis has shown that discretion plays a vital role in lubricating the machinery of the 
modern state. Discretion is indeed exercised for personal gain. But personal and 
institutional interests are rarely discrete. The cases presented here demonstrate that the 
pursuit of a promotion or the lining of one’s own pockets does not necessarily preclude 
interest in the welfare of the institution or a genuine desire to pursue its goals. Similarly, 
involvement in illegal activity does not necessarily frustrate institutional objectives. In fact, 
acting illegally might achieve just the opposite. Law is then little more than a tool that can 
assist with the achievement of institutional aims – when its statements about how things 
should be done align with institutional objectives. The usefulness of law diminishes in 
difficult situations, especially where the law and institutional objectives do not align. In 
these situations, the law does not facilitate implementation and so implementers look to 
other means for doing so. It is here that discretion becomes particularly important – 
especially when exercised in conjunction with legal authority, which empowers officials to 
make choices about law. 
 
This thesis has shown that discretion was the primary resource available to bureaucrats 
seeking to perform their roles in the face of institutional break down. Street-level 
bureaucrats charged with responsibility to administer the overseas labour migration 
programme were faced with a dilemma: whose instructions to follow? In Jakarta, the 
Ministry of Manpower performed administrative tasks that duplicated services already 
provided by the BNP2TKI. Regardless, officials in these government agencies followed 
their managers’ directives. By contrast, immigration, police and tax authorities were forced 
to choose between the ministry and the BNP2TKI, even though they were not always 
comfortable with the situation. Outside Jakarta, the ministry wanted provincial 
governments to take over the BNP2TKI’s tasks. In Surabaya, this was no problem at all 
because the provincial government already controlled the administration of the overseas 
labour migration programme. In Nunukan, there was no provincial government authority to 
speak of. As a result, there was no choice to make in either place. But in other locations, 
such as Medan, Semarang and Tanjung Pinang, local government authorities had to choose 
between the ministry and BNP2TKI. In these cases, conflicting institutional objectives 
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added an extra layer of complexity to the context for accomplishing bureaucratic tasks. It 
was discretion that enabled them to continue with their work despite the added complexity. 
 
This thesis has shown that discretion can generate informal institutions that serve as a kind 
of ‘institutional fix’ in the absence of effective formal structures and processes. The various 
arrangements examined here explain in detail how government officials negotiated these 
absences in the face of uncertainty about which central government agency would prevail. 
Together they constitute a set of decisions that aim to free up space for the 
institutionalization of a way of doing things preferred by those tasked with 
implementation.30 These informal institutions may serve to delay the implementation of 
much needed reforms, and such strategic use of legal authority might enable bribery and 
other forms of corruption. But given that personal gain and furthering sectional interests are 
not always detrimental to the government agency concerned, it is necessary to study these 
institutions and the discretion that enables them in order to fully understand how 
government officials to achieve institutional objectives. This focus shifts attention away 
from the modus operandi of illegal behaviour to why it happens. 
 
This thesis has shown that individuals use their legal authority to subvert the substance of 
law, with the effect of widening the gap between the state’s legal and institutional 
structures. On a micro level, it demonstrated that officials in Indonesia exercise a great deal 
of discretion in making judgements about how to treat the law in their work. The risk 
associated with such behaviour is that highly personalized regimes for performing public 
functions may develop, as is evident in the case studies about how labour attachés in three 
different countries did their work. More broadly, the practice lays bare power relations 
between the legislative, judicial and executive branches of the Indonesian state. The 
response of the Ministry of Manpower to the legislature’s attempts at mediation and the 
lengths to which the ministry went in its attempts to subvert a Supreme Court judgement 
expose the extent to which the executive continues to dominate other branches of the state. 
Individual and systemic observations have important implications for those tasked with 
                                                          
30 Brenner, N and N Theodore, "Cities and the geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism"," 
Antipode 34, no. 3: 356. 
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refining Indonesia’s far-reaching reform agenda, as they demonstrate the centrality of legal 
authority and discretion in determining how the state is constituted and imposed. 
 
These findings reveal the complexities associated with implementing national government 
programmes through a diverse network of officials, agencies and tiers of government in a 
large and geographically dispersed country. As the case of the overseas labour migration 
programme has demonstrated, institutional objectives and the private ambitions of those 
who determine them are intricately interwoven and place-specific. The thesis has also 
advanced the debate around the effects of discretion by refocusing attention on legal 
authority rather than illegality. This focus is useful because it centres attention on the 
ability of government officials to make choices, which are what bring different elements of 
the state to become mired in conflict over control of systems and their attending benefits in 
the pursuit of individual and institutional objectives. 
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 District police office, head, Tanjung Pinang, 13 January 2010. 
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 Immigration Office, immigration officer at Dumai Port, Pekanbaru, 21 April 
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 Ministry of Manpower, Head of the Centre for International Cooperation, 
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 Ministry of Manpower, Head of the Sub-directorate for Protection 
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 Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, Assistant Deputy for Protection of 
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 Regional Office for Justice and Human Rights, head, Tanjung Pinang, 4 
January 2010. 
 Regional Office for Justice and Human Rights, head of immigration 
division, 5 January 2010. 
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Sub-national government informants 
 BP2TKI/UPT3TKI, head, Surabaya, 19 December 2008 
 District Office, vice district head, Bintan District, 12 January 2010. 
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 Mayoral Office, vice mayor, Batam, 21 October 2009. 
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 Indonesian consulate, labour attaché, Hong Kong, 2 March 2008 
 Indonesian embassy, immigration attaché, Kuala Lumpur, 21 June 2010. 
 Indonesian embassy, labour attaché, Kuala Lumpur, 4 August 2009. 
 Indonesian embassy, labour attaché, Singapore, 27 July 2009 
 Indonesian embassy, police attaché, Kuala Lumpur, 21 June 2010. 
 
Labour recruitment companies 
 Asia Employment Agency, manager, Singapore, 4 March 2010. 
 Assanacita Mitrabangsa, main director, Jakarta, 13 October 2009. 
 Bina Mandiri, registration post manager, Blitar, 17 March 2010. 
 Jatim Krida Utama, main director, Surabaya, 1 September 2009. 
 Iin Era Sejahtera, main director, Malang, 28 September 2009. 
 Indonesian Migrant Service, main director, Malang, 11 August 2009. 
 One-Accord, owner, Singapore, 9 April 2010. 
 Pinangsiam Karya Utama, main director, Tanjung Pinang, 4 January 2010. 
 Tritama Bina Karya, registration post manager, Blitar, 16 March 2010. 
 
Professional associations of labour recruitment companies 
 APJATI, secretary-general, Jakarta, 13 October 2009. 
 APJATI Jawa Timur, chair, Malang, 11 August 2009. 
 PAPA, vice president, Kuala Lumpur, 7 September 2010. 
 
Other non-government informants 
 Asian Migrant Centre, deputy director, Hong Kong, 5 November 2009. 
 ATKI-HK, chair, Hong Kong, 13 November 2009. 
 Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics, founding president, 
Singapore, 28 July 2009. 
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 Migrant Care (Malaysia), director, Kuala Lumpur, 14 September 2009. 
 Suara newspaper, reporter, Hong Kong, 8 November 2009. 
 
Intergovernmental informants 
 ILO, chief technical advisor for the anti-trafficking programme, 16 
December 2010. 
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Appendix C 
YEAR 
POLITICAL 
PERIOD 
DEVELOPMENT 
1968-
1985 
Economic 
development 
 Suharto becomes President of Indonesia 
 President Suharto appoints Mursalin Daeng 
Mamangung Minister for Manpower  
 The legislature passes Law No. 14/1969 on 
the Important Points about Labour  
 Minister for Manpower Mursalin Daeng 
Mamangung issues Ministerial Regulation 
No. 4/1970 to set up infrastructure for the 
state to administer the recruitment of labour 
for the domestic and international labour 
markets 
 President Suharto establishes a taskforce to 
coordinate export activity to the Middle 
East, which is then expanded to work out 
how to increase migrant labour exports to 
the region  
 President Suharto appoints Harun Al 
Rasyid Zain as Minister for Manpower 
 Minister for Manpower Harun Al Rasyid 
Zain introduces the first regulation that 
licenses migrant labour recruitment 
companies 
 Minister for Manpower Harun Al Rasyid 
Zain introduces the first regulation that 
requires labour migrants to hold overseas 
identity cards 
 Minister for Manpower Harun Al Rasyid 
Zain bans recruitment for overseas 
employment as domestic workers in Saudi 
Arabia 
 Minister for Manpower Harun Al Rasyid 
Zain makes an exception for the Saudi 
Arabian royal family, Indonesian diplomats 
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and senior staff in a few companies so that 
they can employ Indonesian domestic 
workers 
 The export taskforce recommends the 
Ministry of Manpower to develop policies 
and standards for administering 
international labour migration 
 The Ministry of Manpower produces the 
first detailed document with standards and 
policies for administering international 
labour migration  
 The export taskforce convenes an 
interdepartmental discussion panel to 
workshop ideas for enhancing policies and 
standards  
 President Suharto appoints Sudomo 
Minister for Manpower  
 The export taskforce is disbanded and staff 
are recalled to their respective ministries  
 President Suharto approves Sudomo’s 
proposal to establish the Overseas 
Employment Centre (Pusat Antar Kerja 
Antar Negara, Pusat AKAN) 
 Minister for Manpower Sudomo issues a 
regulation that makes migrant labour 
recruitment companies take financial 
responsibility for migrant workers 
1986-
1997 
A different kind 
of intervention 
 Minister for Manpower Sudomo revokes 80 
per cent of licences for migrant labour 
recruitment companies sending workers to 
the Middle East 
 President Suharto appoints Cosmas 
Batubara Minister for Manpower 
 Minister for Manpower Cosmas Batubara 
liberalizes implementation of the licensing 
system for migrant labour recruitment 
companies 
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 Minister for Manpower Cosmas Batubara 
introduces higher standards for mandatory 
training and skills certification 
 President Suharto appoints Abdul Latief 
Minister for Manpower 
 President Suharto approves Abdul Latief’s 
proposal to fold Pusat AKAN into the 
Directorate-General of Guidance of Labour 
Placement 
 Minister for Manpower Abdul Latief 
requires returning migrant workers to 
transit in the city and appoints Oring Jabu 
Jaya to transport them back to their places 
of origin 
 Minister for Manpower Abdul Latief 
cancels the appointment requiring migrant 
labour recruitment companies to transport 
returning migrants back to their places of 
origin 
 Minister for Manpower Abdul Latief 
introduces a regulation that allows ad hoc 
evaluation of migrant labour recruitment 
companies 
 Minister for Manpower Abdul Latief 
delegates more administration to regional 
implementation units 
 Minister for Manpower Abdul Latief 
establishes a state-owned company 
called Binajasa Abadikarya (Bijak) to 
compete with licensed migrant labour 
recruitment companies 
 Minister for Manpower Abdul Latief 
convinces the Directorate-General of 
Immigration to set up a special unit in the 
Ministry of Manpower as part of a one stop 
shop for processing migrants. Corruption 
allegations prompt the immigration unit to 
move office 
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1998-
2006 
The long reform 
 President Suharto appoints Theo Sambuaga 
Minister for Manpower 
 President Suharto resigns and Bacharuddin 
Jusuf Habibie becomes President of 
Indonesia 
 President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie 
appoints Fahmi Idris Minister for 
Manpower 
 Minister for Manpower Fahmi Idris 
Minister appoints non-career bureaucrat 
Din Syamsuddin Director-General for the 
Guidance of Overseas Labour Placement 
 Minister for Manpower Fahmi Idris 
establishes a cross-sectoral structure to 
coordinate other state agencies’ 
involvement in administration of the 
overseas labour migration programme 
 Minister for Manpower Fahmi Idris 
reorganizes the programme’s regional 
implementation units to make them 
subordinate to the Ministry of Manpower 
 Abdurrachman Wahid becomes President 
of Indonesia 
 President Abdurrachman Wahid appoints 
Bomer Pasaribu Minister for Manpower  
 President Abdurrachman Wahid appoints 
Al Hilal Hamdi Minister for Manpower  
 Al Hilal Hamdi appoints career bureaucrat 
Soeramsihono Director-General for 
Guidance of Overseas Placement 
 Al Hilal Hamdi and Soeramsihono allow an 
informal division of administrative labour 
with the Jakarta provincial government to 
evolve 
 President Abdurrachman Wahid is 
impeached and Vice President Megawati 
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Soekarnoputri becomes President of 
Indonesia 
 President Megawati Soekarnoputri appoints 
Jacob Nuwa Wea Minister for Manpower 
 Minister for Manpower Jacob Nuwa Wea 
issues a pro-migrant ministerial decree that 
among other things imposes a cap on 
placement fees that migrant labour 
recruitment companies can charge to 
migrant workers 
 Malaysian authorities deport hundreds of 
thousands of Indonesian citizens. The death 
of deportees in north East Kalimantan 
comes to be known as the Nunukan 
Tragedy 
 A citizen's lawsuit is filed against the 
government for failing to prevent the deaths 
 The government is found to have failed to 
respond appropriately 
 The Jakarta High Court overturns the 
decision that blames the government for the 
deaths 
 News breaks of severe physical abuse of 
Nirmala Bonat, a West Timorese women 
employed as a domestic worker in Malaysia 
 Overseas protection of Indonesian migrant 
workers becomes a platform in the 2004 
Presidential Election campaign 
 Law No. 39/2004, the country's first law 
governing the overseas labour migration 
programme, is passed 
 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono becomes 
President of Indonesia 
 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
appoints Fahmi Idris Minister for 
Manpower 
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 Minister for Manpower Fahmi Idris issues 
re-activates the cross-sectoral structure to 
co-ordinate administration of multiple 
government agencies 
 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
appoints Erman Suparno Minister for 
Manpower 
 Minister for Manpower Erman Suparno 
issues ministerial regulations to assert 
control over the Ministry’s regional 
implementation units 
 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
issues the presidential regulation that 
establishes the National Agency for the 
Placement and Protection of Overseas 
Indonesian Workers (Badan Nastional 
Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia) and abolishes the 
Ministry’s Directorate-General of Guidance 
of Overseas Labour Placement 
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